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I. INTRODUCTION 
Can federal officials be impeached even after they have left 
office? Or do the potential remedies of impeachment-removal, 
disqualification, and possibly others-disappear when an official 
leaves office? To put these questions in perspective, consider the 
following hypotheticals: 
1. The Republican Party wins a series of stunning electoral 
victories and obtains the presidency and a two-thirds majority 
in both houses. The Party decides to deliver the COllI' til' Knlel' 
and impeach all of the popular leaders of the opposition-
many of whom have just been narrowly voted ou t of office-i n 
order to prevent them from fielding viable candidates in the 
next presidential election.' 
2. A federal judge is about to be impeached for gross 
incompetence. Before the House can vote on the case, 
however, the judge resigns and flees the country. The I louse 
sees no practical reason to pursue the judge, but is wary of 
setting a precedent that impeachment Illay be stopped in its 
2 tracks on the whim of the offender. 
3. The Secretary of Defense is discovered to haV(' been 
involved in a complicated bribery scheme during his earlier 
service in another federal post. He finds out that the I louse is 
going to impeach him, but he resigns hours be/exe the vote 
and argues that he is now unimpeachable. The Iiouse wishes 
to proceed in order to disqualify him from federal office and 
take away his pension, to protect its jurisdiction, and to set a 
precedent that the Secretary's nuanced conduct in the bribery 
scandal constitutes an impeachable offense. I 
I. Thi~ is an exaggerated ve...,ion of the attempt by Jeffer'oniall ReplIhli( .,," .tllt·, 
the IHOO elections to remove holdover Federalist jlldges via illlpe.KhllIent. SI'I' EMil' 
FIELD \',\\; TASSEL & PAl'L FI;\;KEL~IA\;, I\II'b\( IIAIILF O~H,:-'''~S 10. !Jl·!l2 (I!I(I!I) 
(describing .Iefferwnian efforts); lee (/LIO P~TER CIIARLES 1-l0FF~,R & :--1.E.l1. III II. 
hIPEAClI\IE\;T I;\; A~fERICA. I 635-IH05. at 151 (I!lH4) (describing impe.l(hmellt 01 
Repllblican William Blollnt a, "opening gambit" in Federalist pl.1I1 to d,\lI".llily .lI1d tilll' 
"ward off potential [Repllblican J candidate,"); 11'1' grnemll)' D,md 1'. ClIrlle. Thl' 
Comllll/tlOn ill Congrrss: nIl' Most Ellllmlgrmi Brallch. /80/-/805.:n WM,~ F(}R~~I L. IHv 
21!1 (l99H) (describingJeffersonian a~ault Oil Federalist jlldgl·~. partklll.lrly tIll ollKh ,"" 
of impeachment), 
2, Thi, is an adaptation of the com mOil ~itllatioll 01 I<-dl',.11 Jll(lgI" ,e"glllllg to 
,I\oid impeachment and the tension betwel'lI the Iiollse', rcllll'tall((' to PIII"'"(' ollelld,'" 
alld it~ COllcel'1I for presen;ng Its power,. Sel' Infra Part VI.A.7. 
3. This i, an adaptation of the case of Secretary of War Wilham Bdkn.lp. III 'h,' 
actual ca.,e. however, Belknap's condu(( was not particlliarly IIl1allced; it did lIot ')( (III III 
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4. In the middle of the President's term, the Secretmy of 
State is caught in a politically charged sting operation. The 
House impeaches the Secretary, and it is obvious that the 
Senate will convict. To help salvage the Secretary's political 
career (bigger comebacks have happened), the President fires 
him minutes before the Senate is to take its vote but 
denounces the "overzealous" Congress and appoints the ex-
Secretary to be a personal advisor and emissary on foreign 
policy issues. The ex-Secretary argues that he cannot be 
convicted because he is no longer in office.' 
Ii 
All of these are examples of potential "late impeachments," an 
attempt by Congress to impeach and U)' a federal official after 
he has left office. There is no simple constitutional answer as to 
whether, in any or all of these scenarios, Congress can pursue a 
late impeachment. The text of the Constitution says nothing 
explicit about the timing of impeachment, neither expressly 
authorizing late impeachment nor ruling it out. Pre-
constitutional impeachment practices in England and America 
included late impeachment but are of uncertain applicability. 
The debates surrounding the framing and ratification of the 
Constitution provide fodder for debate but little clarification. 
Precedent from actual late impeachment cases is favorable to 
late impeachment but is ambiguous. Scholarly opinion, too, is 
generally favorable but divided. In short, tllOugh it has spurred 
heated and detailed debate, the question of late impeachability 
is close and unsettled. 
Regardless of how close the question of late impeachment is, 
however, there can be only one answer.~· Eitller Congress can 
pursue late impeachments, or it cannot. The premise of tllis 
article is that Congress can pursue late impeachments. based on 
analysis of the text, structure, historical underpinnings, and 
precedent of the Constitution's impeachment provisions.b 
a different federal office; and his pension was nO! an issue in h~ impl·.tchuIC.-nt 10011. .~~ 
infra Part VIA5 (discussing Belknap case) and Pan \,II.B. (discussing Pl'll>lOlll.>Mle). 
4. This is a very loose adaptation of the case of Te:GlS Go't'rnur Jallll':!> Fl'rgll.>{)n. 
who resigned just before the judgment against him "~lS pronuunn'd and 1m pUllL,hml'nt 
approved. He was disqualified from fUlllre office, but his "ife \'~l.> ~uun dl'Cll'd gml'rnOf 
based in pan on her promise that she would follow her hll.>band\ -ad\lCl'. - .0;...- "'1m Part 
VI.B.2.c. 
5. One can argue that late impeachment is constillltiunal III {l·n.un lunHl'd C;L~. I 
reject that argument. See infra Pan V.e. 
6. This typology of constitutional argument is taken from PIIIIJI' BOIIIII n. 
CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE CO:'\SnTlIIO:'\ (I9S2). Bubbll! l'llllllll'r.lI .... Ihl' 
different categories of constitutional illlerprt·tation: Ihl' fOllr Il.>l'd hl'fl' (-ll'XIII.II: 
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vVhether late impeachment should be pursued is a wholly 
separate question, and one that is easier to answer.7 In a 
pragmatic sense, Congress will rarely have a good reason to 
pursue late impeachment. Then again, it rarely has cause to 
pursue any impeachment. The impeachment power provides a 
significant incentive for federal officials to behave properly, and 
so the practical importance of late impeachment lies just as 
much in the offenses it prevents as in the ones it redresses. 
In any case, if the Senate had ever been confronted with an 
ex-officer clearly worth convicting, it likely would have convicted 
and settled the question. It is possible, if not particularly 
common, for Congress to possess power that it chooses not to 
use. Late impeachment may prove practical and worthwhile ill 
the future if the offense is heinous enough, if the stakes are 
raised high enough, or if the offender is situated just so. Even ir 
it is not worthwhile, there may be enough members of Congress 
who believe othenvise to force the issue. Because such a case 
would be highly charged, both politically and emotionally, it is 
better to hold this constitutional debate now, with cooler heads 
and purely hypothetical defendants." 
II. IMPEACHMENT BASICS AND THE SIMPl.E ARClfMENTS FOR AND 
AGAINST LATE IMPEACHMENT 
The Constitution gives the House of Representatives the sok 
power to impeach9 and the Senate the sole power to tl)' 
impeachments, with a two-thirds majority required to convicL III 
"historical," "structural," and "doctrinal") and "prudential" interpletatlon. ftI . • It 7. 1111' 
article does not make a prudential argument becallse .uch arglilnent~ are ".1( tII.lted hv 
the political and economic circumstances surrounding the derision" by the I'rlldellll.lh,t 
decision-maker. Jd. at 61. Because this article IS an elTort to argile ill the ah'II.11 t. thcle 
are no applicable "circllmstances" to discllss. Srr mira note R. SOIllI" 11I.1( til .11 
col1siderations are discllssed in Part VIII. infra. 
Bobbitt suggests, somewhat tentatively. adding a ,ixth 1II0de 10 Ihe 1.llIon: III(" 
"ethical" argument that derives decisions from thl" ethos 01 Ihe Alllenc.1II I'ohlv .\,.,. 
BOBBl'lr, 5Ilfrra, at 93-94. Given the uncertain ,tatlls of thi, mode in thl' callOll, II " 1101 
trealed separately here. 
7. See mfra Part VIII. 
8. It is worth stating near the outset that thi. artil-Ie is 1101 aholll illlPI".llllIlIg .1111' 
particular ex-ofIicial. I have argued elsewhere thaI a lall" impeaclllnl"l1t 01 1'1(·"dl'lIl 
Clinton is possible, but those argumenL, are now largdy 1II00t. and .• lmW.IV. WI'II" 
primarily concerned with abstract constitutional principles. Srr Hn.11I Kall." ,\1/(/ \/fI\ 
OUI!": The Constitlltional Case for Post-Presidm/Ull Im/)f(/rhmml. '/l'RIS I (Mar. I. \!OO I ). fI/ 
http://jllri,t.law.pitt.edu/pardonop3.htm; Bri.1II Kall, And .\ta), Out: ""/Jmrhmrllt Should 
/Villain on the TablR for Clmton, NAT'L Pas r (ToronlO) . ./lIne 9. 1999. at A H. 
9. See U.S. CaNST. art. I, ~ 2, d. 5. 
10. See Id. !i 3, d. 6. 
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When the President is on trial in the Senate, the Chief Justice 
presides. II The Judgment" (i.e., sentence) in an impeachment 
case cannot "extend further than to remo\'al from Office, and 
disqualification to hold and enjoy any Office of honor, Tmst, or 
Profit under the United States."I~ The President cannot use his 
pardon power to prevent, preempt, or undo an impeachment:' 
but once impeached and convicted, a person IS stiU subject to 
the regular criminal process." 
The most important constitutional clause conceming late 
impeachability is Article II, Section 4, which states: ~The 
President, Vice President and all civil Officers of the United 
States, shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for, and 
Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and 
Misdemeanors. ,,15 
Those who believe that late impeachment is unconstitutional 
rely very heavily upon this clause. 16 First of aU, they say the clause 
provides for impeaching only" [t] he President, Vice President, 
and all civil officers." "Officer" means "officer," not "ex-officer."I~ 
11. [d. 
12. [d. cl. 7. In my Q\m view, this disqualification dOl" nol .IIT(·n lIlt" com1n', abilll\ 
to sen'e in Congress, because the COllstiltllion use" Ih(' I('nn "oOin'" C'xdll,I\t'h or 
sening in Congress. Su, t'.g., id. § 6, d. 2 ("(Njo Pen.ou holding ;IIIV oOiet' uudC'r lilt' 
United States, shall be a Member of eilher House: (of CougH"'-') duriug hI> (;ollllnu;lIIl:C' 
in Office."); id. art. II, § 1, cl. 2 ("[Njo Senator or Rl·pn-sl·lI\:lIi\·e. or I't'n.t>ll huldillg all 
Office of Trust or Profit under the: Uuile:d Slates. shall bt' appoill\t'd au Elt'nuc.") 
(emphasis added). But others are not so sure-Judge Alet'e lIasling" \\,1> illlpC'adlC'd. 
convicted, but not disqualified; wheu he was ell-cte:d (() Cougn.,.,.. "'IIUt' 'pt'cul:lIt'd Ihal 
he might be disqualified relroaclively. Sri' MICIIAEL J. GERII ·\RD I. 'I'm. Fl m.R.\L 
IMPEACHMENT PROCESS 60-61 (2d ed. 2000). 
13. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, d. I; Briau C. Kah. :-':Olt'. P,mio" .\Ir?: nit 
Constitutional Case Against Presidmtial SrlfPardoll$. \06 Y\Lt. LJ. 779. 7!l:Hl6 (1996) 
(explaining broad interprelation ofimpeaclunent excC'plion 10 pardon pu\\·C'r). 
14. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, d. 7. 
15. [d. at art. II, § 4. 
16. Those who have written againsl lale impeachabilil\' IllcIlIti(' jll>l«,(' jo .... ph SlUr.. 
see infra Part VILA; a significalll minorit\' in lhl' Sl'nall". Vt' /II/m I';Jn \'1..\; ;lIId 
commentators, see El.E.\.'10RE BL·SIl:>:ElJ .. CRI~IF.S. FOIJJt_'>. A~ll ~IISH)RIl 'L'>: 'I'm 
FEDERAL IMPEACHMEl'.'T TRL\LS 16 (1992); Robl'rt C. S\('III·. :'I:OIt'. f),ji"IIIg IIrg" Cmnn 
and Misdemeanors: A Coli for Start' Drcisis. 15 J.1.. 8: POI .. :~09. :~:IH (1999) (1IIl"lIl1olllllg 
"rule" that "fonner federal officers (canjnol be impl"acht'd"); jOI'gC' E. SOl""', lmfxadr 
Clinton? Why Not [mpmdr OJ.?, jL'Rlsr (~Iar. I. 20011. III 
http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/parnonop-1.hllll. HolTer and HlIlI "'t'1I1 \0 ;l\SlIlIIC' Ih;1I bIt' 
impeachment is inappropriate as well. Srr HOFFER 8: III U .• wpm nolC' I .• 11 257 
(regarding Blount case as federal precede 111 againsl lalt' illlp('achabilll\'). 
17. Throughout this article, tilt' tenn "chil officl'rs" will bl' 11S('d ;l, ;1 "lIch·aIl 
including not just federal chil oOicers blll also 1Ill' Pn-sidl'lI\ alld \'in' I'r<">l(ll'n\. 
Technically this may be incorrect. as tht' Constillllion disllngtll,hl'S Ih(' I'r<">ldC'1I\ amI 
Vice President from chil officers. Article II. § -1 dol'S 1101 S:I\ "all otlrrr CJ\,I uflin·r.: .1£\C'r 
all. The distinction appears 10 be Ihal tht' Prt'sidenl and \'in' I'r<">ldt'1I\ ;Ut' C'lt"nC'd. ,u 
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As one lawyer, speaking in the midst of an actual late 
impeachment, put it: "A half-grown boy reads in a newspaper 
that the President occupies the White House; if he would 
understand from that that all Ex-Presidents are in it together he 
would be considered a very unpromising lad,"IH 
The second part of the classic argument against late 
impeachment is based on punishment. There is no way to 
"remove []" an ex-officer "from Office" as these critics say Article 
II, Section 4 requires, I" If Article II, Section 4 applies to ex-
officers, they contend, then its removal provision makes no 
sense-not a conclusion about the Constitution and it<; Framers 
that one should make lightly,20 In a broader sense, some critics 
have argued, impeachment is not about punishing individuals 
anyway; it is about protecting the office from bad occupants,ll 
Under this theory, once an offender is out of orficc-by 
whatever means-no proper purpose for impeachment 
22 
remaIns, 
The third part of the argument, a reductio (ul absurdllm 
logically derived from the first two, is that any interpretation or 
Article II, Section 4 permitting late impeachment must permit 
any impeachment. To these critics, the only interpretive choices 
are either limiting impeachment to sitting officeholders or 
U.S. C01';51 , art, II,!-i I, c1. I, while civil officers of the lfnited State, art' cOlllllli'SIOII('d hy 
the President, see id. !-i 3. On the other hand, the Constitution refns repeatedly to the 
President and Vice President as holding "office." See, e,g .. /(/. at art. I. !:i :{, rI. :,: /(1 .• 11 .\11 
II, !-i I, c1. 1,5,8; id. at amend. XII. 
18. CO:'-ll:RES510)';AL RECORD CO)';TAI)';I)';(; TIlE PROCFFI>I:'-I(;~ OF I lIE S~,~ \ I F SI rI I~(, 
FOR TIlE TRIAL OF WILLlA~1 W. BELK1';AI', LHF SECRnARY OF WAR 71 «;oV('lnlll('1I1 
Printing Office, Washington 1876) [hereinafter BEI.K~AP TRIALJ (.11 gUlllell1 01 dekll'e 
counsel); acrord Souss, supra note 16 ("The word 'Pre,ident' appears 14 oth('1 111111" III 
Article II, and in evel]' sillgle case it is undi'puted Ihat it refers to the per,oll S('I"Vlllg ." 
President, 1I0t to a former Presidellt:): BEI.K),;,\I'TRL\I., IIlpm, at 1:~2 (oplllioll of S('II.llol 
Boutwell); if. it!. at 40 (recording ab51lrt!um suggesllon by del('II,e (o\lmd III 1.lle 
impeachment case that trials of former presidellt.' would have to he pn',i(kd O\"{'I hI 
chief justices). 
19, This leaves open the question of what to do with '0111('011(' who h.I' lelt Oil(' 
federal office but who is currently holding another. Should ,uch a pel\OII-who " .111 
officer, after all-be susceptible to illlpeachment for offen,eo; cOlllnlltted III hi, »1('\'1011' 
office? See iI/Ira Part V.E. (discllssing different 1Il0deb 01 illl»eachahility .lIId II ('.11111('111 01 
offenses in former offices). 
20. See. e.g., iI/Ira note 355 and accompanying t('xt (Iklkn.lp (."('): III/III 11',1 
accompanying note 499 Ullstice StOI]'); Souss, wpm note Iti. 
21. See, e.g., Jonathan Tllrley, "From Pillar 10 POll": 'Ole I'rOlfClIl/{J/t (1/ ;\ IIII'I/{ 1/11 
Preridrnts, 37 AM. CRI~1. L. REV. 1049, 1052 (2000) ("Impeachml'nt Sl'rvl" .1 (iIstlll( t, nOIl-
punitive function. The Impeachment C1ausl' is designed to proll'rt thl' olli( (' 01 till' 
pre~idency . . . :). 
22. Srr, e.g., //lIra text accompanying note, 500-0 I. 
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ignoring the mention of "officers" and "remov[al]" and 
extending impeachment to all manner of private citizens. In 
other words, they see no principled constitutional basis to 
distinguish between private citizens who used to hold office and 
those who did not.23 
That, III short, IS the simple argument against late 
impeachment. (The complicated argument against late 
impeachment consists of various rebuttals to the argument in 
favor of late impeachment, and thus will emerge in pieces in the 
remainder of this article.) Unsurprisingly, given the closeness of 
this question, the argument against late impeachment is not 
unreasonable, and it has attracted significant historical and 
scholarly support.24 Nevertheless, it also has problems-textual, 
structural, historical, and precedential-that in the end tip the 
constitutional scales against it. 
The argument Jor late impeachment is, relatively speaking, not 
as simple. It has several parts, each of which will be developed in 
its own Part of this article. A brief summary before embarking is 
useful. Textually, the Constitution does not address the 
appropriate timing of impeachments, and those readings that 
suggest it does are flawed.:!!; Structurally, late impeachment 
provides a more coherent and sensible framework for the timing 
of impeachment. Barring late impeachment would weaken the 
deterrent effect of impeachment and would allow malfeasors 
and Presidents to nullify Congress's impeachment powers in a 
way that is incompatible with the Constitution's structure.~' 
Historically, late impeachment was practiced before (and 
during) the drafting of the Constitution. but unlike other 
questionable aspects of impeachment. it was not criticized in the 
pre-constitutional era or explicitly trimmed back in tlle final 
document.2i Finally, doctrinally, tllere is subsequent 
precedential support for late impeachment. not the least of 
23. See, e.g., Souss, supra note 16 ("Inslead of impeaching Ih ... fonn ... r i'residl"lII. win 
not impeach acquitted murderer OJ. Simpson. whos ... personal apprm'll r.lling~ ;Irl" C'\l"n 
lower than Mr. Clinton's? Ridiculous. you say? Well. nOI quile. if,,· ... us ... Ihl" S;lIl1l" flawl"d 
logic being disseminaled by those who claim Illat a fonn ... r offic ... r of Ih ... L·lIil ... d StaId is 
subject to impeachmenL~); infra note 356 and accompall~illg leXI (Bdkllap GISt."). 
24. See, e.g., infra Part VIA (historical suppon); nOI~'S 49(}'501. 511·12. :,18. and 
accompanying texI (scholarly support). 
25. See infra Part IV. 
26. See infra Part V. 
27. See infra Part III. 
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which is the fact that the Senate once ruled specifically that it 
had jurisdiction over a late impeachment trial.2H 
None of these arguments, alone or together, can conclusively 
prove that late impeachment is constitutional. The arguments in 
favor of late impeachment have caveats and flaws. Remember. 
this IS a close constitutional case. Nevertheless, the 
constitutional case for late impeachment has more strengths 
and fewer flaws than the case against it. 
III. HISTORY 
While it is ordinarily proper to begin a constitutional 
argument with text and structure, in this case it is useful to 
begin with history. The history of impeachment practice will 
shed light on the meaning of the word "impeachment," which is 
important for textual understanding. Specifically, pre-
constitutional history demonstrates that impeachment is limited 
to public offenses and offenders, refuting the concern that 
allowing late impeachment would mean allowing the 
impeachment of any private citizen. This history also sheds light 
on the structure of constitutional impeachment, which is 
important for structural understanding. History shows the 
importance of the deterrent effect of impeachment, of which 
late impeachment is an important structural component. At the 
same time, history also provides independent evidence-it 
reveals that allowing late impeachment is feasible, desirable. and 
precedented. 
A. English Impearhment 
English impeachment is the ultimate foundation of American 
impeachment.!!,l To be sure, American impeachment in l7H7 was 
also influenced by colonial and state experiences,"' but English 
impeachment informed those colonial and state experiences. 
2H. Sff mfra Pan VI. 
29. SrrTm: FEDERALIST No. 65, at 397 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Ro's,t", ,·d . 
19(1) (referring to British impeadllnent as "[tlhe model from which the idea 01 th,' 
institution [American impeachmentl h'L' heen horro\ved"); IPf fill() RAOl't H~,R(,~ R, 
hIPf.,\CII\IE:\T: TilE CO:\SHrllTIO:\AL PROIIU,~IS 3-<1, 217 (197:\) (dncrihing Fngli'h 
influences on American impeachment); GORDO:\ S. WOOD, eRE,\ ItO:-.l OF III~ I\M~ R(( ,\:--; 
REPllILlC 177G·17H7, at 141 (1969) (descrihing Engli'h Whig roots 01 I\III("I(.ln 
impeachment) . 
30. Sff HOFFER & Hn,L, Ill/'ra lIote I. .11 2(iH (.11 guing that coloni.,1 .IIHI 't.lt,· 
impeachment precedellts "were far mon' important III inllll('ncing kd('r.11 1.lw th.II' 
English examples"). 
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and it further provided parallel precedenrs for the federal 
Framers to consider. 
Impeachment was practiced in England sporadically from the 
fourteenth century to the early nineteelllh celllufY." The hL<;t 
significant burst of activity occurred in the sevenleemh and early 
eighteenth centuries; impeachmenrs slowed LO a trickle by the 
1720s and cease to be discussed after 1806.'~ 
In essence, English impeachment was a criminal proseclilion 
that began in the House of Commons instead of before a grand 
jury and that was tried before the House of Lords instead of the 
criminal courts. Because of this unique SU'ucture, it was directed 
particularly at public officials and public offenses. 
Initiating prosecution in the House of Commons rather than 
through a regular grand jury was not unique to impeachmelll; 
there was also the bill of attainder, in which Pariiamem would 
pass ad hoc legislation to punish an offender. Because a bill of 
attainder was a legislative act, however, it required the approval 
of both Parliament and the King.~~ By conUClst, impeachmem 
was a judicial process in which the House of Lords had the last 
word and the King had no voice. Impeachmem was also less ad 
hoc and developed its own common law of sorts." 
As impeachment did not require royal approval, it became a 
popular mechanism in the seventeenth century for Parliamelll 
to control the King's high officers.~' Pariiamem could not 
control the King directly-other tllan extra-legally-but it could 
impeach and convict his subordinates. Parliament's struggle to 
assert its authority over the King tllrough impeachment came to 
a head in 1679. In that year, King Charles II pardoned the Earl 
of Danby in order to preempt Parliament's investigation of the 
King's questionable dealings; Parliament responded shortly 
thereafter by limiting tlle pardon power to prevem such 
preemptive strikes in the future.:<f' However, the rise of the 
31. See BERGER, supra note 29, at 1·3 (sullllllari7jng Engli,h 11II»,·.ldllllt·llIlmlOn). 
32. See]. Hampden Dougherty. /l1lierml Lllnrlaliolu IIjJol1/mprndllllrl1l. 2:~ y.\U LJ. (;0, 
68-69 (1913) (giving chronological breakdown of English illl»t'adllll,·nb). 
33. See BERGER, slIpra note 29, at 28 (disc\L~ing attaind"r and n"llIin'IIIt'1lI "r ru\~11 
assent). 
34. See 4 WILLJA.\I BL-\CKSTONE. CO~I~IE::-'TARIES *259 ('tating that "'IIIIt' .lItilllHlr .... 
are new laws, "an impeachment before the lords b,· th,' COIllIllOII' of Gn'at Untillll, 111 
parliament, is a prosecution of the already known and estilbli,llt'd law-I. 
35. See WU.LIA..\I R-\Wl..E, A VIEW OF TilE CO:-l~TI nTIO' OF lilt l''''lnll SJ \Jl." 210 
(Da Capo Press 1970) (2d ed. 1829) (discussing illlpeadull"m .111<1 lad-. of J()\~11 cumrul). 
36. See il1fra text accompanying notes 258-260. 
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parliamentary impeachment power signaled a corresponding 
weakening in the independent power of the Crown and thlls, 
paradoxically, a decline in the need for impeachment. Once 
Parliament had cemented its control, and once the cabinet 
became responsible to the government rather than the King, 
there was much less reason to impeach anybody.<7 
Even though reining in the King's ministers was the most 
significant use of impeachment, Parliament could and did 
impeach private cItIzens. English impeachment was not 
technically limited to public offenses or public offenders. 
Anyone (except the royal family) could be impeached, in 
essence because Parliament could do whatever it wanted (except 
to the royal family) .IH By the time of Blackstone in the mid-
1700s, however, the well settled rule was that a commoner could 
only be impeached for "high" offenses (i.e., those against the 
state) and that only peers could be impeached for both public 
and private offenses. 1'1 
The impeachment of peers for private misconduct was based 
on the fact that the ordinary courts were not equipped to tl)' 
such significant defendants-peers required, quite literally, a 
jury of their peers. III As for the impeachment of commoners, the 
limitation of parliamentary jurisdiction to public offenses was 
significant. One must remember that Britain does not separate 
its powers; impeachment trials were held before a judicial 
body-the House of Lords-that sat as a court in other sorts of 
cases as well. II What made impeachment cases special was that 
the prosecution was directed by the House of Commons, the 
"grand inquest" of the nation for offenses against the statc. ll For 
3i. See HOFFER & Hel.l., supra note I, at 28 (de~cribillg rise and fait of Impe<l( hlll('IIt 
in England); lee also Theodore W, Dwight, Tna/IT)' Im/lnlrhmml, !i A~t. L. RH .. 2':'7, 282 
(new series) (lS!ii) ("There is no poizlira/ reason for impeachment ,It the plt"ellt tllll('. 
as the power of the Commons is never resisted by a miniMer or the Ex('clltiv('. III fa! t. It 
may be said in a representative government, that tht' absoillte ('('"at ion of IIl1pe,\( IIIII('IIt' 
indicate5 that the legislathe department ha~ trillmphed over the t'X ('C II II\'(' ,lIId III, 
agents."). 
38. HOFFER & Hl·l.L, supra note I, at 4 ("[TJhe Commons cOllld imp(',1( h ,111\,011(' III 
the realm except, perhaps, the royal family."). 
39. See 4 BlJ\CKSTO:-'E, SIt/Ira note 34, at "'259-!iO. Blackstolle nH'ntloll('d th,lt 
commoner~ cOllld not be impeached for capital ol1("nse ... bllt provided ,I cOllntel exalllple 
involving an impeachment for high tre'L50n. Id. at *2fiO n.2. 
40. See iii. at *260-fi I. 
41. HOFFER & HCLL, lupra note I, at:~ (describing Jlldicial role of 1101I't' of 1.00d" 
which continues to this day). 
42. 1~'K' 4 BL\CKSTO:-';~:, Ill/Ira note 34, at *259 (defining impt',lChmt'nt ," ",I 
presentment to the mo5\ high and 'llprelllt' cOlin 01 Criminal 11I1I"h! tUlII hy tht' 1Il0,t 
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mere offenses against the peace by mere commoners, the 
regular judicial process was adequate. 
For reasons of national institutional SU'ucture, then, 
impeachment was used to prosecute public offenders or public 
offenses, cases that "the ordinary magistrate either dare[d] not 
or [could] not punish."4s 
By 1787, English impeachment had further narrowed in 
scope. For over a century, "impeachment [had] c[o]me to stand 
for ajustifiable concern among the Commons for misconduct in 
high places."H The last (and anomalous) impeachment of a 
common private citizen was that of Doctor Sachevercll in 1709 
for sedition.45 Even before Sacheverell, virtually all GL'iCS involved 
either treason by peers or, more commonly, mismanagement by 
government officials.46 To the extent that impeachment had 
been used in the memory of anyone living in 1787, then, it was 
for cases of public offenses by public figures. H 
Late impeachment was never a disputed issue in England. 
Initially, the bounds of impeachment were largely unlimited, 
and timing was no exception. Late impeachment was only an 
solemn grand inquest of the whole kingdoll1"); 2 JOSEI'II STORY. CO\.'U" I.\RU-', 0' nit 
CONSfInmON OF THE UNITED STATES 23i (Boston, Hilliard. Gr.IY. &: Co. H;:~:~) (quulIng 
Blackstone's successor Wooddeson that Parliament and 1I0t "ordman .ribulI.lb" .Irc 
equipped to deal with ·political" offenses). The "!,'T:md inqut"St" Iallguagc rcnt~ III 
discussions of impeachmenL Su, r.g., illfra 1I0te 2i6 alld tcxt a("("oll1p.I\I\;lIg lIot"" S:-'. Si, 
and 302. 
43. 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 34, at *260-61. B1acl-slOllt' ,,~'" 'pcaJ,.lIIg hcrc ullh of 
impeaching public officers. Se£ also BARO~ DE MO!\'TJ-:.sQl·IEl', Tilt: SI'IRII OF lin. L\\\'~. 
book 11, ch. 6, at 159 (Thomas Nugent trans., Hafncr Publishillg COll1pam 19·19) (I i·IS) 
("It might also happen that a subject intmsted ,,;th .ht' adlllinistr:llioll of public i1ff;l1~ 
may infringe the rights of the peopk, and be guilty of crilll"" which thc ordlll;\n 
magistrates either could not or would nO! punish:). Justin' (alld Fr.l1ncr) J;l\ncs WiMn 
made the same point in his famolls V.clum; 011 JAIl' in I i91 . . w I TilE WORk,,> OF J\'U~ 
WILSON 426 (Roben Green McCloskt'y t'd., 196i), at'mlabll" III hllp: " pr~ 
pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/al_2_5sI5.hunl ("Wt' lilld Ihc WIIIIIlUIU 
appearing as the grand inquesl of the nation, aboul Iht' lallt'r t'lId uf Iht' rt'ign uf f.d"~Jr(1 
the thinl. They then began to exhibil accusations for Crilllt.,. and nllsdclI\cano~, ;tg~III"'1 
offenders who were though I 10 be OUI of Ihe rt'ach of Iht' ordinan' pO"'t'r of thc 1;\1\,"), 
44. HOFFER & HULL, supra note I, al 6 (charnClt-riljng Englil>h IInpcachlllt'1II frolll 
1650s onward). 
45. See UL at 4 (describing Saclle,'erell case). 
46. See UL at 8 (describing IWO ~wt'll-dt'lined" calegonl'" 11110 "llIch ;tll 
impeachments fell after early I iOOs). 
4i. See 2 RICHARD WOODDESO~, A S\'SrE~IATIC-\L "lEW OF !lit L\\\-.., ()~ E.'I.L\"1l 
*601 (London, Payne li92) (~A1llhe king's subjects art· impt·;lchablt· III parlt;tlllclII 
. Such kinds of misdeeds however as peculiarly injurt' Iht' COlI\lIIoll\,'calth b\' Ihc abl~ 
of high offices of truSt, are the mosl proper. and ha\t· bl·t·1I Ihl' IIlOSI \\Sual grouJI(b for 
this kind of prosecution."); BEUG-:AP TRIAL, supra 1I01t' I H. al 109 (O)lIlIlOIl of s,,1I;l\or 
Mitchell) (making similar historical poilll and aT'!,'lling Ihal Alllt'lican IInpt';tchlllt'1II 
incorporated English impeachmelll as ilexislt'd in liSi,lI<l1 l:ii6). 
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Issue if the defendant was an officeholder. Additionally. 
punishments upon conviction in an impeachment court wcre 
severe-loss of property and even death werc not 
uncommon IX-and so punishment in impeachment cases was 
not mooted if the target left office. I" But late impeachmcnt 
remained as a sensible option even as impeachment becamc 
more focused on public offenses by public oflicials, and the 
punishments became more restrained.-" Impeachment was more 
about creating a culture of accountability than it was about 
removing bad men from office, which could be accomplish cd by 
other means anyway, and late impeachment exemplified this 
fact.'·1 
Lord Chancellor Macclesfield was impeached and convicted 
for bribery in 1725, after he had left oflice.-,2 After that, no 
public officers were impeached'" until 1786, when impeachment 
proceedings began against Warren Hastings, the first (;overnor-
General of India, for his conduct in that post.·" Like 
Macclesfield, Hastings had already left office:'-' but this hlCt was 
not an issue-accountability was. After several articles of 
impeachment against Hastings were approved over a pcriod of 
more than a year, the House of Commons impeached Hastings 
on April 3, 1787:'" shortly before the constitutional convention 
began in Philadelphia on May 25th. The trial in the 1·lousc or 
48. .\ee HOFFER & III Ll., HI/ml note I, ,II :~ (dt'~(Tihing Engli.h impl"u 1IIIIt'IIt 
punishment.". 
49. Cf il/fm Part V.B (discus.,ing disqllalilic,lIioll in American iml'e,u h!llent). 
50. Lord Chancellor Macde~lield, for illstallce, was I elllO\ed lrom ollil I' (llot the 
one he walo being impeached about) ,md lint'd £30,000, IloFFER & III Ll., III/,/(/llote 1,.11 
8 (de~cribing ~Iacdeslield caM'). 
51. Cf /IIfm Part V.A (discus,illg ,\Ccolllltabdit) ,lIld detl'lTI'lIt elkl I 01 
impeachment). 
52. See 16 TIIO\lAS B.\\1.\' HO\\'~J.l., A COMPU n. COLI FCItO:-J OF SIAn. rRIAI.~ 7(;7· 
68 (LOlldoll, TC. Hansard (816). 
53. The 011 I} other case in the interim was that 01 j.\('obite cOII'pn<ltOl [.OId [.O\.lt, 
who wa, impeached, conyictt'd, ,md executed lor high tn'a"", in 17·1(;. I It- W.I' .1 1'1,(,1, 
not a pn\'ate citi/t'n, but ht' W,L' 1I0t a millbter 01 gO\t'ntlllent. II" tli.ll" 11'1'01 ted .It 18 
HOWELL, SII/Jlfl note 52, at 529·S58. 
54. See A. ~J~:R\'Y~ D.\\,I~_~, SIR,\:"CE D~.~II'''·: A BIO(,R,·\PI" OF WARR~:-' [[,\~,,~(,~ 
373-74 (1935) (discussing in~tigatiol1 oJ impeachment pron'('ding' ,Igaimt [[."tlllg' hv 
Edmund Burke). Oayies's book i, unabaslH'dly pro-Hastings but rl'l,lIl" th(' I hlOllOlog\ 
of e\'enL~ clead}. See mfra Part [[I.e.!.c (dis(,IIs.~ing tht, American Fra 1111' ,,' VI('W' on th(, 
Hastings case). 
55. Hastjngs had re~ign('d hi~ P()~t in 1785. 'iee [)A\,I~~, HI/lYanote :d, .It :n·I,:F •. 
56. See uf. at 383; ,re aL50 uf. at :177-S:~ (diM'w"ing illlpeadlll\('nt prol ('('dillg' III 
Hot"e of Commons). 
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Lords proceeded sporadically, until 1795, when Hastings was 
acquitted.57 
After Hastings, there was only one other impeachment in 
English history, and it too was a late impeachment. In 1806, 
Lord Melville was impeached for acts committed in an oflice he 
had held decades earlier; like Hastings, Melville was acquitted 
but not due to any suggestion that the impeachment was 
untimely.58 
To summarize, by 1787 English impeachment was understood 
as being directed against public offenses by public offenders, for 
which Parliament was the proper venue for prosecution. The 
goal of impeachment was public accounulbility, not simply 
punishment. Late impeachments, such as those against 
Macclesfield, Hastings, and Melville, were thus perfectly 
• 59 
appropnate. 
B. Pre-Constitutional Amenmll Impl'fldlllletll 
In the eighteenth centuI)', impeachments were relatively 
common in the colonies, and later in tlle states. Peter Charles 
Hoffer and N.E.H. Hull have argued convincingly that American 
impeachment practice was deeply rooted and widely practiced, 
and it developed its own characteristics independently of the 
(comparatively fewer) contemporaI)' English cases.'" Moreover, 
the impeachment power in the states was generally rooted in 
textual authorization from the states' constitutions. The colonial 
and state experiences with impeachment tlms directly informed 
the federal constitutional impeachment power. Although late 
impeachment was less finnly established in pre-constitutional 
America than it was in England, it was known and accepted. 
1. Colonial and Stene Cases 
Among the defining characteristics of impeachment on this 
side of the Atlantic was its unifonnly public character: Even 
57. See id. at 411-12 (recounting Hastings's acquill;Il). 
5S. See BELKNAP TRIAL, supra note IS. at 54 (discussing ~kl\il1<- C;~ dunng an 
American late impeachment tri;ll). The lengthy Mel\;lle G'-'l' is reported III 2<) II()wUj~ 
mpra note 52, at 549-1482. 
59. See BEL&'IAP TRL-\L, mpra note IS. at 363 (opinion of Senator l'un,'uoc:i) (C'Il1ng 
Macclesfield, Hastings. and Mel\;lle precedents). 
60. See HOFFER & Hl'LL. supra note I. at 268 (a'1.ruing thaI culum;1l ;md ,tate 
precedents "were far more important in inflm'neillg federal law Ihall Engll>h 
examples"). This is a point that peno.des HolTer and Hull's oouk, 
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more so than in England, private citizens were only pursued 
through the regular criminal process or attainder but not 
impeachment, which was reserved for officers."1 
When the colonies broke formally from England and wrote 
their own constitutions, they made these limitations on 
impeachment clear. In every state where the legislatur<:' had the 
power to impeach, private citizens were excepted,b2 By l7H7, 
then, "impeachment" had come to mean a process for the 
legislature to inquire into and prosecute public offenses by 
public officials. 
With the exception of Pennsylvania, no colonial legislature 
actually had authority to initiate and try impeachmen ts,''' 
Parliament in England was the proper body to initiate and try 
such cases, and so colonial impeachment constituted a 
usurpation of sorts."1 Nevertheless, the need to hold public 
officials accountable-and oust them if necessary-occasionally 
became too important for colonial officials to leave to distant 
England. Hoffer and Hull have found sixteen cases of 
impeachment, near impeachment, or quasi-impeachment in the 
years between 1635 and 1776.":; 
When the colonies declared themselves independent states 
and wrote constitutions, most of them provided an 
impeachment power for their respective legislatures. 
Impeachments picked up where they left ofT, holding public 
officials accountable for their public offenses. 
6 I. See ld. at 14 ("From the first . . . the Amt'riran rases ~howt'd prolloulH"('d 
departures from English precedent. The Ameriran~ a("cu~ed W('I (. 111\'0111.11>11' 
officeholders .... "). Bill lee ld. at 28-30 (describing Massarhu~ett" caM' 01 111('1 ( h.1II1 
captain Samuel Vetch. whose rase was labeled an attainder bul whirh 1"("('lIIhkd 
impeachment in some respects). 
62. Cf. illJra Part III.B.2. 
63. See, e.g., FRA~n: OF GOVER:-i~IE;\;'1 OF P~:;\;:-iWI.VA;\;I" OF MAY :>, I (ill2, .It !:i XIX 
("[TJhe General Assembly shall continue so long a~ may be nl't'dlul to Imp('.I( 10 
criminals . . . ."); see also CIIARn:R OF PRIVI[.E(;~~~ OF OCI OilER 211, 170 I, at !:i 2 (gl.llIlIlIg 
Assembly the power to impeach "criminals"); FRA\IE OF COVER:-1ME:-11 OF I'~;\;N"""I V,\NI,\ 
OF NOVDIBER I, 1696 (same); FRA~I~: OF GOVER:-I~I~::"I OF I'E:-l:-1WI.V,\NI.\ OF F~ IIRI' \R' 2, 
1683 (same). 
The Mas.'achusetts judicial code provided before 1684 for "impeachlllt'III," hili hy Ill!' 
General Court. See HOFFER & i-ilTLI., supra note I, at II, 28. 
64. See HOFFER & Hl'l.l., JIl/)ra nott' I, at 9 ("Americans lirM adopt('d illlp('.1( Iom('1I1 
because thev grasped its ulility and were 1101 told 10 desiM, and rontillued to illlpl'.1I h 
even when proprietors and crown rOllncillors explicitly told the roloni'ls to '101' "); 
BEL"''',\!' TRIAl., supra note 18, at 149 (opinion 01 Senator Dawes) (discu~"lIg illh('I('1I1 
colonial power to impeach). 
65. See HOFFER & HCLl., supra note I, OIl 15-56 (describing wlonial imp('.lchllll'lIt 
cases, as well as others that re~embled impeachment). 
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It was in the pre-constitutional state period that late 
impeachment first occurred in America. In 1781, ex-governor 
Thomas Jefferson of Virginia was subjected to preliminary 
impeachment proceedings for his conduct in office, though in 
the end he was not impeached.66 In February 1787, Vermont 
impeached former assemblyman Jonathan Fassett for 
participating in a rebellion. The impeachment followed the 
decision by the Assembly not to reseal Fassett, so he was out of 
office when impeached and when tried.b' He was convicted and 
disqualified from future state office.'" In both Virginia and 
Vermont, however, late impeachment was specifically referenced 
in the state constitution.69 
2. State Constitutions 
The federal Constitution was not the first modern written 
constitution; it was preceded by twelve state constitutions that 
influenced it heavily. As such, pre-1787 slate constitutions are 
obviously useful sources for understanding the federal 
impeachment power.70 
Twelve states (all but Connecticut and Rhode Island, and 
including Vermont) wrote constitutions before the federal 
Constitution was drafted in 1787. Ten of the twelve (all but 
Georgia and Maryland) had impeachment prO\'isions in their 
state constitutions. Given the revolutiomuy spirit of ami-
monarchism prevailing in the states, it was hardly surprising that 
this strong check on executive power was written into most 
constitutions." The biggest dispute was over what body should 
try impeachments; the question of the timing of trials animated 
less debate.72 
The following are excerpts from state constitutional 
impeachment provisions, in chronological order of adoption. 
66. See id. at 85-86 (describingJefTerson case). 
67. See id. at 84-85 (describing Fassen case). 
68. [d. at 85. 
69. See infra text accompan)ing notes 74 and S:t 
70. See Gordon S. '''ood, Forro..om: SlaU eollsliIIl/IOII·.\lllklllj! /II I},I' .-\mfflrtlll Ilrt-olll/lOlI. 
24 RUTGERS LJ. 911, 911, 925 (1993) (discussing broad inlhu.·nn· of Molle- comtllutiun .. 
on federal Constitution). 
71. See WOOD, supra note 29. at 141 (-Nothing indicate" bl'lle-r huw thuwughh 
Americans were imbued with Whig apprehensions of misapplied ntling powe-r than the-Ir 
rather unthinking adoption of this ancient English procedure- . . . . -). 
72. See id. at 142 (describing state debates O\er the prope-r bu<h' to In 
impeachments). 
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The specifications of who can be impeached are italicized, and 
specifications of timing are in boldface. 
Virginia (6/1776) 
The Govl'77lor, when he is out of office, anti OtlWTS, oJJnulinK 
against the state, either by mal-administration, corruption, or 
other means by which the safety of the state may be 
endangered, shall be impeachable by the House of Delegates. 
Such impeachment to be prosecuted ... in the General 
Court, according to the laws of the land. If ((HlIld guilty. he or 
they shall be either for ever disabled to hold any oflice under 
government, or be removed from such office pro tempore, or 
subjected to such pains or penalties as the laws shall direct. H 
. . . [T] he judges oj the GI'nt'ml Court . .. may, in like 
manner, [be] impeach[ed] .... il 
New Jersey (7/1776) 
[TJllp judgps oj till' SU/Jrf'mt' Court ... [,J thp jIUIKf., 0/ tht' 
In prior Court oj Common Plms in tilt' snwml Counti/'.I, jll.ltir/'.I oj" till' 
Pf'(lrt', Clf'rh oj tilt' Suprnnp Court, Cinkoi' of till' hl/t'rior COllrt 0/ 
Common Plms and Quartt'r SpSSiOllS, till' Attonwy-Gnwml, and 
Provinrial SprrPlm)" ... aTid tltp Pnminrial Trl'fl.lll1"f'r ... shall 
be liable to be dismissed. when a(~judged guilty of 
Misbehaviour by the Council on an Impeachment of the 
Assembly:" 
Delaware (9/1776) 
711£, /JI"f'Sirinlt, when he is out of office, and within eighteen 
months after, and all otilt'l"s o/JnulinK aWlin.lt tit£' Statl', either by 
maladministration, corruption, or other means, by which the 
safety of the Commonwealth may be endangered. within 
eighteen months after the offence committed. shall be 
impeachable by the house of assembly before the legislative 
council .... If found guilty. he or they shall be either 
forever disabled to hold any oflice under government. or 
removed from office pro tnn/JOrp, or subjected to such pains and 
penalties as the laws shall direct. And all o!lim:~ shall be 
73. VA. (;O:-';S"1. of 1776. art. XVI (emph'lsis added). 
74. Id. at art. XVII (emphasis added). 
7f>. 01J. Co:-.;sr. of 1776. art. XII (ernph'l,i, added). 
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removed on conviction of misbehavior at common law, or on 
impeachment, or upon the address of the general assembly. ;" 
Pennsylvania (9/1776) 
The general assembly of the represelll<ltives of the freemen 
of Pennsylvania ... may ... impeach slale 0-;11Ii'/(1ls.-:-: 
Every ofJu:er oj slale, whelher judicial or t'.-.:em/ivt', shall be liable 
to be impeached by the general assembly. either when in 
office, or after his resignation, or removal for mal· 
administration . . is 
North Carolina (12/1776) 
[TJIle Governor ami other Offi::l'rS offending against the Slate. 
by violating any Part of this Constitution. l\ial·Administration, 
or Corruption, may be prosecuted on the Impeachment of the: 
... General Assembly . . . . 
New York (4/1777) 
[A] court shall be instituted for the trial of impeachments 
. to consist of the president of the senate. for the time being. 
and the senators, chancellor, and judges of the supreme court, 
or the major part of them; except that when an impeachment 
shall be prosecuted against the chancellor. or either of the 
judges of the supreme court, the person so impeached shall bt, 
suspended from exercising his office until his acquittal ... 
8Q 
[T]he power of impeaching all officers of Ihl' Siale. for mal 
and corrupt conduct in their respective offices. be vested in 
the representatives of the people in assembly: but that it shall 
always be necessary that two third parts of the me:mbers 
present shall consent to and agree in such impeachment. That 
previous to the trial of every impeachment. the nwmbers of 
the said court shall respectively be sworn truly and impartially 
to try and detennine the charge in question. according to 
76. DEL CONST. of 1776. art. 23 (emphasis adclt-d). 
31 
77. PA. CONST. of 1776, ch. 11. § 9 (elllpha"" adckd). I'l·nm\h~III1.L\ ('r<"-
independence Frames of Go\"emmelll g<1\'e the colonial ;""elllbl\' thl' (,"her to 11111>.,..Lch 
~criminals." See supra nOll' 63. 
78. PA. COl'ST. of 1776. ch. 11. § 22 (emphasis adclt-d). 
79. N.C. COr-ST. of 1776. arL XXlII (emphasis added). 
80. N.Y. COl'ST. of 1777. arL XXXII. 
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evidence; and that no judgment of the said court shall be valid 
unless it be assented to by two third parts of the members then 
present; nor shall it extend farther than to removal from 
office, and disqualification to hold or enjoy any place of 
honor, trust, or profit under this State. But the party so 
convicted shall be, nevertheless, liable and sul~ert to 
indictment, trial, judgment, and punishment. according to the 
laws of the land.sl 
Vermont (7/1777) 
[T] he General Asembly [sic 1 of the Representatives of the 
Freemen of Vl'T11Iont ... may ... impeach Stall'rriminaLI,."2 
1:vl'T)' oJJicpr of Statl', whl'lher juriiria[ or I'xl'rlltivl', shall be liable 
to be impeached by the General Assembly. either when in 
office, or after his resignation, or removal for l11al-
administration .. 
South Carolina (3/1778) 
[T] he form of impeaching all o/jirprs of till' Slall' for l1Ial and 
corrupt conduct in their respective offices. not amenable to 
any other jurisdiction, be vested in the house of 
representatives. But ... it shall always be necessary that two-
third parts of the members present do consent to and agree in 
such impeachment. That the senators and such of the judges 
of this Slate as are not members of the house of 
representatives, be a court for the trial or impeachments, 
under such regulations as the legislature shall establish, and 
that previous to the trial or every impeachment. the nH'mbers 
of the said court shall respectively be sworn truly and 
impartially to try and determine the charge in question 
according to evidence, and no judgment or the said court, 
except judgment of acquittal. shall be valid, unless it shall 1)(' 
assented to by two-third parts of the members then present 
HI 
81. Iri. at an. XXXIII (emphasis added). 
82. VI'. (;O;\;ST. of 1777, eh. 2, ~ 8 (emphasb added). The substance 01 till, pi (lVi'IOII 
remained in the revised Vermont Constitution of I 78(), eh. 2, ~ 9. 
83. VI'. (;0:-15'1. 01 1777. eh. 2. ~ 20 (emphasb added). The sub~tan«' 01 thi, 
provision remained in the n'vised Vermont Constiwtion of I 78(). ch. 2. ~ 21. 
84. S.C. CO:--;ST. of 1778. art. XXIII (empha~is added). An earlln (I 77li) 
eon~titution for South Carolina made no provision for impeachment. 
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Massachusetts (3/1780) 
The House of Representatives shall be the Grand Inquest of 
this Commonwealth; and all impeachments made by them 
shall be heard and tried by the Senate ...... 
The Senate shall be a court with full authority to hear and 
determine all impeachments made by the House of 
Representatives, against an)' offifRr or officers of /IIl' C011/11/o1l!vt'lll'", 
for misconduct and mal-administration in their offices; but, 
previous to the trial of every impeachment, the members of 
the senate shall, respectively, be sworn mil)' and impartially to 
try and determine the charge in question, according to the 
evidence. Their judgment, however, shall not extend further 
than to removal from office, and disqualification to hold or 
enjoy any place of honor, tmst, or profit under this 
commonwealth; but the pan so cOIwicted shall be, 
nevertheless, liable to indictmen4 u'ial, judgment, and 
punishment, according to the laws of the land.N> 
New Hampshire (6/1784) 
The house of representatives shall be the grand inquest of 
the state; and all impeachments made by them, shall be heard 
and tried by the senate.8' 
The senate shall be a cour4 with full power and authority 
to hear, try, and determine, all impeachments made by the 
house of representatives against an)' officer or officers of /IIt' S/ll/e, 
for bribery, cormption, malpractice or maladministration, in 
88 
office .... 
Their judgment, however, shall not extend further than 
removal from office, disqualification to hold or enjoy any 
place of honor, tmst, or profit, under this st'lle, but the party 
so convicted, shall nevertheless be liable to indictment, trial, 
33 
85. MASS. CONST. of 1780, pt. I, ch. I, § 3, art. 6. III 1778, ~lassachlbl'l~ rl'Jl'Cll'U .1 
proposed constitution that would have vesled ill Ihe House -Ihe pO\\'l'r of IIllpl';l("llIllg .111 
officers of the State for mal<onduct ill their respeclh e offict'l>.- JOllL'\AL Of nit. 
CONVENTION FOR F'RA.\IING A CONSTITlTION OF GOVEIL,\MtXI FOR IlIt. SLUr. Of 
MASSACHUSETTS BAY, FROM THE COMML'\CBIE.'T OF Tm:IR FIRSI St~IO:-', SU'lBllltJt I, 
1779, TO THE CLOSE OF THEIR L-\STSESSION,Jl'NE 16.1780, al 2:,:" 262 (Bo,toll. DUllun 
and Wentworth 1832). 
86. MASS. CONST. of 1780, pt. I, eh. 1. § 2. an. 8 (emph;bb ad(kd). 
87. N.H. CONST. of 1784, pt. II, an. 17. 
88. [d. at art. 38 (emphasis added). The eariil'r (1776) CUI~lIIl11HIII for :>;r\\ 
Hampshire made no provision for impeachmelll. 
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judgment, and punishment, according to the laws or the 
land."" 
Several important patterns emerge from these state 
provIsIOns. 
First, they make clear the poor drafting of the federal 
Constitution-which specifies only that oflicers shall be 
removed if convicted, not directly that Congress has the power 
to impeach officers in particular-given the abundance of clear 
constructions in the state constitutions. In each of these state 
provisions (with the exception of New Jersey), the designation of 
who can be impeached appeared alongside the grant of 
authority to the legislature to pursue it:'" In six states 
(Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New York, Pennsylvania, South 
Carolina, and Vermont), the authorization took the form of a 
limited grant of power: i.e., "the legislature has the power to 
pursue public offenders through impeachment." In the other 
three (Delaware, North Carolina, and Virginia), the 
authorization took the form of an explicit limitation on the 
officers themselves: i.e., "public oflicers can be pursued through 
impeachment by the legislature." Though it is conceivable that 
others could be impeachable as well, the f~lct that there is no 
provision for anyone else to be impeached suggests that only 
officers are subject to that form of penalty.'>! Only New Jersey 
foreshadowed the poor wording of the federal Constitution, in 
which impeachment is only mentioned obliquely in a 
removability provision that gives little inkling as to whether 
others (removed or not) may be impeachable as well. 
A second pattern is that in each constitution. late 
impeachment was either required, permitted, or not discussed. 
but was nowhere explicitly forbidden. The first state constitution 
to feature impeachment:'2 Virginia's, was practically English in 
scope: it almost seemed to allow impeachment of anyone. not 
89. Id. at art. 39. 
90. Justice Story noted that the purported limits on who could be IIl1pe.l( hed .IIHI 
for what would han- been better placed in Article I of the Constitution rathel th.11I 
Article II. See 2 STORY, llI/m/note 42, at 255 ("By ~ome 'trange illadvl"ften(T, thl' 1'.11 t of 
the constitlllion has been taken from its natural conllexion, and wit h 110 gl e.lt I" 01" H·tl' 
arranged under that head, \~hich embrac<", the organi/ation .• lIId right" arrd dutH" of 
the ('"<'cuti,,e department."). 
91, Spp lIIlra text accompanying note, 189-97, 
92. l\cw Hampshire and South Carolirra drafted corr'titutlon, bdore \'rr gllll.1 dId. 
but neither pro"ided for impeachmerrt. Sep:-';.1 I. CO:--;S I. of 1776; S,C. (:ON\I. of 177li 
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just officers, who offended against the state:" and it did not limit 
the potential range of penalties. The principal limit it imposed 
was that the Governor could not be impeached until he left 
office. Implicitly, other officials could be impeached in or out of 
office. To the Virginia drafters, then, late impeachment was not 
only potentially worthwhile, it was the only acceptable way to 
proceed against the Governor. To be sure, this may reflect the 
fact that the Governor's term was only one year and that he was 
chosen by the legislature, making removal less important:" But 
for' the Governor, at least, impeachment was very clearly about 
accountability rather than removal. 
The Delaware Constitution adopted the Virginia formulation. 
with a slight variation. Delaware added an eighteen-month 
statute of limitations for impeachments, tolled for the 
"president" (Delaware's title for governor) until he left ofIice. 
Other officeholders could be subjected to late impeachment. 
too, if they left office before the eighteen-month period expired. 
In Delaware as in Virginia, then, late impeachment was possible 
for any official and was tlle onl), way to proceed against a 
governor. 
Another early effort, the Pennsylvania Constitution of 1 i76. 
gave late impeachment a more nuanced treaUllent. Like 
Virginia, impeachment almost seemed as if it were not limited to 
state officers;95 the General Assembly was authorized to impeach 
any "state criminal," just as it had been for decades before:'" But 
an executive or judicial state official qua state ofIicial could not 
be impeached once his term of service had expired naturally. If 
he was still in office or if he had resigned or been removed. he 
could be impeached. Late impeachment was possible, in other 
words, but only against those officers who had left of11ce under 
abnormal circumstances. This made it clear that impeachment 
was about accountability and not just removal. so much so that 
the officer could not preempt proceedings by resigning or by 
being so bad that the legislature removed him in advance of his 
93. See infra text accompan}ing note \02 (t-xpl:tillillg limilalloll of Virgllua 
impeachment to officers). 
94. See VA. CoNSf. of 1776. an. IX. 
95. See infra text accompan~ing note \03 (t-xplalJling illhl'rt'lII 1111111:111011 of 
Pennsylvania and Vennont impeachment to officers). 
96. See supra note 63. 
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Pennsylvania 's 
Five other states' impeachment provisions-North Carolina:'" 
New York, South Carolina, Massachusett<;, and New 
Hampshire-did not specifY that late impeachment was 
acceptable, but neither did they forbid it. Writing as they were 
against the backdrop of the Virginia and Pennsylvania 
formulations that provided for late impeachment, one might 
have expected these newer efforts to be explicit if they were 
making such a fundamental change. 
To be sure, one can argue that they were being explicit-by 
conspicuously omIttmg the Virginia/Pennsylvania broader 
timing language. But the Virginia language was a limit on timing: 
Virginian Governors and Delawarean President<; could only be 
impeached after leaving office, so removing that language would 
presumably have added an option (i.e., regular impeachment). 
not subtracted one. Pennsylvania (and Vermont) barred 
impeachment of officers whose terms had expired naturally: 
removing that language just as easily could have been Illeant to 
expand impeachment as to restrain it. Moreover, after explicitly 
allowing late impeachment, Pennsylvania used the term "ollicer" 
to describe those who were officers when they committed 
crimes, not just those who were officers at the time or 
impeachment. Later constitutions, speaking only or officers 
without reference to timing, could just as easily have been using 
the term with similar breadth. 
Furthermore, four of these states were explicit in placing other 
limits on impeachment that earlier state constitutions lacked. 
New York invented-and specified-the requirements of two-
thirds majorities, a special oath for impeachment judges. and a 
ban on punishments greater than removal and disqualification. 
South Carolina, Massachusetts, and New Hampshire followed 
suit, in part. The eventual language in the U.S. Constitution 
closely tracked the language of these four states' constitutions. 
97. See PA. CO:-lST. of 1776. ch. II. li 34 (ma"ing probate oflker~ n·IIH)\, •• bk .It tht" 
"ill of the general assembly). 
9H. :\'ote that North Carolina', provbion was milch narrmV("1 in 'copt" th.ln It, 
counterpartl.. It used impf'achment as a first step in allowing crlmin.ll pI "'("(,lltlOn of 
officeholders. It did not specify rf'moval-or anything dse-as .1 penaltv. It '11II1'h 
substituted the General f\.<.sf'mbly for a grand jllry in the reglliar rrimin.ll pi on'". 11\ tht" 
case of public offenses. See IIllml note 79. 
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Despite adding these specific limitations on the impeachment 
powers, these four states added no specific limitation on the 
timing of impeachment, Significantly, tllOugh, they did specify 
that the offenses covered by impeachment were only those 
committed while in office, This made clear that impeachment 
did not reach private conduct or private parties, r-,·Ioreover. it 
made clear that impeachment was not designed just to remove 
bad men from office-private offenses committed prior to 
taking office were exempt from review via impeachment. Thus, 
impeachment in these four states was not designed to keep 
criminals out of public office, it was designed to keep oflicers 
from becoming public criminals, 
A critic of late impeachment could argue that things like two-
thirds majority requirements are not self-evident and. therefore, 
require specification, and tllat late impeachment is similarly 
counterintUitIve and also requires specification, Virginia 
specified late impeachment and not two-thirds m(~orities; New 
York specified two-thirds majorities and not late impeachment. 
But as noted above, the Virginia, Delaware, Pennsylvania, and 
Vermont formulas made specific reference to late impeachment 
in the context of limiting it, while using language that suggested 
that late impeachment was otherwise implicitly permissible, 
Therefore, allowing late impeachment is the self:.cddent 
proposition, not the counterintuitive one, and f~lilure to 
explicitly bar it while specifying other limitations on the 
impeachment power is a telling omission, 
Another potential point against state late impeachment is that 
the Virginia, Delaware, Pennsylvania, and Vermont 
constitutions, which explicitly allowed late impeachment. also 
suggested that any "state criminal" or "offend [er] against the 
state" could be impeached, not just oflicers:" By contrast. the 
newer constitutions specifically limited impeachment to 
officers,tOO A critic thus could argue that late impeachment was 
implicitly permissible only in tllOse states where holding oflicc 
99, See HOFFER & HULL. supra not~ I, at 70 (dt',,:nblllg -\~lgllt'IIl'>.'>- of \,irgllllil 
language that might ha\'e allowed for illlp~achlll~1\I of pl1\~lIt' <"iu/t'm alld ('x,o!1in'r.); 
BELKNAP TRIAL, supra note 18. at 121 (opinioll of St-nalOr :\lli~oll) l:lfglllllg th.1I \'irgllll;1 
and Delaware Constitutions allowed illlp~achllll'l\I of lIoll'oflin'r..); ",pm tt'xt 
accompanying notes 77-78 (stating P~nnsyl\' .. nia·s illlPt';ldlllll'l\I J>ron~IllIl'); "'P'" tt'xt 
accompanying notes 82-S3 (stating Venllol\l's illlp~achllll'1\I pnl\·IMolI'l. 
100. In Massachusetts. a proposal 10 allow illlpl'achlllt'l\I of 1H1Il,ollin'r. \\~L' 
specifically proposed and rejected, SrI' stl/Jra not~ 85; HOn1-.R & Illll. "'P'" 1I0tl' I .• 11 
76. 
HeinOnline -- 6 Tex. Rev. L. & Pol. 38 2001-2002
38 Texas Rroinv oj Law & Politirs Vol. (j 
was not a requirement for impeachability. In states where private 
citizens could not be impeached, it would not he s(')(~eviden t 
that impeachment could reach people who were no longer in 
office. But even to the extent that this might he true as a mailer 
of technical textual construction, it does not resonate with the 
actual practice of impeachment. There are no instances or 
impeachment being used against private citizens-other than 
ex-officers-in any state. lUI Indeed, read in con text, the text or 
the older constitutions supports this more limited construction. 
For instance, the grounds specified for impeachment in Virginia 
and Delaware-maladministration and corruption-would seelll 
to apply only to public officials, and there is evidence that the 
Virginia language was meant to expand the class of offenses. not 
the class of offenders. lu2 In Pennsylvania and Vermont only 
maladministration was specified, and the term "state criminal" 
appears to refer only to officers (i.e., administrators, allegedly 
mal). Later case law bears out this interpretation. I !)' 
In sum, state impeachment provisions fell into two broad 
categories. The first group both provided for and implied the 
underlying propriety of late impeachment. The second group. 
which more directly influenced the federal Constitution. did not 
attempt to limit the scope of late impeachment enshrined in 
earlier state constitutions. States designed impeachment as a 
means of ensuring accountability for official action rather than 
simply a mechanism for removing "bad men" from office. In 
some states late impeachment was actually performed and 
I 0 I. Bill r/ IloFFER &: III U. mImi note I. ,It 29-:10 (diM II,-,mg \' el, I. ',I"'. "I.I( 10 
imolwd pri\,lIe citi/t"n and had impeachment-like qll,lliti(" dnpil(' I)("mg 1.(1)("1<-<1 
attaiIHI"r). 
102. .\1'1' ROBERI P. Sl rlO:-", R~\'()u 110" 10 S~U,"''''IO'': CO:'>;'" I I I t 11o" ~I \""'t, I" 
rtlF 0111 DO\II,IO, 'I:~ (191'9) (de~criblllg.1 d,.lli of th .. Vilgini.1 ,omtltlilion ,,111,10 
darifie~ that ",af .. t\, of tht" Stat .. " 1.1IIgllag .. wa' part of th .. definition of IIIIpe.1( h.,hl<-
offense, fill ('xt"clltiH' offic .. r~), 
10:1. Sn' State " Campb .. II, 2 Tvl. I ii, IX2 (VI. IX(2) ("In ,.1'(" of ,".t! 
adminbtration th .. re i~ a pecliliar and malllf!'~t propn('t' In , , , blll'gmg \/11/1' {II1/1//II1l1, 
a.' they are styled in the constitution, to trial bef(>rt, this lugh u,ltlOnal t"bllll.l!. "IH'I" Ih" 
,olemllity and publici tv of the trial will !'ith .... pubhch plllg!" 11.('11 "Ifirw/ {illI/mll'/\ hOIll 
imputed crime, or make their 1II(//-(/t!IIl/lll\lml/{1Il kllOWII to th!' (111/1'11' .11 I.llg!', .ulIl 
t"specially to those in whom n',ts comlllollh the ripr/lilll 10 o/firl',") «-lIIph.I'I' .1(1<1<-<1>. 
Ilan'i, v, IlulltingtoJl, 2 Tyl. 129, 144-45 (VI. 11'(2) ("It j, to he ohM'n('d, th.11 though II I' 
true the hou,,' of representatives ha"e no pow .. r 10 try per.oll' for cr IIIH", wt It dOl"~ 1101 
follow that the, may not examine illio th .. cOllduct of o/l;"n "I KOllI'mlll{'II/ , III<' 
cOII~litutjoll gives th .. powel' to the hOIl'!' of II'!>n',,'lIIatIV(" , , , to ""1)('.11 I. ,I{{II' 
rl"ll11/lw[,,"") (emphasis added), 
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authorized, and where it was not, it was at least compatible with 
the text and structure of state impeachment. 
3. The Articles of Confederation 
The Articles of Confederation, drafted in November 1777, did 
not contain any provision for the impeachment of national 
officers. In 1786, as it became apparent that a stronger national 
government was needed, the Congress appointed a committee 
(which included two eventual delegates to the constitlllional 
convention) to draft amendments to the Articles:'" The 
amendments were reported in August 1786, six months before 
the constitutional convention was called but were never acted 
105 
upon. 
Among the amendments were two that touched on the issue 
of impeachment. The proposed Article 9 alilhorized the 
unicameral Congress to "institute a federal Judicial Court for 
trying and punishing all Officers appoimed by Congress for all 
crimes, offences and Misbehaviour in their Oflices . . . . H"" The 
proposed Article 20, directed at ensuring sufliciel1l attendance 
in Congress, authorized Congress to punish delegates who failed 
to attend when required by Congress or withdrew without either 
permission from Congress or a recall from their state, though 
the punishment could not be "further extended than to 
disqualifications any longer to be members of Congress, or to 
hold any Office of trust or profit under the United States, or any 
individual State . . . ." 107 
Neither of these provisions used the word "impeachnwnt. H 
Both, however, established the power to punish oflicials for 
dereliction, and both were directed at accountability, not 
removal per se. Indeed, the punishment for A\\'OL delegates to 
Congress presupposed that the party was, 111 a sense, Olil of 
office. 
These proposed amendments to the Articles of 
Confederation, while not shedding abundant light on the 
104. 1 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF TilE R,\TIFI(~UIO" OF JlI~ CO''iJl It' ItO" lIi:\ 
(Merrill Jensen ed., 1976) (melllioning that flllllrl' fr.IIIIl''''' Chari • ." l'",d .. lIl'\ .",e1 
William Houstoun were on this -grand cOlllllliul'l"-). 
105. /d. 
106. Id. at 167. 
107. Id. at 167-68. 
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question of late impeachment. nevertheless provide mort' 
positive data. 
C. The framers and the Ratijiers 
The Framers established the federal constitutional 
impeachment power against the backdrop of English, colonial. 
and state impeachment doctrine described above. Their intent 
with regard to late impeachment is unclear. The notes on the 
convention debates are sketchy at best and do not directly 
address the issue of late impeachment. They do, howewr. 
provide tantalizing bases for an inference that late impeachment 
was acceptable to the Framers or, if not intended. was at least 
not intentionally subtracted from the congressional 
impeachment power. This is especially significant given that a 
well-known English impeachment case-a late impeachment-
was proceeding as the convention sat. 
Many Framers considered the state ratification debates-
which, unlike the convention debates, were not secret-the most 
valid source for construing the original understanding of tht' 
provIsIOns in the Constitution. III" Unfortunately, the state 
ratification debates provide only sketchy evidence toward 
resolving the puzzle of late impeachment. They do suggest. 
though, that the impeachment power was understood as being 
quite broad. V\'hile the federal impeachment power was mort' 
closely connected with removal than it<; state counterparts had 
been, it remained grounded in a desire for accountability and 
deterrence. Late impeachment may not serve the [<>rIner goal. 
but it certainly serves the latter. 
1. The Convention 
By the time of the constitutional convention. tht' 
revolutionary ideology had been transformed in significant ways. 
The fear of executive power that informed state constitutions 
had shifted; now the legislature was the branch to constrain. and 
lOR Sel'. e.g .• Ronald D. Rotunda. Ongllw/ In Inti. /lw \';1'111 liflhe Fmmrn. 1IIIIIIhl' N,,/I' "/ 
Ihe RalijinJ. 41 v,\ ,n. L. REV. 50i. 512 (19HH) ("When we t.llk poplllarly .Ihollt the 
framers' intent. we really shollld be 1II0re precise and refer to the ratifie,,' illtellt. wh.lt 
Alexander Hamilton in nll'l'i,tlnll/HI 1'11/)('" called 'the intention of the people ... ·). "I<-, 
K07imki & lIarn SlIsman. Ongl1lll/ .\I1'//1//tll'1/llIg'o. ·19 51 \'>. L. R~v. 15H:{. !fiO:1 (1'1!li) 
(discussing ~Iadi~on \ reliance on the ratifier,' 1IIf('nt in interpl etlllg the' (;01l't;1II1101l) 
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tolerance for executive power had 
impeachment was still considered 
executive (and judicial) power. 
increased.·'" That said, 
a necessary check on 
Delegates came to the convention aware of their own S~lle 
constitutions and precedents, and of English precedents.Il'J The 
Framers discussed impeachment at length and on several 
separate occasions at the convention. The Issue of late 
impeachment never arose explicitly, but several of tlle 
discussions provide bases for inferences about the Framers' 
understanding of late impeachment, and suggest that late 
. h dill Impeac ment was accepte . 
a. Initial Proposals 
Impeachment was placed on tlle table almost from the stan of 
the convention. On May 29, Edmund Randolph offered the 
"Virginia Plan," which formed tlle baseline for subsequent 
discussion over the next few weeks. In it, Randolph followed the 
Virginia state structure of having impeachment trials in regular 
courts: He proposed that the federal supreme coun would "hear 
and determine ... impeachments of any National officers."llt 
On June 2, the Committee of tlle \"'hole, working from 
Randolph's proposal, came to discuss tlle remo\<lbility of the 
President. John Dickinson of Delaware proposed that the 
109. See WOOD, supra note 29, at 409 (-\\1u:re once th ... Illagistr.ln h;ul ,c ... lII ... d lU Ix-
the sale source of tyranny, now the legislatures through Ih... R ... \'oitlliollan ,Iill ... 
constitutions had become the instimtions 10 bc mosl fear ... d:): Sf(' abo 1I0Hl-.R & IIl11_ 
supra note 1, at 60 ("Without a king 10 shield wrongdo ... rs in offic .... \"ilholll .111 arulocr.ln 
to protect their own from public outcry, was thcrc any n ...... d for imp ... achlll ... m?-L 
110. BEL&'<AP TRIAL, supra nOle 18, at 363 (discussing falllilianl\' of Fr.III1 ... r.. "~Ih 
state constitution impeachmem provisions): HOFFER & Hl"ll_ wpm 1101 ... I, ill !Jt) 
(discussing familiarity of Framers \\ilh Slale impcacllml'l1I law alld casn): B~.R(.t.R, wpm 
note 29, at 87 n.160 (describing American familiarity \,illl English impe;lchlllcl1I law). 
Hoffer and Hull go further in dO\mpla}ing Ihc English inJ\ucllce, -:l\1l1g Ihal Engl"h 
impeachment precedem "had receded il1lo a dim past: d ... spil'· the COI1l ... IIII>or.III ... Ol" 
Hastings case. HOFFER & HL'LL, supra nOl ... \, at 96. Thl'" abo CnliclI'" lkrg ... r's 
assumptions, asserting that the Framers used English Cil:.l'S .1:. -colllII ... rcXillllpll'!> ,lIId 
passing illustrations" rather than rel)ing on th ... m as good \;1\\', 1tI, .11 266-iO. 
Ill. Other discussions on impeach melli, panicularh Ih.· ... xhamu\ ... dl""I~IOIl' 
o\'er which body should try impeachments, ar ... not disn~"d in Ih" Pan .• 1:. Ihn do 1I0t 
implicate the late impeachment issue, 
112. 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CO:-:VE.'TIO:-: OF I iH7, al 22 (~Iax F.lffillld ... d., 
1911) [hereinafter RECORDS], At IIle sam ... timc. Chari ... , Pin<:klll'\ IIIlrodu<: ... d 1m 0\\'11 
drnft constitution, which ga\'e the Housc th ... powl'r to illlpl'a<:h and nlablbh ... d Ih ... 
Senate and Supreme Coun as IIle impeachmcnt coun. par.,llding Ih." ,tm<:tur ... III SOlllh 
Carolina. Pinckney prO\ided scparatcl\' for th... rl'lllo\~11 of Ih... Pr...."ldclII \~a 
impeachment. This account of Pinckncv's Plan is b.l:. ... d Oil th;1I I> .... <: ... d log ... th ... r '" 
Farrand. See 3 id. at 606, 608, 
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President be removable by Congress on the request of a m;~jorit)' 
of state legislatures, a notion that no other delegation 
supported. 111 The next removability proposal, however, was 
approved: The delegates voted to make the President 
"removable on impeachment and conviction of mal-practice or 
neglect of duty."II' At this stage in the drafting, then, 
impeachment applied to all national oflicers, while removability 
and the standards for it were discussed only in the context of a 
sitting President. 
Significantly, four states voted against making the President 
removable on impeachment: Maryland (which had no provision 
for impeachment in iL'i state constitution), Virginia, Delaware, 
and Pennsylvania. II; Recall that in the Virginia and Delaware 
constitutions, the governor was not impeachable while 111 
oflice." h At home, these states supported the idea of 
impeachment for officers in general and for the governor in 
particular. At the convention, their delegations offered no 
objection to a parallel structure for the federal Constitution. It is 
readily inferable, therefore, that while the Virginia and 
Delaware delegations opposed the idea of removing a sitting 
President by impeachment, they would not have ol~jected to {all' 
impeachment of the President."7 Pennsylvania too allowed late 
impeachment, and iL'i delegation may have felt the sallle way as 
Virginia and Delaware. 
The next development came on June 15, with the 
introduction of vVilliam Paterson's "New Jersey Plan," a hroad 
counterproposal to Randolph's Virginia Plan. The New Jersey 
Plan also provided for impeachment trials of ''federal orIin:rs" to 
be performed in the federal court'), but separately advanced the 
Dickinson proposal that the President be removable by Congress 
on application of a majority of state legislatures."" Once again 
this proposal went nowhere, but like Randolph, Paterson had 
provided a general power to impeach national officers and a 
I I:t .\('(' I ul. at H5-87. 
114. I id. at 7R 
115. I Ill. at 79. 
116. See wln(l text accomp<lIl}ing nott"~ 74 &: 76. 
117. To the contrar\,. though. Dickin,on had made hi, )110)10",1 10' ,1.IlI"·h.",'d 
n'moval of the Presidenl because "[hk did not like the plan 01 illl)leadllng the {;"'.,I 
Officers of St.lle, - I RECORD';, mlIT(l note 112, at H5, 
IIR I Ill, at 244, 
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wholly separate provision ensuring the n."mo\·ability of the 
President. 
On June 18, Alexander Hamilton proposed a broad plan as 
well, in which it was specified that "The Govemour [i.I'., 
President,] Senators and all officers of the United States to be 
liable to impeachment for mal- and corrupt conduct; and upon 
conviction to be removed from office, & disqualified for holding 
any place of trust or profit .... nll" Here and elsewhere,'''' 
Hamilton seemed to believe that removal was a required 
component of the impeachment penalty, which suggests that he 
viewed late impeachment as impossible. On the other hand, 
Hamilton's later writings on impeachment in Tht' Fl'tirrali.!>t 
Papen'-Construing the Constitution as actually written and not 
his own unadopted proposals-can be construed more favorably 
1"1 to late impeachment. -
b. RellUJving the Presitil'1ll 
In late July, an intense debate raged over the impeachability 
of the President, which remained in the working draft (b,L'ied on 
the Virginia Plan). Some, fearing that the proposed legislature 
was already much more powerful than the proposed Presidelll, 
did not want to place the PresideI1l at the mercy of the 
Congress; instead, they would have advanced accountability by 
replacing impeachment with shon terms and the possibility of 
re-election.':!:! Many of the comments emphasized the 
importance of being able to remove a silting Presidelll through 
impeachment; this focus gives an undue impression that late 
impeachment was not considered possible, when in fact the 
issue simply was peripheral.'~~ The same W,L'i true of comments 
on the other extreme, which argued against all)' impeachment 
of the President, implicitly excluding late impeachmelll as well, 
but not addressing the timing issue per st'.'~' 
In one instance, however, the debate avoided these extremes 
and provided a glimpse, albeit vague, of some Framers' 
119. 1 id. at 292. 
120. See 3 id. at 626-2i (discussing a plan u\, Hanllhon th.1I \\~L' not pll~·ntt"d. \,llIlh 
would have limited punishmelll to remO\-.l1 or rem()\~11 pilL' d"'I".llllk.lllOn) 
121. See infra text accompanying note 145. 
122. See 2 RECORDS, supra note 112. at :,:1. At that POInt III th,' dd>.II'·. til,' ),,, ... ,d("nt 
was impeachable, served six years. and (ould not be n'elected. :! III .11 ;,1 
123. See, e.g., 2 id. at 66-6i (conullen", of l'ind.Ill'\ and KIng) 
124. See, e.g., 2 id. at 65-69 (cOillmen", of :'Iadis(}n. R.lIIdolph. ,lIId :'Iorm) 
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understandings of late impeachment (to the extent thaI 
Madison's notes of the occasion are reliable). On J lily 2(), 
immediately after Charles Pinckney and Gouverneur Morris 
moved to strike the provision authorizing removabili ty of the 
President, the following exchange occurred: 
Mr. P[inckney] observd. he ought not to be impeachable 
whilst in office. 
Mr. Davie. If he be not impeachable whilst in office, he will 
spare no efforts or means whatever to get himself re-elected. 
He considered this an essential security for the good 
behaviour of the Executive. 
Mr. Wilson concurrcd in thc nccessity of making the 
Execlltive impeachable whilst in office. 
Mr. Govr. Morris .... In case he should be re-elected, that 
will be sufficient proof of his innocence .... 
Col. Mason. No point is of more importance than that the 
right of impeachment should be continued. Shall any man he 
above Justice? ... One objection agst. [the Electoral 
College] was the danger of their being corrupted hy the 
Candidates: & this furnished a peculiar reason in favor of 
impeachments whilst in officc. Shall the man who has 
practised corruption & by that means procured his 
appointment in the first instance, be suffered to escape 
punishment, by repeating his guilt?I~-' 
This debate was not really about impeachment-it was about 
removability.12h The clause that Pinckney was trying to eliminate 
provided that the President was "to be removeable,,,m not that 
he "be impeachable." National officers were generally 
impeachable; the issue here was, as Pinckney put it, whether the 
President (whose term was othenvise definite and limited) 
ought to be "impeachable whilst in office." In other words. 
Pinckney arguably presupposed the possibility of late 
impeachment, and was concerned only with whether "regular" 
1"K impeachment was acceptable as well. -
123. 2 Id. at 64-65. 
126. S"" Id. at 11>5-1>6 (recording dralt lrom Committt'e of [let.1I1 pl.1t IlIg 
remo\<lbility pr()\l~ion between prclYi~ion' for presidential oath and \'ice l"t'"dt'lIl1.t1 
succe~sion); 2 id. at 499 (recording recommended language from COllllllittt,t, 01 I-:lt'\('11 
placing remo\'abilit) pro\'ision in salJle clause a~ ,"cn,.,sion proviMon). 
12i. 2 uf. at 64. 
12K Bul ,,,,, BELK:-'AI' TRI.\L, mImi note II>, at 119 (opilllon of Sen.Hor Alh.,on) (ll.lt" 
stating-withollt citing am support-that Pinckne\ Oppo.,t'd .IIIV I III I't'.1t hllWllt 01 Ih .. 
President at all\' time). 
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William Davie responded to Pinckney that Kregular" 
impeachment was important because if it were not available, the 
President would attempt to win reelection by any means 
necessary. Davie, who came from North Carolina, where late 
impeachment was not discussed in the constitution, could have 
meant t\vo things by this. First, Davie might have presupposed 
that late impeachment was possible and argued that if 0111)' late 
impeachment were available, a malfeasing President would 
entrench himself in office to avoid it.I~' Alternatively, Davie 
could have meant that a President could entrench himself in 
office if he corruptly won reelection and there was no other 
means of removing him-in which case late impeachment 
would never be an issue. 
Madison next described James '<\'ilson as using the same 
"whilst in office" construction. 
Gouverneur Morris had more faitl1 tl1an Dm'ie in the Electoral 
College, but George Mason shared Davie's concern about a 
President who would do anytl1ing to get reelected. :--':otably, 
however, Madison quoted Mason as speaking of the right of 
impeachment being "continued," as opposed to it merely being 
"available." This suggests tl1at to Mason, the issue was whether 
impeachment would be suspended during the President's term 
or instead would be continuous. The word "continued" makes 
little sense if the only options were eitl1er impeachment in oflice 
or none at all. In other words, Mason appeared to presuppose 
late impeachability. 
Mason's final comment, tl1at a President could Kescapc 
punishment" for fixing an election by fixing the next one, 
reveals a similar presupposition. If late impeachment were not 
an option, then reelection would not allow the President to 
"escape" anything: Once his new term ended, he would not have 
to face impeachment. Of course, Mason might also have feared 
a President stealing eue1)' election and Slaying in power for life. If 
he were able to win every election and was not susceptible to 
removal, then he would indeed escape punishment. I'" But as 
129. See Uf. at 53 (argument of Hous ... manag ... r in lall' IlIIpl·.Khlll,·1II tn.11 dl'l-IL>.>lIIg 
Da\ie statement, and arguing: "Whal good would il do huu 10 b.· \<·,d ....... d If h.· (ollid 
not be impeached anyway if h ... was 0111 of offic .. ?-); /(1, OIl \:',0 (OpIIIIOII of Sen.llor 
Dawes). 
130. This concern of Davie's and Mason's \\~U. 1II001 .. d b\' Ih.· 'i\, .. III\,S,,('Olld 
Amendment. U,S, COl\ST. amend. XXII (-No p .. rson shaH b .. d"nl'd \0 Ihl' .,lIkl' of Ih .. 
President more than t\\ice ... ,-). Now, Ih .. Pr .. sidl·JI\ IIIILSI 1 ... 1\ .. "Ilk .. (,\l'IIIU.llh 
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with Davie, if this is what Mason meant, then his cOlllments did 
not implicate late impeachment at all. 
This bl'ief exchange about whether the President should he 
impeachable "whilst in office" therefore provides some evidence 
to support the notion that late impeachment was considered 
possible by the Framers. The corps of national officers was to he 
impeachable; the only question was whether to exempt the 
sitting President. The impeachability of a J017lwr President-and 
thus of any former officer-was implicit or, at the very least, not 
ruled out. In the process, moreover, the notion was reinforced 
that impeachment is about accountability and detern'lHT 
("providing essential security for the good behaviour of the 
Executive," as Davie put it) and not just removability."1 
c. The Hasling\ Paradigm 
The next exchange providing inferences on the Frame) <;' 
understanding of late impeachment did l10t come ulltil 
September H, in the debate on defining impeachable oH<"w.;('s. 
Again, l\:ladison's notes provide the crucial implications: 
The clause refi.'rring to the Senate. the trial of 
impeachments agst. the President. filr Treason & bribery. wa<; 
taken up, 
Col. Mason, Why is the provision restrained to TI easoll & 
bribery only? Treason as defined ill the Constitution will not 
reach many great and dangerou<; ofknces, IIrLllinK\ is n(ll Kllil/)' 
oj Trl'{{.loTl, Attempts to subvcrt the Constitution lIlay lIot be 
Treason as above defined- As bills of attainder which have 
s;{w'd the British Constitution are filrbidden, it is the lIlore 
11(.·ce~sary to extend: the power of impeachments, I Ie lIlovd, to 
add after "bribery" "or maladministration," Mr. (;er ry 
seconded him-
1"[r. .\Iadison So vague a term will be equivalent to a It'nul (' 
during pleasure of the Senate, 
~[r. Gon Morris, it will not be put in f(>lTe & can do no 
harlll- An election of evcry fiHlr years will pr('\'(' 11 1 
maladll1i n istratiol1, 
(unle" he can contriw ~ome W;I\ to h('conH" I'n"ld('nl wlthollt ht'lIIg eI('( ((,d) I h" 
make, remO\ability Ie" important and, cOIl\'('r~(''', m,.k(', late IIIIP(',\( hlll('lIt 11101(' 
I el('\~lIl t. 
I:~ I . .~('(' /!Ifia Part \'.A. 
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Col. Mason withdrew ~maladminislJ"<llion - & slibslillltt.'~ 
"other high crimes & misdemeanors" (a!,TSI. lhe Slale), "! 
Mason's offhand tone (if it was not just i\ladison's onhand 
notes) in referring to Hastings suggests that those present wt:re 
familiar with the famous case,l" ''''hat is more readilv infel"<lble is 
that Mason wanted someone in Hastings's position to be 
impeachable, I:\,! Mason's proposal, which broadened the range 
of impeachable offenses to include all high Cl'imes and 
misdemeanors, was intended to ensure that a President who 
acted like Hastings would be susceptible to impeachment. 
If Mason and the Framers knew anything about the I-lasting'i 
case, though, they knew that Hastings was being subjected to a 
late impeachment. Yet, that aspect of Hastings's case alll"<lcted 
no negative comment, While late impeachment was not rdevant 
to the discussion of removable impeachable offenses, Mason's 
comments are relevant to the larger question of how mllch the 
Framers meant to distinguish American impeachment from 
English impeachment. If aspects of the Hastings case-!>uch as 
the fact that Hastings was out of oflice-were seen as 
unacceptable, it would be surprising if Mason would have used it 
as an example of a good impeachment and e\'ell more 
surprising if this attracted no dissent. Conversely, if the Hastings 
case was seen as an appropriate model, the fact that Hastings 
was out of office surely must have registered, 
More generally, in defining impeachable offenses :-'lasol1 
moved away from the American "maladministration" standard"-' 
132. 2 RECORDS, supra no Ie 112, al 550 (,'mph;L,i, added) (loOIIIUI" omllled) 
133. E"en an opponelll of lale impeachlll<'llI cOllce(kd g"II<'r.luon, 1.11"1 Ih.lI 
Hastings's "case was presellllO all minds. and was debaled b\ all hp'.- lIuJ-.'\!' rRl\l. 
supra note 18, at 98 (opinion of SenalOr Howl'); srr (/1.0 Arthllr 1I",wl. Imprl/dJtllrtll, ·1'1 
WASH. L. REv. 255, 284 (1973) (book n.·\;ew) (-A" Ih,' plopo",d Con-lIlllllon \\('!II 
before the ratifying cOIl\"elllions of Ih,' sewr.11 Anl<'l;Call '1;11," III 17SS. Iht' m",1 
spectacular impeach men I lrial of Ihe age gOI under \\~I\ III Ihl' Iluu,,' of l.ol (b.-I 
Reference was made 10 Haslings in Ihe Firsl Congn· .... ' .l> ,,<"II. .11 \\ hl( h POUIl tiu' 
proceedings were still ongoing; il \\'L, ml'llliun,'d IInl;I\()!~lbh .L' all '''"unpl,' 01 ho\\ ,10\\ 
impeachment trials could be. I A.\::-\Al.'> OF CO:-'{;. :17:~ (l7H9) !-I.II,'III"III 01 R,'p 
Vining). 
134. Then again, maybe knowledge 01 H;L'linh'~;' C.L"· \\.L, 'p.HI\ III Ih,' '\t'\\ ,,"odd 
After alI, one of the charges a)f<linsl Hasling> \\'L~ for brib"J"\ (though nUl 1.II)(,lt-d .l' 'III h 
in the articles of impeachment), srI' gt'1/l'm/{\" John T. "oonan . ./1 .. /1". IJn/Jn) ul \lim..,. 
Hasti7lgs: The Setti7lg of (/ Sta7ldard for 17ltl'g71ly /II Adll//IIB/mlltJII. 10 I hlF'! It \ I. Rn 107'~ 
(1982), a fact that undermines Mason's "!IIirl' argIlUl"!ll .lbOlIl bro.ld,'mng th,' h'l of 
impeachable offenses so as 10 ensure Ihl' inrillsion 01 C;L\l', hl.,' II.l,lIng'·' 
135. Mosl state conslimtions used Ihi, fonllul.llron . . \a "'Pili 1'''101 .It (ornp.!II\III)( 
notes 74-89. 
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to the English "high crimes and misdemeanors" standard. II" 
American federal impeachment was thus placed squarely in the 
context of the English experience, where not just high crimes 
and misdemeanors but late impeachment were the order or 
business. m 
d. Late Adjustments 
Late in the convention, the provision for removing the 
President was expanded to make clear that he was not the only 
official subject to impeachment. To the provision for removing 
the President upon impeachment and conviction, the 
convention simply added the Vice President and civil ollicers to 
the list unanimously and without debate. II" This late change 
ended the distinction in the text between the genl'l'al 
impeachment power and its specific application to presidential 
removal. It is also the source of the poor construction of Article 
II, Section 4.1:\9 
One last item implicitly raised the issue of late impeachment. 
and at first glance it might seem to suggest that it was Itot 
intended. On September 14, John Rutledge and Gouverneur 
Morris proposed to suspend impeached officers pending their 
. I d . I I III Th' I h' I . I III tna an acqmtta . IS proposa, w IC 1 was reJectec. 
suggests that impeachment was for sitting officers only. As with 
the earlier discussions on impeachment. though, it appears that 
this simply reflected the importance of removability to the 
Framers. It was not necessarily the case that all impeachments 
would involve sitting officers; Rutledge and Morris simply 
wanted to consider suspension as a remedy for those that did. 
136. See BERGER, supra note 29, at 59-73 (describing Engli~h lise of "high (I illl(" .lIId 
misdemeanor~ - concept). 
137. See sujJra text accompanying notes 52-5H. 
13H. 2 RI-.CORDS. wpm note 112. at 546. 552. 
139. The late impeachment dilemma i~ not the onl} one' neated hy th" ,lo!,!,1 
craftsmanship-the Framers also neglected to provide explicitly for ~on1('OJl(' otl1(" th.11I 
the Vice President to preside over an impeachment trial of the Vice Prl'~idl'lIt. ,\rr./oel K. 
Goldstein, Call lile \'ICe Presitil'1l1 Presu/e at fit> OW" Impearillllmt Trllli?: II Cn/lque 0/11111/' 
Texlua/;"'III. 44 ST. LOl"lS C. Lj. 849 (2000) (arglling agaimt the •• bllit} of the' \'" (. 
President to preside over his oIVn impeachment trial); s/'e {lilo K;.lt, IIljmlnotl' I:~ .. It 7W,-
96 (dj~cllssing incongruity of Vice President pr('~idiIlg on-r hi~ OWII impe •• dlllll·lIt tn.ti). 
140. 2 RE< ORDS, sujJT(l note 112. at 612. 
141. Id,at612-13. 
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e, Conclusion 
Quite a bit about impeachment went without saying in the 
debates, and the fact that something as admittedly peripheral as 
late impeachment was one of them should not be surprising, 
Nevertheless, the mention of Hastings and the debate on 
whether the President should be removable "whilst in office" 
provides some evidence for the notion that late impeachabilit), 
was a given and that "regular" impeachment (for the President 
at least) was the controversial question, 
Regardless of what the Framers knew or thought of the 
Hastings case, they clearly gave Congress a more restricted 
impeachment power than that possessed by Parliament. One 
can argue that when the Framers meant to eliminate an 
impeachment power from the English baseline, they did so 
explicitly,142 Conversely, when tl1ey were not explicit-as with 
late impeachment-they must not have intended such a limit. If 
the British could impeach Hastings after he had left oflice, this 
argument would go, so too could the Americans impeach an ex-
officer, in the absence of a constitutional statement to the 
contrary, 
2,Ratification 
Further insight on the original understanding of late 
impeachment can be gleaned from ratification sources, nIl' 
Federalist Papers present neitl1er direct evidence about the 
142. See, e.g., BELK.'IAP TRL-\L, supra note 18, at 87 (opllllon of St'Il.ltOl Sh"nnall) 
("The preceden15 of impeach me III of persons not in olin' for offell"'" ("Olllllllll"d "1111,, 
in office were well kno\\n, and if this had been considered an .lbIL'l' lO I)(' guard"d 
against it would have been done in the same clear manner that the ComlHullolI gu.mb 
against excessive punishment in cases of impeachml'lll."): td. at 129 (opilllOn "r St'II.Huf 
Bayard) (cataloguing explicit changes in Constitution a"~\\ from ElIgli'h pr.tcun' .lIul 
not including prohibiting late impeachmelll). 
These explicit changes include: the two-thirds m:tiorit\' n'quirl'ml'lll 101 nlllnnlOn: 
limitation ofimpeachment to high crimes and misdl'nll'allo("S by ("i\,1 olin'f>. bUI ' .... Pan 
IV.B.I; the limitation on presidelllial pardons to pn'\'('1ll their 1I'l' \U lind" .111 
impeachment judgment; and the limitation 011 pllnishllll'lll to Il'lIIm';ll .lIul 
disqualification. 
On a separate note, English impeachmelll procedlln-s werl' bJ(lIIghl IIIto AIII"nc.1II 
practice as a baseline when Senate Presidelll Thomas Jefferson in("o'l)()r.Hed th"lII IlllO 
his manual. SeeTHO~L-\SJEFFERSO:-;, A MA:-<t'ALOF PARIJ-\~IE"L\R\, PIl\('J In FOR I lit l',~ 
OF THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES § LIII (180 I): srI' (/bo EdwlII !lnm'n Finll.lg" 8: R. 
Collin Mangrum, Remavai of Ihl' Prrstdml: Ivs;p/(/IIOI/ lIlUi Ihr Pwwi,,1tI1 1.11... of 
Impeachm£1ll, 1974 DUKE LJ. 1023, 1031 (describing Engli'h prucedllfl' .lIId J"n"f'>tlll" 
adoption of it). 
HeinOnline -- 6 Tex. Rev. L. & Pol. 50 2001-2002
50 Texas Review oj Law & Polilirs Vol. (i 
original understanding of late impeachment, nor lIluch valid 
basis for inference. There are, however, some invalid bases that 
bear mention given the prominence of Till' Fnipmlisl as a SOUtH' 
for deciphering original understanding. 
The first discussion of impeachment in Till' Fedpmlislmentions 
late impeachment explicitly but does not discuss whether it is 
possible under the federal Constitution. In TlIP Fnlrmlisl N, 
James Madison compared the republican character or the 
proposed constitutional government with those in the states. I Ie 
wrote: 
In several of the States, however, no explicit provision is made 
for the impeachment of the chief magistrate. And in Delaware 
and Virginia he is not impeachable till out of office. The 
President of the United States is impeachable at any tillle 
during his continuance in office. II I 
Taken out of context, Madison's statement that the President "is 
impeachable at any time during his continuance in office" 
would seem to rule out late impeachment. But Madison was not 
speaking of the limits of the federal impeachment power; 
rather, he was speaking of its expansion. Unlike certain states 
where the governor cannot be impeached at all or can only be 
impeached after he leaves, Madison explained, the Presidellt 
can be impeached while he is in of1ice." 1 Later, Alexalldn 
Hamilton made the identical point, noting that "IT II\(' 
President of Confederated America would stand upon no better 
ground than a governor of New York, and upon worse ground 
than the governors of Virginia and Delaware.""·· Ol1e call debate 
whether a President who is only impeachable while in offin' i.., 
"on worse ground" than one who can only be impeached aftet 
leaving office-Hamilton may have been supporting the idea or 
late impeachability. At worst, though, late impeachlllent was 
simply beside the point to Madison and Hamilton and not ruled 
out. 
The only other potentially relevant discussions of 
impeachment in TIll' F'pdpralisl concerned removability, alld so, as 
143. TIlE FEDER.\U',I ;\io. 39. at :~~J7 (Iallle' ~Iadi,on) ({ :tinton R""\tel ed .. I ~lIi I) 
144. q: IIllml Part I11.C.l.h (di,clI"ing n'lIl()\ahiht) 01 PIt',idenl. IIl1phlll/( III, 1"11' 
illlpeachahliity) . 
14:;. Tilt FEmR.\I.I~1 :'\0.69. al 'IHi (AIt-',lIIder lI,uniltoll) (elilltoll R"''''''I etl, 
I~)(il), 
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in several debates in the cOl1\·ention,H •. f(>cused ciispropor-
tionately on the impeachment of sitting oflicers. H~ As before, the 
fact that "regular" impeachment was more likely and more 
important-and that the discussion of impeachment reflects 
that fact--does nothing to rule out the possibility 0/ late 
impeachment. 
Impeachment was also discussed by opponents of ratificatioll 
in the loosely organized canon known as the :\Tl/;-Fnirra/i.\/ 
Papers. Here too, late impeachment was not addressed, but some 
inferences are available. 
As in The Federalist, at least one anti-Federalist author 
discussed the removability of the President in terms that might 
seem to crowd out late impeachment-if read out of context. 
Luther Martin (who was a convention delegate, but who walkt·c\ 
out and refused to sign the final document) ol~jected that the 
Constitution made it too hard to remove the Presidellt via 
impeachment, gIven the likely contours of congressional 
politics. J48 This would not be a problem if late impeachment 
were possible; the presidential leverage over Congress that 
Martin worried about would be mooted once the President left 
office. Thus, one might conclude that ivlartin did not think that 
late impeachment was possible; if he did. he would not have 
complained so stridently. But Martin was not thinking in such 
subtle terms. Martin was concerned that the President would be 
"a King in name, as well as in substance," who could ~establish 
himself in office not only for his own life, but even if he chooses. 
to have that authority perpetuated to his hUllily. """ ~Iartin 
dismissed impeachment as irrelevant, because the Pre.,ident 
could "set [it] at defiance. "I'" This would be so for late 
impeachment too, if the President never left ollict'. :\.., with 
Hamilton and Madison, then, for Martin the timing of 
impeachment was beside tlle point. 
In the actual state convention debates on ratification, 
impeachment was raised as an issue on several occasions, but 
again late impeachment was not addressed directly. 
146. See supra text accompanying nOll' 12:~. 
147. See, e.g., THE FEDERAl.ISr No. 77. al .J(}.J (,\I,·\..III<h-1 11.1II111roll) (<:lInlOlI 
Rossiter ed., 1961); id. No. 79. at .J7.J. 
148. See Luther Martin. Mr. Mnrlm:S /lIJlIntllltll11l to tltr (;rllt7l1/ .1"r7l/"') IIf III' ,\11I/~ of 
Mnrylalld, ill 2 THE CO~IPI..ETE AXfI-FEIlER.\I.IS'J 27. 6R.{i!l (Ilt-rl}("n J. Stonng "<1 • 19S 1 ) 
149. 2 id. at 68 (emphasis rl'mon·d). 
150. 2 id. at 69. 
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One concern about impeachment among opponents of the 
Constitution was that the Senate was established as the tribunal 
for trial. Relatedly, many debaters assumed that senators 
themselves were civil officers, subject to impeachment. For 
instance, John Brooks expounded at the Massachusetts ratifying 
convention as follows: 
When men are answerable, and within the- reach of 
responsibility, they cannot forget that their political existence 
depends upon their good behavior. The Senate can frame no 
law but by consent of the Representatives, and is answerable to 
that house for its conduct. If that conduct excites sllspicion. 
they are to be impeached, punished, (or prevented from 
holding any office, which is great punishment.) 1-.1 
Brooks supported the impeachability of senators, in other 
words, and understood impeachment as being about much 
more than just removal. Apropos of late impeachment, Brooks 
understood removal, disqualification, or any combination 
thereof as a threat to one's political existence, a threat that 
provided proper incentives for "good behavior."I-.t Once again. 
we see impeachment conceived as a way to guarantee propriety 
in office-a goal to which late impeachment would contribute-
rather than simply to remove malefactors from office_ 
An exchange at the North Carolina ratifying convention 
contained language that implicated late impeachment. In the 
context of a discussion of who was su~ject to impeachment. 
delegates puzzled over the Constitution's vague language and 
worried that slate officers and even private citizens migh t he 
susceptible to impeachment- I-.:1 Governor Samuel Johnston 
rejected this notion, stating: "Removal from office is the 
punishment-to which is added future disqualification. Ilow 
could a man be removed from office who had no office?"I'" 
Johnston's interpretation would seem to preclude late 
impeachment- If removal is a necessary element of punishment. 
!:, I. 2 TilE DmA n:s I, I liE SEn-RAL 51.\ H Co,n::-. I IO:-'~ 0:-' I m A!lOI'I IO' Of I I II 
FEIJER,\L CO'SIITlHO, 45 (jorl.lthan Elliot ("d., 2d ("d. IH:~6) [h("l("in.titt'1 «,J II()I'~ 
DEliA n:s I; 'PI' (/[,0 2 uf. at I fill-69 (r('cording 5amllel Stillman maklllg t ht' "\1111' 1'00nl) 
152. One can rt·;td-bllt ,hollid not n·.ld too lillich-into 111001.,', 1"(' of tht' WOld 
"or: illlpl~illg that disqllalificatlOn alollt' W.I' .1 po"iblt- pIIIli,hnll'llt (." 11 wOllld 
nl'cl'ssarily be in a late impeachml'llt case). 
153. Sn' 4 EU.lOT·S D~ 11,\ IFS, 5ll/mlllotl' 151. at :~2-:H. 
154. 4 ul. at 33; 5pr "l5O </ ul. at 49 (recording Archibald :-'Iad.llllt' Ill.lklllg 'Illlll.ll 
COlllllll'nt~) . 
HeinOnline -- 6 Tex. Rev. L. & Pol. 53 2001-2002
No.1 Law, Histor)" and Practice oJ Latl' Impl'tlchml'lIt 53 
then how could an ex-officer be impeached? But Johnston's 
comment seems to be directed more at dispelling thc notion 
that ordinary citizens could be impeached than at discussing the 
acceptable timing of impeachment u·ials. Late impeachmcnt 
does not present the problem of pursuing an individual who 
"had no office," and thus does not really conflict with Johnston's 
underlying interpretation. I ,., 
Finally, another comment at the North Carolina convcntion 
further reinforces that impeachment was designed not simply 
for removal, but as a way of promoting accountability in office. 
Framer, Ratifier, and later U.S. Supreme Court Justice James 
Iredell stated: 
[Impeachment] will be not only the means of punishing 
misconduct, but it will prevl'nt misconduct. A man in public 
office who knows that there is no tribunal to punish him, may 
be ready to deviate from his duty; but if he knows there is a 
tribunal for that purpose, although he may be a man of no 
principle, the very terror of punishmeIll will perhaps dewr 
h. 156 1m. 
Iredell's statement is perhaps the clearest one by a Framcr that 
impeachment is intended as a structural incentive for excclltive 
and judicial officials to behave. As will be discussed furthcr 
below, in the argument from constitutional structurc, latc 
impeachment is an important component of this function"~7 
Because the impeachment process is so cumbersome, it is only 
with late impeachment that the inccntivc effccts of 
impeachment extend to the later portions of an cxccutivc 
officer's term. vVithout late impeachment, as h'cdcll puts it, 
there is effectively "no tribunal to punish" such a malfcasing 
officer, who would then be all too "ready to dc\;atc from his 
duty."I58 
155. Other comments may ha\'c rcflcctcd vicws on I;ue illlpeachlllelll. but uot 
necessarily. See, e.g., 3 id. at 516 (recordingJames Madison at \,iI1,'luia coll\ellliou. ,t;1I1ug 
that a criminal Presidcnt in Icaguc \\;th senators would ,till b,' \llluerabll' to 
impeachment, as one-third of the Scnate tunled over even' t\\·o \,ear.). It ." 11I1I:Il'ar 
whether Madison was refcning to impcachment after the i'r,,,,idelll" tenn l'udl'd, or 
simply impeachment during thc Presidcnt's term after uew s,·uator. \,','r,' l'il'nl'd. 
156. 4 Uf. at 32 (emphasis addcd). 
15i. See infra Part V.A. 
158. Although the criminal law prO\;des additional iuCt'ulI\l", lIupeacilllll'ut ('mer> 
offenses that may full short of criminal \\Tongdoing or thai are too poliucal for the 
ordinary judicial process to handlc appropriateh·. Imp"adunelll .Il", pwnd ... 
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D. The Argument from History 
Impeachment in 1787 meant pursuing public offenses 
committed by public officials. Private citizens were exempt from 
such inquiries-except to the extent that they had bl'en public 
offenders who had since left office. 
There was clear precedent for late impeachments in America 
and an even clearer one in England. Several states made clear 
that late impeachments were preferred or even required, and no 
states specifically barred them. If regular impeachments were 
more common than late impeachmenL<; in America, it was only 
because they were more worthwhile, not because they were the 
only way to proceed. American impeachment was designed not 
solely to remove misbehaving officers, but to provide incentives 
against their misbehavior in the first place, a goal for which late 
impeachment provides essential support. 
When the Constitution was debated, drafted, and debated 
again, this tradition of late impeachment was not addressed 
head on. Several other limits were placed on impeachment, 
however. Another one-preventing impeachment of the 
President "whilst in office" and presupposing his late 
impeachability-was almost adopted as well. But no provision on 
late impeachment was introduced, suggesting that it was not 
part of the historical baggage of the word "impeachment" that 
the Constitution took pains to shed. 
IV. TEXT 
The text of the Constitution places several significant limits on 
the impeachment power, but it neither explicitly authorizes [lor 
explicitly forbids late impeachments. Indeed, read over-literally, 
it does not even limit impeachment to civil officers, let alone 
sitting officers. 1-." But regardless of whether impeachment is 
limited to civil officers or is not limited at all, the text of the 
Constitution does not foreclose the possibility of late 
impeachment. The textual argument against late impeachment 
is a defensible one, to be sure, but it is not the best 
in terpretation of the text. 
p"nbhmenL' that the criminal law does not. Srr III/Ill note' 2:F, ,lIul '.!.71 .\IId 
accompanying text. 
159. For cOIl\'enience. the term "civil oflicers- i~ lI'ed here to ,('\(" not III~t to 
federal civil omcer~ but aho the Vice President ,\lid the President. S"" <l1/I/lI IIot!' 17. 
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A. Everything but Article II, Sl'ctioll -I 
The Constitution establishes tllat the House and Senate have 
the main responsibility for construing the breadth of their own 
impeachment powers, They are given the sole powers to 
, h l60 d ' I 1"1 d tl I' Impeac an to try Impeac lments, an ley are a so gl\'en 
the authority to make their own rules for their proceedings,l.:! 
Because the Constitution commits tllese matters to their 
discretion, their determinations generally are not susceptible to 
judicial review,l63 Further strengtllening Congress's dominion, 
the President's otherwise plenary power to pardon is void with 
regard to impeachments, 1M 
The Constitution does, however, provide some specific limits 
on the impeachment power in Article I, Section 3: The Senate 
must sit on oath or affirmation; tlle Chief Justice presides when 
the President is tried; a two-thirds m<~jority is required for 
conviction; and the outer limit of tlle Senate's sentence upon 
conviction is removal plus disqualification from holding oflice,h.·, 
160, U.S. CONSf. art. I, § 2, d. 5. 
161. Id. § 3, cl. 6. 
162. Id. § 5, cl. 2. 
163. Nixon v. United States, 506 L'.S. 224, 234 (l99:~) (-['nh,' Jllthn.ln, .lIld th,' 
Supreme Coun in particular, were nOI chosen to han' all\ rol,' in IInp";Ichlll,'n~,-); .rr 
also id. at 253-54 (Souter, j., concurring) (-If the S,'nat" w,'n' (0 , , , nllmn [ J, ... 1" 
upon a coin toss, or upon a summar), determination thaI .1Il ollin'r of Ihl' t'lIItl'd St;lIl"> 
was simply a 'bad guy,' judicial interference mighl wdl b,' appropnall',- (1II1t'm.II 
quotation marks and citation omilled». 
This is not to say that the House can impeach ;\II\OIll' it \\~lIll' .11 .1 "llIIn, II '1lIIph 
means that the House is the lead interprell'r of the COlhlillllion Oil tim 1 ... ,Ul' , AII(l\\'III~ 
judicial review would not change the standard. it \\'ould jlL't .Idd .1 "'If"~lI.Ird b, .l(ldill~ 
another institutional interpreter of the standard. Bill flow bl'sid,,,, Ih,· ''YnK.11 '\OlIld ... 1\ 
that with judicial review the House could impeach all\onl' Ihal th,' .\lIprnnr CUII,t \\~IIl~ II 
to impeach. Just as the Supreme Court wOllld be prt'Mlm,'d 10 .Ipph th,' Il'qllbll,' 
constitutional standard. so too is the HOlL~l' bOllnd b, til<' COII,II till 1<111 , rhl'rl' I', 01 
course, a rich literature on the subject of non:jlldicial comtilllllollal 1Il1,'rprl't.lllol1 ''''''' 
e.g., MARK TUSHNET, TAKI:-IG HIE CO:-;SrI rlTIO:-; :\\\'\\' FRO\! lin COl RI'> (19!19); 
SA>"FORD LEVINSON, CONSfITl'TIO:-:AI. FAITII 27-:~0. :~7-5() (19SS) (d"linlll~ -c.llhoh,-- .lIId 
"protestant" approaches to imerpretiw authority); :'\l':l1 Knlllal K.II\~II, [.rgulllttt· .. 
Constitulio1UIi Interpretation, 50 Dl'KE LJ. 13:~5 (2001); ~Iirhad Sto!..,,, I':lnl.,..n. 'J1r .. ,\10.1 
Dangerous Branch: Executive POlllrr to Sa)' II'hlll IIII' /"a", [1, S:~ CHI, 1.J. 217 (I 99'1J /Jut.rr 
Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer, 0" Exlrajlll/lrln/ C",,,tlfllt""1II1 ["tnp,YIIII"'", Ilu 
HARv. L. REv. 1359 (1997) (arguing in fa\'or of judicial Sllpn'III:1('\ ), 
164. See supra texl accompanying notel:~; "'Ira Il'XI accolllp.III\ 1Il~ 1101" :.1ti:.1 /Jilt ll'r 
KaIt, supra note 13, at 790-93 (posllliating other limitation. Oil Ih,' p.mioll po" .. ! I 
165. U.S. CaNST. art. I. !i 3, cis. 6-7. \\,hik n'mo\~II I, 1II.lIId:l1U1'\ (II .Ippl .... lbl,·1 
upon con\iction, disqualification is not; Ihe {)\'er\\'h"'nlln~ lIIaJonl' 01 ,,'IIIl'IIC<" ul'(JII 
comiction have not included disqualification. S('(' "'1m IlOt,' :,2:.1, /Jilt ll'..-JOII.llh.1II I min, 
Smale Trials and Factional Disputl's: Impradllnl'III (/S a Mmil""'1Il11l O""Ia, ,19 DI hl 1..) I, 7:.1 
11.349 (1999) (contending that -the fail un' 10 sel'!.. di~luahlir,lIIol1 '\ lilt .1 1l'1II""t1 I' 
HeinOnline -- 6 Tex. Rev. L. & Pol. 56 2001-2002
56 Texas ReviP1V of Law & Politics Vol. () 
It also provides some limitations elsewhere, in Articlc II, 
Section 4, which will receive separate consideration below. 1M. 
Another limit that the Constitution places is that 
impeachments must be "impeachments," a point that is no less 
important for being obvious. If the word "impeachmcnt" 
connotes something limited-i.e., if only certain actions call 
occur within the true meaning of the word "impeachment"-
then the reach of the congressional impeachment power is 
similarly limited. lh' 
An analogous if extreme example may make this point better. 
Congress can grant letters of marque and reprisal,If'" but it 
cannot grant titles of nobility. I"" A letter of marque and reprisal 
is a document that gives permission to a private citizen to outfit 
a warship and plunder the ships of foreign enemies. 17" The 
Constitution does not offer this definition, but the term "letter 
of marque and reprisal" had a meaning and a context in 17H7, 
such that the power granted by the Constitution to Congress ill 
this regard was specific and limited.I'1 Congress cannot simply 
name you a hereditary Baron, label the appointment a letter or 
marque and reprisal, and declare that Baron is not a title or 
nobility. The point is not that the Constitution defines the terms 
"title of nobility" and "marque and reprisal"-it does not. The 
conceptuall) difficult to under~tand"). Furthermore. once a twO·thl1d~ malollty h.l~ heell 
obtained for com'inion, only a simple m.!jority i~ required to dbqu.lhlr the deft-nd.1111. 
Srr Bl·~II,\~.I.L. slI/Jra note 16. at 239 (de~cribing thirtr-nim' to Ilmty-live \ott' th.lt 
disqualified Judge Robert Archbald); Irr a/5o G~.RII,\R[) I, III/Jla 1I0tt' 12 .• It 7i{.7!) (notlllg 
Senate practice of requiring only a majority lor di~qualilication hut .ugllmg th.lt two· 
thirds should be required). 
166. Srr il/fm Part IV.B. 
167. Sa Gibbons v. Ogden. 22 l·.S. (9 WheaL) I, IH9 ("[ 0 1m wmtitlltion he111g .• 1' 
wa., aptly said at the bar, one of enumenltlOlI. and not of definitIOn. to .1'ct·1 t.lln the 
extent of the power, it becomes necessary to ~ettle the meaning 01 the word."); ){,\\\ I ~, 
HI/1m note 35, at 210 ("Impeachmenl~ are Ihus introdllced as a known ddinitt, 1('1111 •• ul(l 
we mll~t han' recollrse to the commol/ (aw of HI/g{m,,{ for a definition 01 the111.'·); If. 111/", 
note 351 and accompanying (ex I. Admittedly, 'L' legal realist and then-I 1011'(' Minolll\ 
Leader Gerald Ford put it, an "impeachable offeme i~ whalever a majorilY of Ihe 1101I,t, 
of Repre~entatives con~iders to be at a given mOIlH'nt ill hiMory." Ilti CO;\l( .. RH . II," 1:1 
(1970) (stalement of Rep. Ford). But the Iioll'e (and Ihe Senale) h.I~.1 dill,· 10 1001 11' 
"considerations" in the COnS(illltion. alld hislorically il has done 'I'. 
16H. l' .S. Co,\s·!. art. I, ~ H, cL I L 
169. frl. ~ 9, cL H. 
170. Srr gmrm{Zl' Charles A. l.ofgren, lI'm·Maklllg (llIda /lIP (;01l\/lIl1llOlI: nil" ()"K/1/(/1 
['l/dffS/lIlIdillg, HI Y,\I.E I.J. 672. 692-96 (1972). BII/ ,pp gmrmllyJult" I.ohel. "1,,1/['- 1\,11\" 
alld /!lp COllsll/II/IOII, 50 l'. ~\'IIA~II 1.. REV. 61. 67·69 (1995) (arguing lo( hroadt"1 dclillllll>ll 
of marque and reprisal a~ embod\"ing tht" conct"pl or impt"rit"cl war). 
171. For thost" who disfavor looking to Iht" original Ilndt'I'landlllg. ''It'lIt'l 01 
marque" has the ~ame mt"aning today . .<irr BL\( ,,'~ 1.\\1' DIClIO;\lARY 917 (71h "d. 19<)9) 
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point, rather, is that a "letter of marque and reprisal" is what it is 
and nothing more. The limits of the meaning of the tenll 
"marque and reprisal" represent congruent limits on the power 
actually given to Congress to grant the letters. 
There is a sound basis for attributing a limited definition to 
the word "impeachment" in the United States in 1787, namely 
that it comprehended only proceedings conceming public 
officials' conduct of their jobs. l 7:! Put another way, if the House 
were to try to impeach me, a private citizen, for stealing oflice 
supplies from the private law school where I teach, its action 
would be as void as your baronage. As a House manager put it in 
an actual late impeachment trial, "[T] he jurisdiction of the 
Senate by the very naming of impeachment per se is confined to 
official crimes."m A congressional prosecution of a private 
citizen simply would not be an "impeacluneI1l. "I~' 
At first glance, the English precedents might seem to suggest 
othenvise, because English impeachment technically was not 
limited to public offenses or public ofTenders.I~·. But the 
impeachment of peers for private misconduct was b'Lo;eci on the 
fact that the ordinary courts were not equipped to try such 
significant defendants.I~6 In the United States, with no nobility, 
this form of impeachment did not u'Ulslate. As for the 
impeachment of commoners, in practice this at least was limited 
to state offenses-the domain of Parliament-and had in any 
case fallen into desuetude long before 1787.177 
Though English impeachment evolved to include these limits, 
American impeachment included them all along. Private 
citizens were pursued through the regular criminal process or 
through attainder, but not through impeachment.I~" When the 
newly independent states wrote their constitutions, they made 
172. "Impeachment" certainly had such a limiled connol'llion once Ihc 
Constitution became well eslablished. bill Ihis simph ccOl'ell> Ihl' IIIllucncc of 
subsequent interprelation, a son of lexlUal boOlslcap Ihal doo nOl a(h~lIIcc !lIt. 
argumenL See, e.g., Slate v. Hill. 55 N.\\'. 794. 796 (Nl.'b. 189:~) (-Hl.'rl.' nonc bUI public 
officers are subject to impeachment."); 2 STORY, supra nOll' 42. al 2:n (-Thc o[kllcn. 10 
which the power of impeachment has been. and is ordinarih' applil·d. ,I!> .1 ccmc(h. arc of 
a political character."j. 
173. BEl.Kl'lAPTRL-\l., supra note IS. al 54. 
174. This is so regardless of whal Artick II. li 4 h,l!> 10 S;I\ aboul who l~1II bc 
impeached and for what. See infra Pan IV.B. 
175. See supra text accompanying nOll' 3S. 
176. See supra text accompan)ing nOle 40. 
177. See supra note 47 and accompan)ing II.'XI. 
178. See supra text accompan)ing noll' 61. 
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this limitation on impeachment clear."" The single exception to 
this was that former public officials-technically private citiJ:ens 
at the time of trial-were impeached for prior public actions. I"" 
By 17R7, then, "impeachment" had come to mean a process for 
the legislature to inquire into and prosecute public offenses 
committed by public officials. 
If the federal constitutional provisions on impeachmellt 
discussed above had been the only ones written into the federal 
Constitution, it would be much clearer that late impeachment is 
allowed. Even those who aclhere to a wholly literalist reading of 
the Constitution devoid of context would concede that, other 
than explicit limits specified in the text, the congressional 
impeachment power is as broad as the word "impeachment" 
itself. While the definition of impeachment can be restricted to 
exclude private offenses and private offenders, there is nothing 
inherent in the notion of impeachment that requires the 
process to begin or conclucle while the defendant is .\till a public 
official. 
B. Articlf II, Sfrtion 4 
There IS, of course, one other significant clause 011 
impeachment in the Constitution, Article II, Section 4: "The 
President, Vice President and all civil Officers of the United 
States, shall be removed from Oftice on Impeachment for, alld 
Conviction of, Treason, Bribery. or other high Crimes and 
Misdemeanors."lxl This clause has been interpreted !;lirly 
decisively as limiting the impeachment power further, so that it 
reaches only civil officers and only high crimes and 
misdemeanors. Because some have construed the limitation to 
"civil officers" additionally as restnctmg the timing of 
impeachment, Article II, Section 4. plays a uniquely important 
part in the interpretation oflate impeachment. 
I. The Over-Literal Reading: Helpful but Wrong 
This limiting construction is not the only one possible for 
Article II, Section 4. Another reading of the provision-which I 
will concede has been soundly rejected, even though it would 
179. Sff' I/I/ml Pan III.B.2. 
IHO. .\f'(" <Il/ml text accolJlpall~illg 11Ot(", ()()·()9. 
I H I. IT.s. Co, ~ I. alt. II. :i .1. 
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make the case for late impeachment a slam dunk-is the over-
literal one. Under this reading: 
The Constitution does not undertake to definc the nature and 
fonn of impeachment, or its scope and boundaries. . . . 
[T]he House of Representatives may impeach for other 
offenses, abuses, failures, and wrongs than thosc included in 
the tenns "treason, bribery, and othcr high C1imcs and 
misdemeanors." [I]t may impeach othcr partics than the 
"President, Vice President, and other civil ofiiccrs of the 
United States."182 
The basis of this argument is that Article II, Section -l provides 
on its face only a mandatory sentence: if a civil oflicer is 
impeached and convicted of a high crime or misdemeanor, he 
must be removed. It does not say that onZ), civil oflicers can be 
impeached. It does not say that impeachment can ollZy be for 
high crimes or misdemeanors. It says one thing, and one thing 
alone: if the party is a civil officer, and if the charge is it high 
crime or misdemeanor, then conviction requires removal. In 
other words, Congress can aiso pursue non-oflicers, non-high 
crimes, or both at once, and can either remove the convict in 
such cases or not. Under such a limited interpretation of Article 
II, Section 4, late impeachment is obviously within the power of 
Congress-as is the impeachment of jaywalkers or f~unil)' pets. I!\5 
Such an approach-parsing the text of a clause in isolation 
from the rest of the Constitution, oblivious to the general 
context and larger structure of the document-commits the 
error described by Laurence Tribe as misL:"1king a gap in a map 
for a hole in the space it describes. 1M Impeachment has a 
context and a meaning deeper than that yielded by wooden, 
out-of-context readings of constitutional clauses. A better 
practice is to reason based on broader textual clues, structure, 
182. BEL&'1APTruAL, supra note 18. at 146 (opiuion of Senator IU·\ I, 
183. This debate most recently empted O\'er till" CliulOu illlpeachlllelll. III \\'Illch 
some commentators argued t1lat impeac\lIuent uet"d uol be for high cnllln .lIId 
misdemeanors. E.g.,Joseph lseubergh, Impradllnml alld Pmldml/(/llrnllllltlll) from j1ll11Clt11 
Process, 29 YALE L & POL 'y REv. 53, 62·77 (1999) (a'1,,'lIing Ihal Anic\l· 11. li ·1 don nOI 
define impeachable offenses, but merely requir~"S Ihe n·IIlO\'al frolll "fIire of Ihe ,I.lled 
class upon conviction of various serious offensl"S). Tho>l' who 1U01.. all .... , hll·r.1I \1l"\' or 
Article II, Section 4, such as Professor Akhil Amar. offered Ihe ja\'>';lll..lIlg- ",,'ell.lnll .~ 
rebuttal. Akhil Reed Amar, 011 Irnpendlillg PTl'sidl'1lis, 28 HOFSI1{A 1.. RE\'. 291. :~23 ( 19')<JI. 
For his pan, Isenbergh argued that impeachmelll \\'ollid be limiled IU Iho'l" ,-nllllll.1I 
offenses that were historically the subjecl ofimpeac\ullt"ul. Isl'lIbt·rgh. ",pm. al!Ji 
184. Laurence Tribe, Takillg Texi alld Sin/clll .... SmOl"~l: RrJ1«lw,,, 011 r;rt'rimn .\lrlhDd 
in Conslitulionallllterpreiniioll, 108 HAR\,. L. RE\'. 1221. 12:~9-E', (199:, I, 
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context, and history and to deduce what must fill the space that 
the map has failed to describe. 
To be fair, the over-literalist argument sketched out above is 
something of a straw man (with due respect intended to those 
who actually subscribe to it) constructed by those who oppose 
late impeachment. Such opponents have argued that if Article 
II, Section 4 allowed for late impeachment, it would not ofler 
any limits at all on impeachment; therefore, late impeachment 
must not be allowed. 18:; But this syllogism is not valid. Even if 
Article II, Section 4 does not limit impeachment to civil offiens. 
neither does it authorize Congress to impeach offenders who 
never served in office. As discussed above, the impeachment 
power is inherently limited by the bounds of the definition of 
the term "impeachment" itself, and these bounds do not include 
impeaching wholly private citizens.l"b They do, however. include 
late impeachment. 
Therefore, while the over-literalist argument is too unpopular 
an interpretation on which to rest the case for late 
impeachment, one should reject the reductio (ul abSllrdll1ll 
argument leveled against it by the opponents of late 
impeachment. The parade of horribles marshaled by the over-
literalists is in reality a short one, including as potential 
additional targets for impeachment only members of Congress 
and perhaps state officials but not people who have never been 
in office. There are structural and precedential reasons to 
exclude members of Congress and state oflicials from the 
domain of federal impeachment;I"; moreover, one who starts 
with the literalist reading but is not averse to using other 
interpretive tools can limit impeachment to "civil officers" 
without using Article II, Section 4 and without implying a 
limitation on the timing of proceedings that would exclude late 
. h 1M lmpeac ment. 
185. See supra text accompanying note 2:1. 
186. See wpra text accompanying notes Itii-80. 
18i. Although the federal Constitution doe~ comtrain .,tate offici.ll, ." well .1' 
federal ones, these constrainl~ arc few and very specific (e.K .• the 1111111, 011 '1.lit' 
governments in Article I, ~ 10; the oath requirement in Artide VI. ~ :1). Re~'lIdlll~ 
members of Congress, see ill/ra note 19i. 
188. A lingering problem with such a reading is thai il would 1101 hnlll 11111)(,.1<'11.1"1(' 
offenses to high crimes and misdemeanors. To be ~lIre. this i~ 1I0t whollv IIl11l'a,oll.I"k, 
gi\'en the implication in Article III. ~ I that judges can be impeached lor mel(' 1.11"1" III 
"beha\;or- that rail short of high misdemeanors, COllgre,s has ~('t'med 10 applv 1111' 10WI'I 
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2. The Expressio Unius Reading: Four Possible Interpretations 
In any case, Article II, Section 4 does limit impeachment to 
civil officers. l89 More precisely, it has been used to limit 
impeachment to civil officers. The over-literalists are correct that 
there are no explicit limits in the text, and their critics are often 
guilty of citing Article II, Section 4 as if the text clearly says 
something that it does not. l90 The limiting effect of Article II, 
Section 4 is based on one of two contemporaneous 
understandings of the clause, which was subsequently adopted 
by Congress and scholars. 191 This understanding takes Article II, 
Section 4 as a sort of expressio ulliusl •r! description of 
impeachment that mentions who can be impeached and for 
what, and that implicitly excludes any otller subjects not listed:'" 
Congress's very first impeachment case reached this issue"'" and 
with the passage of years it has largely become settled,I"" though 
standard to judges, though it has purported to use the "high crimt~ and nmdl"ml".ultll'>" 
standard in each case. Sa infra note 198. 
189. The Blount case is taken as settling this matter. Sri" ",/m nute :iOO; lU IIlw ~ 
STORY, supra note 42, at 257-64 (noting Blount prt·cedt·nt .n\(\ dl"danng th;u 
impeachment is limited to civil officers and high crimes and miMil"ml"anurs). 
The term "civil officer" is used here to indud .. the President and \'jce I'rnldent. .'i<-.. 
supra note 17. 
190. See, e.g., Ronald D. Rotunda, All Essay Oil /,,~ COIu/llu/wllal I'"rnlllr/rn u/ Frllrml 
Impeachment, 76 KY. LJ. 707, 715 & n.37 (1988) (citing unly Artide n, § 4 fur prop'l>itiun 
that "[tlhe Constitution limits the impeachment power to 'all chil Officl"r" of lhl" l'1II1t·d 
States'"); 2 STORY, supra note 42, at 255-57 (discussing samd. 
191. James Wilson, Framer and original Suprenw Coun JU"lICl', ,lth~lIIced IIIl> 
interpretation. 1 JA.\IES Wn.so:-\, supra nOll' 43, al 4~6 ("In lhe l'nul"d SI.lln . 
impeachments are confined 10 polilical char.ICler'>, to puliliGl1 crimn ,lIId 
misdemeanors, and to political punishments. TIle presidenl, ';Cl" prl"sidl"lll, allll .111 CI\11 
officers of the United States ... are liable to impeachmelll .... -j. Prof...."".,r Akllll 
Reed Amar surveys this and other similar slatemenl:> by Fr.lml"l'> and lhl" ",hu!;lrh 
consensus in Amar, supra note 183, at 333-34. 
192. The full phrase is expTl'ssio limIts ~s/ excl.tslO "I/mll.>: 10 expliclll\' 1lIl"II11UII UIII" 
thing is to (implicitly) exclude otllers. 
193. Amar, supra note 183, at 332 ("[Tlhe maillslream \;ew hold,. lhal (1)\ I"xpr..,."lu 
unius) Article II protects private citizens from impeachmt'lll; alld hl"rl" Amell" II h.l'-
worked perfectly, confirming many Founding Slatt'lllt'lIl:> lhal illlpeachllll"lIl \\,l'- IUlIlll"d 
to 'officers.'"). 
194. See irifra Part VIAl. 
195. See supra note 189. 
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some scholars still disagree, I'''. and others offer a few suhlle 
distinctions. I!>. 
The expressio unzus VIew further notes that Article II, Section 
4's discussion of impeachment-covering civil officers who 
commit high crimes and misdemeanors, and who are removed if 
convicted-is the only place that the Constitution addresses 
196. For an entertaining exchange on the ~ubjecl-not limiled 10 dbnl,,-,ion of "'/'" 
can be impeached but also for what they can be impeached-st"{· the ('xcllange between 
Professor Akhil Reed Amar of Yale Law School and Stuart Taylol .lr. of the N,llion,t1 
Journal in Amar, 51lpranote 183, a1317-41. 
197. My own \~ew of impeachabilily and Ill(' definilion of impearh'lhle ollt'nst" " 
that !i 4 gives the impeachment siandard only for execullve ofli< ers and Ieave~ I elllt)\',11 
in Ihe legislati\e and judicial branches 10 Ihe Expulsion and Cood Ikh,lvi", (:I,n"e' 
respectivefy, See U.S, CO:-;ST. art. I, !i 5. cl. 2; 1(1. al art. III, !i I. 
This view of Article II. !i 4 makes the following textual and struclural ca~e: Congll'" 
can pursue any public offense by a public oflicial; anything d~e would not he ,In 
"impeachment." See sllpra note 167 and accompanying text. There are Ihree Ivpe' of 
oflicials thai might be sul~ect to Ihis sort of a,,-,ault: it"gislalive, executive. ,\lid Judit 1.11 
Legislative oflicials are subject 10 expubion. not impeachmenl. hUI Ih" m,lI-.t·, \('n\(' 
given thaI (I) expulsion is ~pecified in Ihe Comtitution. U.S. CO:-;SI. art. I. !i :'. t I. 2; (2) 
expulsion requires a Iwo·thirds vote in Ihe expelling houw. whirh replt'\('nl' .1 'hghlh 
diffel·ent. bUI nol appreciahly lower consensu~ Ihan impeachmenl. vr 1(1.; .lIul (:~) wlllk 
the punishment via expulsion is more limited than Ihat for impeachmenl. Iht'II' " .1 
sound basis fill' distingubhing between ~ingle elccled ollieials in largt· kgi,I.lli\'(' hod It·, 
on the one hand and lifetime-appointed judge" un-eJectcd cxeculi\'(' olliccls. ,\lid IIIl" 
natiol1all) powcrful Pre,ident and Vice Presidenl on the otht'l han(1. Srr (;HU IMUlI. 
jllIJl'{/ note 12. al 75-77 (di,cussing textual and Mrllctllral algum('nl, ,Igiunsl Ihe 
impeachabilil) of members of Congres.,); if- A Nalhc of Virginia (/.Imt·, ~Iollloe). 
Ob,n1lr,liolB 111'01/ Ihl' Propo,wl I'lfIl/ oj Fedl'ml (;mwmmmi. I1l I TII~, WRIIIN(;!'. ()~ .I,\~I~' 
~IO:-;RO~. (Stanislaus Murra)' Hamilton ed., New York. C.I'. Putnam's SOli' 11<91<). 
available at http://prel>S-pubs.uchicago.edu/filllllders/ documcllt,/ a 1_2_:" 12.h 11111 
("The Senators having a power over their OWII melllber~. have Iht· I ighl of expllt-IOII. 
Why then should the~ be impeachable?"). 
Executive oflicials are subject to impeachment as dt'MTibed in Allicle II. ~ 'I. Thl" 
President, Vice President. and the nOIl-ell'cted. non·mililill) ollkc" of Ih(' ex('( UII\'(' 
branch can he impeached ror high crime, and mbdemeanors. If Ihey al t· (onvi( It'd. Ihn 
are remO\'ed and po~,ibly disqualified from fillure service a~ well. Althollgh ~ I ,ll'l'e,I" 
onl} to require a certain punishment upon a certain Iype of conviclion. Ihe .Iltelll.lli\(" " 
a complete lack of standard~. and so an o:pre"l0 IlIlII(' reading of Ihi' (1.1I1S(· i, 
appropriate. Article II. !i 4 i, mcanl 10 constrain notjllst Ihe t'xeCllliv(' olfi( e" ,"hje( I 10 
it but tht' Congres., applying it as well. 
Judges (and here is where Ihis interprelalion <hlf • ." .. s from the om' dt·\( I ihl"d in Ihl" 
main text) are 5ul~ect to impeachmenl notjusl for high crillles and lIIi,delll(·,ulO". hili 
also fOJ' lIIisbehavior. U.S. (;0:-;5 r. art. III. !i I. Because t·x(·nlli\'(· ollicial, '('rve f", 
limited terms. it makes sense to have a higher Ihrt'shold for rt'mo"al Ih,m jlldge'. who 
would othelwise not be removable ror. say. chronic drunkt'nne,~. Indeed. impea( hml"lIl 
has touched such private nmconduct. Srr. r.g .. mIra Pari VLAA (de,cribing (',1M' ol.lllelg(· 
Delahay. a reputed drunk); VA:>' TASSEL & FI"KEL~f.\:\. "'IITil note I. al 91-9:> (elt',cllhlllg 
case of Judge John Pickering. convicted ror "lOlal intoxication" among olht'l Ihlll~') 
Although the Senate ha~ purported to apply the Sillll(' 51anditrtl 01 high tl illl("\ .mel 
misdemeanors to judge,. and many commentalor~ belil"\(' Ihal Ihl" IlIgh 
crimes/misbehin;or distinction is nol constJllllionally ~ignilirant. il i, (11"al Ih,11 ,1Ie1gt·, 
have faced a lower threshold. SI'I' infra note 191<. 
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such issues of scope. Therefore, this must be all there is. I'" In a 
sense, this reading views the silence about the scope of 
impeachment as implicitly adding tile words "The only way that 
impeachments go is that ... " before "[ t] he Presidellt, Vice 
President and all civil Officers of the United States, [arc 1 
removed from Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction of. 
Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors." It is 
of no moment that Article II, Section 4 only purports to provide 
a mandatory punishment and tllat it is set apart from the 
provisions in Article I that spell out and limit congressional 
impeachment power. I !'-' 
But let's get to the point. Even if this is "all there is" in the 
text-that is, that impeachment only applies to "ci"il oflicers"-
what does that necessarily tell us about the timing of 
impeachment? Very little. Indeed, it not only tells us very little 
about the timing of tile trial, it also says nothing about the 
timing of the offense. Thus, tllere are four possible versions of 
the scope of impeachment witllin tile expressio 1l7lillS reading: 
198, See BEl.Kl"AP TRIAl., supra noll' 18, al 98 (opinion of Sl·11.I101 1I00,l" (-[ \\' Ie 
have not a suggestion as to who may bl' impeaclll'd, I 1Il\',e1f lilld Ih.1I III Ihl' 10111 th 
section, second article, and I can lind il nowhere l'Ise."); Ill. al 12:~ (opilllon 01 St-1I.lIor 
McMillan), 
Federal judges are also impliedly impeachabll' for IIlbbeha\;or. \,'Illch .... ·l'lIl, 10 
undermine this reading of Ihe c1ausl' ;L~ exclusive, This is espl'cialh' M) g1\l'lI Ih.1I Jlldgl'" 
are civil officers, See U,S, COl'sr. art. II, S 2. d, 2 ('Iatillg Ihal Ihl' I'n ... idl'lII -,h.11I 
appoint. , . judges of the supreml' Court. and all ol},t'T OillCl'rs of thl' L'lIl1l'd SI.II<"-' 
(emphasis added); id, at arL Ill, § I (-The judges, both of Ihe ,uprellle ;lIId IIIlenor 
Courts, shall hold their OfficI'S during good Bl'Ila\iour , , , ,-) (elllph;I>" .uldl'd" 
Congress has not invoked the Good Beha\;or ClalL~l', and h;L' purpurted 10 .11'1''' Ih,' 
single standard of Article II, § 4 to judges, 
Many commentators belie\'e Ihal Ihere is onl' unilil·d 'landaI'd, , .... r. ',g .. (;~ RII \RIlI. 
supra note 12, at 83-86 (discussing this \;ew): jeff SessiulI' &: Alldrew Slgl"I, JUlluwl 
Independence: Did the ClintQIl Imprad/lnl'llt Trial EITJ(/l' IIIl' I'mlClpll'l. 29 Cl'\\II, L RH ,IS9, 
512 (1999) (citing consensus, including Juslice SIO!"Y); Cass SlIl1>ll'lII. /III/>mt/,,"r. II" 
President, 147 U, PA. L REv, 279, 304 (1998) (-I do nol belie\(' Ih.lI tim .uglllll,·111 l' 
com;ncing. judges may not bl' removed from OillCl' for bad beha\101; Ihl'\ 1I1.l\ he' 
removed only for high crimes and misdemeanors, -), Olhl'l"> do nOI. ....r. ~ r. .. Bt R(.~ R. 
supra note 29, at 122-80 (arguing for separ.lIe judicial rt'IIl()\~11 'Iand.ud); ,\IIl.lf, ",pm 
note 183, at 327 (expressing belief in separ.lIl' slandanb and l10lillg Ih;lI -[llhulIghlllll 
scholars are not of one mind onlhis poinl-), 
Either \\'ay, judges have undoubtedly been held to a IO\\'l'r ,I.llld.mi. ,"'r" \, I \,..,~ 1 &: 
FINKEDIAN, supra note I, al 8: Sunslein, supra. al :~O.J (-[IIIi-IOI' h;L'1I11.llIlhlglluI1,h 
converged on tile judgment Ihal Ihert· j,. a IOWl'r Ihrt',hold for JlIdg,'" Ih.1II Iu. 
presidents."). Given this hislorical realilY, and ),';\('11 Ih .. IIllxl·d COn'l'n'lb .ullung 
commentators, it is reasonable 10 conclude Ihal judge, an' lIldl·,·d held Iu .1 I"'\{'I 
standard, 
1 99, See supra nOle 90, 
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I. "Civil officer" limits the timing of both the offense and 
the trial. A person can only be impeached ir he was a civil 
officer when he committed the orrense and if he is currelltly a 
civil officer.2f){l (This "conservative" view desnibes every 
convicted impeachment derendant to date.) 
2. "Civil officer" limits the timing or the orrense but 1I0t the 
trial. A person can be impeached at any time, as long as he was 
a civil officer when he committed his ofrense. (The "late 
impeachment" view.) 
3. "Civil officer" limits the timing of the trial but not the 
offense. A person can be impeached regardless of when the 
offense was committed, as long as he is currently a civil officer. 
(The Clinton/"Whitewater" view, or, 111 the spirit of 
bipartisanship, the Bush/"Iran-Contra" view.) 
4. "Civil officer" limits neither the timing of the offellse 1I0r 
the trial. A person can be impeached at any time, regardless or 
when his offense was committed, as long as he was a civil 
officer at some point in his life. (The "radical" view.) 
This breakdown can be placed in a two-by-two chan: 
iW usl lhe offense have occurred 
while the offender was in office? 
Yes 
No 
A'l ust thf' Imrt)' In"f'srn I ~Y bl' in 
o{ficf'? 
Yes No 
1 (consnwllivf') 2 (lalp) 
3 (Whill'7.va/l'r) "' (radical) 
Interpretation #4, the radical version of late impeachment, is 
immediately problematic. It eviscerates the limitations inherent 
in the word "impeachment," because it allows people to be 
impeached who not only committed offenses wholly 
unconnected with their service, but who are not currcntly 
serving in any office. By using the term "officer" neither as a 
basis to define the offense nor as a basis to define the defendant 
in any relevant way, #4 expands impeachment beyond all 
reasonable compass. It renders the use of the term "officer" an 
illogical and arbitrary formalism. 
The principal benefit of Interpretation #2 is that, by basing 
congressional jurisdiction on the status of the offender at the 
time of the offense, it reinforces the notion that "impeachmcnt" 
for "high crimes and misdemeanors" is limited to offenscs 
200. This \"it'w possibly could be divi(kd into two ,eparate \"ari.IIl". nit" olli((' III 
which tIlt' ""Iwct committed tht" ol1"el1'e ma) or lIlay not be the '.IIIIt· .1' the olli( e III 
which the ,uspect is currently ,erving. This i"ue I' di'cw.,ed further below. III 1'.11 t V.I' 
HeinOnline -- 6 Tex. Rev. L. & Pol. 65 2001-2002
No.1 Law, Histo1)!, and Practice oj Late Impeachment 65 
committed by public officers qua public officers.ON ' In other 
words, if impeachment is supposed to be about offenses that, as 
The Federalist put it, "proceed from the misconduct of public 
men . . . [and] may with peculiar propriety be denominated 
POLITlCAL,"202 it only makes sense that the term "ch'il officers" 
refers to the offender at the time of the offense, regardless of 
what has happened to him in the lengthy interim of discovery, 
accusation, debate, impeachment, more debate, and conviction. 
Indeed, this is the clear scope of the impeachment powers 
specified in the state constitutions written before 17S7.M It also 
tracks the way English impeachment was timed, which is 
significant given the textual fact that the Framers explicitly 
changed the rules where they found English practice 
unsuitable-and they made no such explicit change with regard 
to the timing of trials.2Q.I 
The principal defects in #2 are that it makes the term "civil 
officer" appear to apply to people who are no longer civil 
officers and that it may moot Article II, Section ·1's mention of 
removal by applying to people who have no office from which to 
be removed. But removal is just a penalty on convictioll-if 
applicable-and does not purport to be a further description of 
who is impeachable. Put another way, the removal requirement 
is a check on officers, not a protection for them. j\,loreover, 
removal is not the only penalty facing the target of an 
impeachment. 205 
Criminal statutes that specify penalties in similar ways 
generally are interpreted this way; thus, the Constitution should 
be alsO.206 To take just one example, the federal statute OIl 
bribing agricultural inspectors specifies: 
201. See BELK.'<AP TRIAL, supra nOll' 18. al 154 (opinion uf S"'n,lIor Keman) 
(asserting similar argument). 
202. THE FEDERALIST No. 65, al 396 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clllllun Ru",lIl'r .. d .. 
1961); see (liso supra nOle 191 (reporting similar comn1<"111 from Jam .. .." \\,il'>tlll). 
203. See supra Pari 1Il.B.2. 
204. See supra nOle 142 and accompaming Il'XI. 
205. See infra Pari V.B and V11L-\ (discussing disqllalificaliun p,,·.IoII1\) .md 1',111 
VlILB (discussing possibility of olher penalties). 
206. See, e.g., BELK.'<AP TRIAL, SIIpra nOll' 18, al 1-l8 (opilllun uf S,,·n.llo. D.\I\'n) 
(citing embezzling statules forbidding certain cundllcl b\ "oflin'I'1> -); 111 •• 11 1:)·1 (opllllon 
of Senator Kernan) (citing stalllle prmiding Ihal -"'wr\' oflin'''- cUllllllllllng e .. rt'lIn 
crimes "shall, upon comiction, be rl'mm·l'd from oflicl' and fon'\''''r 11I"·I' ... III .. r b .. • 
incapable of holding any office under Ihl' llnill'd Slatl'S-); ul. al :{G·I (UpilllUII of Senator 
\\'adleigh) (arguing thaI "such a COnSlnlClion wOllld b .. • .. I,,"rd- if appht'd 10 ,lIcll 
statlllCS). 
HeinOnline -- 6 Tex. Rev. L. & Pol. 66 2001-2002
66 Texas Review oj Law & Politics Vol. I) 
[AJ ny inspector ... or other officer or employee of the 
United States ... who shall receive ... any gift. money. or 
other thing of \'alue ... shall he deemed guilty of a 1c.·lony 
and shall. upon conviction thereof, be summarily discharged 
from office and shall be punished by a fine ... and by 
imprisonment not less than one year nor more than three 
20i years. 
Few people would read this statute and conclude that because it 
mentions only current employees and officers, and becausc it 
specifies removal from office as a mandatory punishnlC'nt. that 
one who has left office cannot be prosecuted under this 
provision. Indeed, former Secretary of Agriculture Mike Espy 
was indicted under this statute three years after leaving ollicc. l "" 
Although Espy was eventually acquitted, it was not because he 
had already left office; his trial proceeded to the merits.~'" 
Another constitutional provIsIOn presenL<; a similar 
interpretive challenge-and has been read the same way by 
Congress. Article I, Section 5, Clause 2 provides: "Each Iiouse 
may . . . punish its Members for disorderly Behaviour, and. 
with the Concurrence of two thirds, expel a Mcmber. .. !I" 
Congress has used this power to discipline members who have 
already left office.~11 
Interpretation #3 has textual appeal ("officers" arc "officers." 
and ex-officers are not), as well as an admitted degl"lT or 
coherence. Playing off of the reference in Article II, Section" to 
removal. it focuses on the fact that only current oflicers can be 
turned out of office. If they are already gone from office. the 
Removal Clause is rendered mere surplusage.ll~ Under this view. 
207. 21 l".S.c. ~ 622 (1994). 
201{. Bill Miller, 1':5fr)' Arqlllllni 11/ (4" Calr. \\'''~II. Pos I. Ik( :~. I !l9H .• 11 i\ I 
(~lIl1lmari/ing chronology of Espy cas,"). 
209. L'nited States \'. Espy, 145 F.3d 1369, I:nl (D.C. Cir. 1!)9H) (.III.ldllllg 110 Ieg.1i 
,ignificance to fae! that "E.'py is not ,ubject to 1('lI\o"al because he " uo IOllgel Se( 1('1.11 \ 
of Agriculture"'): Miller, 5ll/Jra note 20H. 
210. L" .5. CO:-';S'1. art. I. ::; .J. d. 2. 
211. Sfe infra Pari \'1..\.3 (discus-\ing «I'e,\ of Repn'M'IIlall\'('\ Whlll('lIlol(' .lIld 
Dewt"e,e) . 
212. SPI', I'.K .. 14 A:-..:-..\[-'i OF CO:-"( •. 4:~O-$1 (IH05) ('I)('ech 01 l.uthel M.III111 "' 
impeachment trial of Justice Samuel Chase) ("The Pn',idenl, Vice Pre\idcIII, .\IId olh('1 
ciVil oflicers can only be impeached .... III tht' first alticlt', WOIOII Ihe IIIIld, 01 Ihe 
COIIMilulion, it is declared that, judgment III all ca,(', of Impeacllll\('III, ,h.11I 1101 ('xl('IId 
furthel' thall n'mO\"al from oflice, alld disqll.llilic.llioll 10 hold '\II} olli( (' 01 hOIlOl, 11.1\1, 
or profil, IIl1der the United States. This de •• rh ('ViIlCl", Ih.lt 110 pn\oll~ Inll IhoM' who 
hold ofIice~ are liable to impeachmelll:'): lIlira tt'xt accolllp.III\'IIlg 1I0l!' :1:>:> b.IIII(' 
argullu'III iliad .. in Belknap hlle im(leachlllelll (aM'); SOli", \/I/nll IIOIt' I Ii. 
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impeachment is less about tIJring a certain kind of offense than 
it is about keeping a certain kind of person out of oflice.m An 
officer who committed a high crime and left oflice would face 
impeachment only if he returned to oflice. The same would be 
true if he committed the high crime as a private citizen (after 
all, the t"vo examples of high crimes in the Constitution-
treason and bribery-are both offenses that can be commiued 
by private citizens). 
Despite its coherence, Interpretation #3 tries to make Article 
II, Section 4 do too much work. Is the mention of removal 
meant to restrict the result of impeachmelll-and thereby the 
timing of impeachment trials-or is it just meant to limit the 
terms of malfeasing chril officers who would otherwise serve for 
fixed terms (the President and Vice President), at the pleasure 
of the President (executive chril officers), or for life Uudges)? If 
removal were the only possible judgment in impeachment cases, 
the former interpretation would be more likely. Blll removal is 
not the only possible judgment mentioned in the text; 
disqualification is possible toO.~H Removal is a mandatory 
sentence for sitting officers upon conviction, but it is not the 
sole end of impeachment. ,,,7hile the other parts of Article II, 
Section 4 look backward to precedent conditions for 
impeachment, removal looks forward to its results. Thus Article 
II, Section 4 says "removal requires conviction" and even that 
"conviction guarantees removal," but it does not clearly or 
necessarily say "impeachabilit:y equals removability." In SUlll, 
Interpretation #3 is a relatively plausible textual reading of 
Article II, Section 4, but it is not the only possible one, and it has 
deep flaws. 
Interpretation #1 has some benefits of both #3 and #2. It takes 
full stock of the word "officer" and the removal prO\'ision, but it 
also dovetails "rith the contextual notion that impeachment is to 
be directed at public officials qua public oflicials. However, # I 
also suffers a drawback of #3, in that it reads too much into the 
removal provision. Moreover, it opens up a potential textual 
213. An excellent piece of evidence Ihal Ihis IS nol Iht· Inlt' mt';IIIU1g of 
impeachment is the simple faci Ihal laiC impeachmenl \\~1S pr.lclic .. d in England .Uld Ih .. 
states in the years before Ihe drafting of Ihe Conslillliion. ·l1lis ~ lIwr .. a IU"lOnc;11 POUlI 
than a lextual one, though. See supra Part IIl.A (Engl~h prl'Cl'd"lIl); I'art 1II.B.1 (siale 
precedent). 
214. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cI. i. The possibililY of OIIIl'r plllli,hml'IIU I, dL"-IL"-l'd 
in Part VIILB, infra. 
HeinOnline -- 6 Tex. Rev. L. & Pol. 68 2001-2002
68 Texas Review of Law & Politics VO\. (j 
dilemma: Can an officer be impeached in a second of/icc for 
something he did in a prior office? To the extent that such an 
officer is impeachable, it becomes less tenable to distinguish 
between Interpretations #1, #2, and #3. In all, though, 
Interpretation #1 is a plausible one as a matter of pure text. As 
discussed in detail below, however, it has significant flaws in the 
realms of structure and precedent.~'; Additionally, similar 
provisions in state constitutions have not been held to limit 
impeachment to sitting officers.~IO' 
3. Conclusion 
It is easy to argue that if the Constitution meant to allow late 
impeachment, it would have made that point much more 
clearly.217 On the other hand, the same can be said about 
precluding late impeachment. If one were to focus solely on the 
text of the Constitution's impeachment provisions-ignoring 
their history, structure, and precedents-one could best 
conclude that impeachment may reach public misconduct hy 
civil officers who have left office. But one could also reasonably 
conclude that impeachment can reach only sitting civil officers. 
Because the text of the Constitution does not clearly and 
directly address the proper timing of impeachment, it is 
necessary to consult history, structure, and precedent to address 
the question of late impeachment. Indeed, it is only by 
consulting history, structure, and precedent that Oil(' call 
definitively conclude that Article II, Section 4 limits 
impeachment to civil officers in the first place. 
V. STRl'CTl'RE 
W'hile the plain text of the Constitution's impeachllll'llt 
provisions does not provide a complete solution to the pu/,Z\c or 
late impeachment, the larger structure or the doculllellt-its 
internal consistency and it<; recurrent themes2Ix-providl's Illuch 
more fodder for discussion. The Constitution's structure revcals 
215. Sff /IIfra Part V.E (structure); Pan VI./\ (precedent). 
216. See infra text accompanying notes 44R-52. 
217. Vermont (sl/jlra text accompanying note tl:~) and New./n\{'\ (III/Ill not,' -III) 
currently have language that makes late impeachability expliCit. 
218. Sef' l,Tfllf'raIZl' CHARLES L BL\( K, SrRl( II R~ _\~I> R~,1_\II()~"1I11' I\, 
COI'STIITTI(l~.\1. L\\\' (1969); Akhil Reed Amar, III lrall'xlI/lIlmll, 112 IIAR\. I .. R~\' 717 
(1999). 
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that late impeachment is the only way to avoid several 
incongruous, untenable, and/or presumptively undesired 
consequences. Although there are some sU'uctural arguments 
against late impeachment, they are outweighed by the ones in its 
favor. 
A. The Deterrent Effect of i11lp{'Qc/lml'nt 
Impeachment is a part of the larger constitutional SU'ucture of 
checks and balances. ,\Vhen impeachment came back into vogue 
in England during the seventeenth century, it was as a means for 
the legislature (Parliament) to scrutinize and rein in the 
executive (the King and his ministers). tlQ ,<\ l1en the states wrote 
their first constitutions, having just fought a revolution against 
ovenveening executive power, they almost all included similar 
impeachment provisions.~>:!O By the time of the constitutional 
convention, ovenveening legislative power was the principal 
concern.
221 While impeachment was included in the Constitution 
from the outset of the debates, there was intensive discussion 
over whether the President should be impeachable while in 
office.222 Nevertheless, the final document contained a sU'ong 
impeachment provision that kept the executive and judicial 
branches under the watchful eye of Congress. 
With impeachment, then, the Constitution provided ~a bridle 
in the hands of the legislative body upon the executive [and 
judicial] servants of the government."r!~ Not only can Congress 
truncate the othemrise fixed tenns of the President and Vice 
President and the life terms of judges, it can banish executive 
officers out from under the President. The President can 
protect his minions from criminal prosecution with a pardon, 
but he can do nothing to prevent or undo their impeachment. 
Moreover, the President cannot remove the Vice President or 
any judges, and some early interpreters argued that nothing in 
the Constitution even guaranteed him the power to remove his 
appointees unilaterally.t:!4 In a structural sense, early removal is 
219. See supra text accompan}ing nOI ... s 3:,.3i. 
220. See supra text accompanying nOI ... il. 
221. See supra lext accompanying nOI ... 109. 
222. See supra Part m.e.l.b. 
223. THE FEDERALIST No. 65, al 39i (AI ... xand ... r Hamilton) (ClinlOn RO",lIl'r <"d .• 
1961 ). 
224. Alexander Hamilton, no shrinking \iol ... 1 wh ... n il GIIIIl' 10 (on-Innng <"x<"nm\<" 
powers, "Tote in ThP Federalist Ihal pr ... sid ... J1Is cOllld nol H'mO\(' appollll ....... \\llholll 
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the province of Congress as much as, if not marc than, that of 
the executive. 
But what is the purpose of this check? Is it to get rid of 
malfeasing officers? Or is it to prevent them from malfeasance 
in the first place? To some degree it is both, of cours(,,~~" but 
from the standpoint of constructing a government of laws and 
not men, the system of checks and balances seems Illore 
directed at "prevent[ing] corruption and tyranny,,22h in the first 
place than it is at retrospective punishment. As The Fetin"fllist put 
it: "[S]o far as the fear of punishment and disgrace can operate, 
that motive to good behavior is amply afforded by the article Oil 
the subject of impeachments. ,,22. 
Consider this analogy. Is the true power of the requirement of 
Senate confirmation that the Senate can l"t;ject nominees it does 
not like-a power it uses infrequently-or that it forces the 
President to not nominate unacceptable people in the first 
place? Imagine the sorts of appointmenL<; to high office that 
Presidents would make if Senate approval were not required. 
Unless one believes that appointments would be the same with 
or without the requirement of Senate approval, the incentive 
effect of this check and balance is obvious.22~ 
This pattern is even more true of impeachment. 
Impeachment is tremendously cumbersome, and the Senate has 
not shown much interest in convicting any but the most 
obviously guilty offenders. There have only been seventeell 
impeachments-about one every thirteen years on average-
and only seven convictions, all in cases ofjudges. 22" There have 
Senatt" approval. fd. :-Jo. 77. at 459 (Akxan<lt"r Hamilton) (Clinton Rossitn ed .. I!)(il). II 
was only aftt"r a lengthy dt"bate in the First Congre!>.o,-which induded III I III l" IOU' 
Framers-Ihat the President was given the /1'f.,TH/alll'P awhority to ("("filiI\"(' ! .Iblllet olli! (.( '. 
I 1\:";>';;\1-<; OF CO,,(;. 3R3-99 (17R9). 
225. Jonathan Turley, COIIK'I'''' as GrmuljlllY: n,l' Roll' of Ihl' /low, of Ul'llYflmlalllw, III 
Ihl' fm/Jl'achmml of all AlIlI'ricr/ll Presulml, 67 CEO. W.\~II, I.. R~.\'. 7:~:), 7W (I !l!I!l) 
("[Ijmpt"achmelll emerged from Ihe Con'lilwional Convention .I~ .1 ("h('!" tlml 
(It"tt"rn'nt:) (emphasis addt"CI). 
220. VA:" TA~SEI. & FI:"KEDIA:-', IIllml note I, at :{. 
227. T",,; FEDERAI.IST No. 04, at 396 OohnJay) (Clinton Ro~sitl'f" ed., 19lil). 
228. q. Al..hil Reed Amar, n,l' T7IIa-TiPrl'd Sin/rltlrf' (if tllP jl/(/JrillT)' Arl of /789, I :~H I'. 
PA. I.. RE\·. 1499, 1500 & n.3 (1990) (making 'arne point regarding the I'n,,,dellt', v('to 
power, and nOling that "[Ijhe framers well understood this political ~ciel\(' I.m· 01 
anticipaled responst""). 
229. Even Ihest" st"ven convictions did nol 'pal(' the Republic frolll allY din' h..,.11 d. 
As Raolll Berger once pili it, "Once employed to topple [Engli~h I gl.\Ilt~Strafford, 
Clarendon, Haslings-impeachnlt"1lI has Slink in this coulltry to the OIlM(" of dl('.ln 
linlejudges for squalid misconduct: BER(.ER, "'Iml note 29, at 3. 
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been more cases of resignation 111 the f~lce of possible 
impeachment then there have been actual cases uf 
impeachment. 230 More to the point, there likely have been 
countless high crimes and misdemeanors that were never 
committed in the first place because of the mere possibilit), uf 
impeachment. Imagine a United States in which the President 
knew that no matter what he did, he would be able tu remain in 
office for four years. Can anyone doubt that the temptation to 
abuse power-particularly to get reelected-wuuld not have 
occurred more often in such a system than it has in our real 
one? 
No executive officer has ever been removed fmm oflice 
through impeachment, but every executive oflicer has been 
constrained by the possibility of it. By the same token, late 
impeachment may rarely be worth pursuing in f~lct, but its 
presence may nevertheless represent an efrective way to deter 
officeholders from malfeasance. 
Even in actual cases of its application, the purpose of the 
impeachment power is broader than removal of particular 
officers; it has the loftier goal of causing better administration 
by promoting ultimate accountability. In the words of one 
commentator: 
The only things that can be done-and the thinhTS that Illust 
be done if the abuse of power is not to becollle a precedent 
for subsequent and perhaps even graver abuses and 
usurpations-is to render the perpeu.Hor incapable of further 
wrongdoing and to make his punishment serve as a warning to 
his successors. Impeachment serves the latter purpuse fully as 
much as the former :!SI 
Late impeachment is an important conu'ibutor to these aims, 
and barring late impeachment would undermine them.m If 
impeachment cannot touch an officer once he has left oflice, 
then it provides significantly less incentive for the oflicer to 
230. See infra note 411. 
231. Bestor, supra note 133. at 277. E\'en opponenL' of lal,· I IIIp,· • ..-hlll"lI I h.l\ .. 
noted strongly that impeachment is a "curb upon th .. <·X .. I-o,,· of pOl\'l'r III Ih,' 1"' .......... 'lOn 
of those subject to impeachment." BELK.""'I'TRIAL. 5II/,rn nol,· IS •• 11 ·10 (Il'CllJ(hll~ 
argument of defense counsel in late impeachlll .. nt GL"·). 
232. The deterrent effect is disClL-s .. d in this Part: III<" IIK.lpanl.lIIl1~ "IIl'( I l' 
discussed in the neXL See infra Part V.B. Th .. det .. rr"llI POIIII \\~L' 1II.IlI,· d ... lrh III Ih,' 
Belknap case. See infra note 353 (exampl .. s from Bdl..nap 1n.11) and I,'XI .ll"nlllll'.lII\lll~ 
notes 379-81. 
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behave. More precisely, it provides an incentive for him to 
behave only early in his term, to conceal his wrongdoing long 
enough to run out the clock, and to skip out of office if 
congressional action becomes a serious issue.2'11 By contrast, if he 
is amenable to impeachment and disqualification for the rest of 
his days, an officer will have an added incentive to conduct 
himself appropriately to the very end of his term. To the extent 
that he does not conduct himself properly, it will at least be 
harder for him to escape scrutiny forever, as elections intervene 
and seats in Congress change hands. This accountability will 
provide some deterrence to others, if not the officer himself. 
To be sure, many impeachable offenses can be pursued in 
parallel as criminal offenses in ordinary courts, and ex-officers 
still must contend with those potential sanctions. But those 
sanctions exist when the officers are still in oflice toO.211 And 
impeachment reaches offenses and provides punishment that 
the criminal process does not or cannot.2'I·, Barring late 
impeachment does not increase the efIect of criminal sanctions 
as a deterrent; it merely limits the effect of impeachment as a 
deterrent. 
On another note, criminal sanctions provide a keen analof.,'J' 
to the deterrent effect of impeachment. Imagine a larceny 
statute that allows a sentence of restitution and jail time. 
Imagine now that a defendant can terminate the criminal 
proceeding entirely by returning the stolen money. No thief 
would ever face jail time, because he could simply pay restitution 
if and when he was caught and preempt the proceedings. 
Imagine further that the statute of limitations in this larcell), 
statute was very short, or better yet that it expired at a set dale 
233. See BELK.'>;,-\I' TRIAL, IIIP/{/ note IH, at 129 (opinion of St'n.ltol lI.waul) ("Ill(" 
train could be laid and the slow-match lighted with dost' c.lleulation, .lIId tht' IIU l'luh.ln' 
retire to the place of~afel:) oUL~ide the jurisdiction charged with hi~ p\llll~hIlH·IIt.") 
234. RA\\,LE, "'1m/note 35, at 215 ("[Tlhe ordinary tlibunal,;" WI' ,h.llI ,('t', .1It' liCIt 
precluded. either before or after an IInpeadlml'nt. from taking (ognllan, t' of tht' pllbl\( 
and official delinquency."). Bill 'ee Akhil Reed Amar & Bri.1II C. K.llt. Dw /'I/'IIt/I'1III11/ 
I'nm/l'gp Agalllsi I'rOlf(lIllOlI, 2 l\~,Xl'~ II (1997) (.Irguing that prt',ldt'nt, a.t' 1111 III III \(' 
from criminal proseclllion while in office). 
235. Sel'R.\\\'LE, ",pm not(' 35, at 211 ("(Plolitical offt'nct" , .. would bt' dilli, ult 
to take cogninnce of in the ordinat:' cour't' of judicial proc('('(ling'."): It/, •• t 2 I7 ("( rIll(" 
sentence which this court is authori/ed to illlpow cannot rt'gularlY bt, pronolln't'd bl 
the court, of law."). For more on thi' point, st't' IlIjm nott' 274 and accompanYIng tt'" 
(discussing impeachment ca,es that criminal law will not rt'ach). and nott" 24,1 .uul -, It) 
(discllssing criminal statutes that prescribe r('moval and dlsquahficatlon ." pott'ntl.II 
punbhm('nt and con'titlllional probl(,lIl~ with tht'm). 
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every four years. The incentive not to steal would shrink to I.ero 
as the limitation date approached. Only the meekest of thieves 
would be deterred by such a statute. But this is just the son of 
incentive structure that impeachment would be limited to if late 
impeachment were not permitted. 
B. Remova~ Disqualification, and Moo/ness 
If one believes that the central purpose of impeachment is 
removal of the offender, it would follow that late impeachment 
is not necessary to protect the deterrent effect of impeachment. 
Returning to the larceny example in the previous Pan, if the 
only sentence for convicted thieves were restitution, it would be 
no great tragedy if a thief could preempt a prosecution against 
him by making restitution. Similarly, if the main idea of 
impeachment is removal, what difference does it make whether 
the officer leaves office through impeachment, resignation, 
removal by the President, or expiration of his term? A member 
of Congress can resign to avoid expulsion, and no one quarrels 
with that. 236 If Congress can force someone from office with the 
threat of impeachment instead of having to perform an actual 
cumbersome impeachment and trial, that is a good thing.~'7 
This point, true as far as it goes, overlooks the significance of 
disqualification (not to mention other possible consequences of 
impeachment).238 The addition to the Constitution of 
disqualification as a possible penalty was not a throwaway.~'" All 
but one of the pre-17S7 state constitutions that specified 
236. See BELN"1AP TRL-I.L. supra note IS. at 1:~1 (opinion of Stonawr BoU(',· .... Il) 
(making same point). 
237. See Finnage & Mangnlln. supra note 142. at 1O~J.l (-Rl"'l):lI.LUOII 1I ........ d lIot 
represent the defeat of the impeachment process but imtl'ad lIlal bl' jmt on ..... 1.'>1' .... <:1 of 
its successful operation."); BELK."A!' TRIAL. wpm note IS. at 8:, (01'1111011 01 Stollalor 
Frelinghuysen) ("[I]f he resigns. rl'mol'al. thl' main objl·n of IInpl·;I<1I1I1 .... II(. l' 
effected.") . 
238. See infra Part \'lII.B. 
239. See infra Part \'lIl.A. SOI1Il' hal"<' arglll:d that dlS<luahfic;LUon " .1 pOlntln.s 
exercise. because it is implausible that a cOIlIictl'd ollicial "ould br: C'knC'd or 
nominated and confinned. E.g .• BELK."A!' TRIAL. supra notl' 18. at Ilti (01'"11011 of 
Senator Eaton) (arguing thaI disqualification is irrdl'l~lIIt. prt."lIIning th.u Ihl' 5C'n'lIC' 
confinnation process and electoral collegl' "ill kl'l'p COll\ictl'd officC'~ out of ftuurC' 
office). This may diminish the importance of dis<llIalifiC:llion. but l'\'l'n ;1.'> a pranlt.11 
mauer, there is a chance that such officials could stage a cOIlll'baci. ... Y~ Part \'l1I.A. "'1m. 
discusses some of these practical considerations. Most famotl.'>ll'. JUd):l' Air ........ 11.I.'>tlll):' 
was elected to the House of Representati\·l's afll'r being imp .... achC'd. ulII'l("(C'd. "lid 
removed from office. See supra note 12. 
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possible punishments included disqualification among then1.~I" 
Especially in an age oflong, varied careers, it was very significant 
that an impeachment conviction said not only "get out!" but 
added an emphatic and irreversible "and stay out!" It is bad to 
be removed from office, but it surely is no small blot to be 
"sentenced to a perpetual ostracism from the esteelll and 
confidence and honors and emoluments" of the United States 
without hope of pardon.211 This l~lCl was recognized in 17'07 and 
after even by critics of late impeachment, one of whom 
exaggerated only a bit when he said: 
[AJ man who stands convicted of high crimes alld 
misdemeanors commilled while in oHic{', and is sentelHTd by 
the court of impeachment to perpetual dis(Jllalification. is 
held by public opinion to be a living. moving infamy. a llIoral 
leper, shunned by his fellow man and withollt hope of pardoll 
this side [of] the grave.212 
A critic might still argue that disqualification functions 
structurally as leverage: If removal were the only possible 
penalty, parties would have little to lose in lighting 
impeachment tooth and nail. By upping the ante. the additioll 
of disqualification provides an incentive for oflkials to resigll. 
essentially dealing themselves a plea bargain down to simple 
removal and saving Congress tremendous resources. Indeed. 
many more officers facing impeachment have resigned (do/,ells) 
than have been convicted and disqualified (two).w But this view 
is not tenable. Either disqualification is a significallt 
punishment, or it is not. If it is not, then it does not serve tht' 
plea-bargain purpose. If it is a significant punishment (Ollt' 
certainly hajjes that it is), it should not be presumed lightly that 
240. Srr IUpm Pan 1II.B.2. 
241. Tm: FEDER\USr 1\0. (i5. at :~99 (.\It'xander II.ulli"on) (Clinton Ro"lIel .. d. 
19(i I). 
242. B~LK' \1' TRI \1.. IUlmi note II'. at 92·93 (opillioll 01 Sell.ltol \1.lxn): 1l«((lId III 
at 153 (opinion of S(,lIator Dawes) ("Like the leper he 't.md, alolle. ,hunlled bv .111 (1e.1II 
men."): FR'\'C1~ WIIARTO:-l. ST,\IE TRIAI.'i OF IIIE l';-"IIFIl SI \I~~ Dl RIM. Irtf 
AD\II,I~IR\IIO'~ OF WASIII:"t:IO:-; V.;n AIl\\I~ :~()I·02 (Bun Frallkllll 1970) (HWI) 
(argument in impeachment case 01 William Blount): wr ailo. r.K .. State \ 11111. :",:; ;\J.\\' 
794.796 (1\eb. 18(3) (rejecting lat(, impeachment in state ca,e bill 't.llillg that "101111 Will 
concede that di,qualification to hold olliee is .1 punishment IIIl1ch gn·.Il(·1 Ih.1II 
removal"): CO:"<:. CLOIIE. 29th Cong .• bt Sess. 641 (11'4G) (state me lit 01 Rep. Ad.IIII') 
("[Ill an~ public officer ('\'('r pill himst'lf III a po,ition to be tried bv unpe.H hlllellt. he 
would ha\'e Yen' lillie of my good opinion. il he did not think diMJll<llIlh .ltlOIl 110111 
holding olliee for lift- a more severe puni,llInellt than mel (. f"('mO\'al Irolll olli( (' "). 
2-13. Sf'£' /111m note, 41 I alld :;22. 
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the Constitution allows it to be evaded so easily. Moreover. the 
more likely disqualification is to be significant-that is. the more 
likely the target is to want to return to government-the more 
important it is to actually apply it. Returning to the plea bargclin 
analogy, consider that a possible death sentence may cOll\"ince 
murderers to plead guilty in order to get a life sentence. But if 
such a sentence arrangement were solely up to the murderer. 
then no one would ever get the death penalty. a problem given 
that sometimes the prosecutor actually wants to seck the death 
penalty and that it is precisely in those cases that the murderer 
would be most likely to receive it. 
It is more likely that disqualification is meant to serve as an 
actual punishment.~H As a result, impeachment (unlike 
expulsion) is not just about removal, and late impeachment is 
essential. Without it, a party by resigning, or a President by firing 
him, can flout any attempt by Congress to disqualif)'.~··· Although 
the party would be submitting to removal. the significant penalty 
of disqualification (and possibly others~·(') would be taken of I of 
the table. To be sure, some parties would stand and fight their 
impeachment. If they felt that they had a chance to prevail. they 
might not resign even to the end. But parties who know that 
they will be convicted-the worst offenders. roughly speaking-
would have no reason not to resign. The outer bounds of the 
impeachment power would thus be scaled back, not because the 
offender merited lenient treaunent but paradoxically because 
he did not. The Senate would be rendered, as one senator put it 
in a late impeachment case "the only court in Christendom 
whose jurisdiction . . . depends on the volition of the 
accused. "24i 
C. The Indistinguishahle Stages oj Impeachment 
Late impeachment presents a line-drawing issue. Virtually 
every opponent of late impeachment concedes that at a certain 
point in an impeachment proceeding, the target loses the ability 
to end Congress's jurisdiction by resigning. Take an extreme 
244. Indeed, the First Congress established it as pllnbhnll'1Il for otltl'r olTl'I~'" ;u 
well. Though this is a constitutionally problematic illfringelllelll on thl' I'rnldl'nt\ 
appointment power, it shows that disqualification was taken serioll!>l\' in lltl' 1780" .. \.or 
infra note 549. 
245. See infra Part V.D. 
246. See infra Part \'1II.B. 
247. BELKNAP TRIAL, supra note 18. at :~59 (opinion 01 Senator :"'o .. "o()d). 
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case: An officer is impeached, tried, and resigns between thc 
casting of the 66th and 67th votes to convict.2lM Few would arguc 
that such a conviction would not be valid. This is the view not 
just of late-impeachment opponents issuing dicta to avoid 
looking extreme; this is a distinction drawn by state court<; that 
have reviewed analogous state cases. The question then becolllcs 
one of line drawing. Can the officer strip jurisdiction by 
resigning before the Senate vote starts? Before the trial starts? 
Before the House vote starts? Before the House debate begins? 
Before the House committee proceedings begin? 
In some states, there is an arguable textual and structural basis 
for drawing a distinction between the stages of impeachmcnt. 
For instance, when the Nebraska Supreme Court rejected latc 
impeachment in State v. Hill,21" state law provided: "An 
impeachment of any state officer shall be tried, notwithstanding 
such officer may have resigned his office, or his term of office 
has expired.,,2:;o This language more easily supports the notion 
that impeachment is limited to sitting officers but that trial is 
not.2jJ 
In the federal Constitution, however, there is no such basis to 
distinguish between the stages of the impeachment proceedings. 
The only possible source of a limitation on the timing of 
impeachment comes from Article II, Section 4, which states that 
"The President, Vice President, and all civil Officers of the 
United States, shall be removed from office on Impeachment 
for, and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes 
and Misdemeanors." If the mention of removal means that only 
those who can be removed can be "impeach [edl ... and 
convict[ed]," then resignation would stop the proceedings even 
at the very last possible moment of the Senate vote before 
conviction.2j2 Similarly, if only currently sitting "civil officers" ('<Ill 
be impeached and convicted, an effective resignation would stop 
proceedings. 
248. All evell more extreme case b pos-,ible: re~igning after tht, vote but belol(' Ih .. 
pronouneemenl of judgment. See. P.g .• infra Pari [V.B.2.c (di'cu,~ing c •• '" 01 [t·,." 
governor James Ferguson). 
249. 55 N.W. 794. 798 (Neb. [89:~). The filII ea~e is di~nl~M'd III dewl In 1'.111 
Vl.B.2.b. 
250. Hzll. 55 :\'.\V. at 798 (quoting NEB. CO\II'. S·IAI. eh. 19. ~ 8 (1891». 
251. Indeed. this is Ihe rondu~ion that the Ifzll Coml reached. ,\ff ztl. Anolh('1 
example b the :-.lew Hampshire langllage ~pecilying Ihat Ihe Sen ale ,h.1I1 Irv ".111 
impeaehmellls made by" the House. Sef III/Jlfl text aerompanying note 87. 
252. See BELK.",\p TRIAL, supra note 18. at III (opinion of Senator Milrht'll). 
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If one is not troubled by the possibility of the defendant 
tenninating the tribunal's jurisdiction, then this is not a 
problem.53 But while one might wish to give Congress the optioTl 
of declaring victory and ending proceedings, it is quite another 
matter to say that Congress is constitutionally disabled from 
continuing impeachment proceedings in such a situation. 
If late impeachment is permitted, then this line-drawing 
problem is mooted. But some critics of late impeachment, aware 
of this problem, have drawn a line at the beginning of "the 
proceedings." They declare that once jurisdiction is established 
in the House, there is nothing that the defendant can do to 
prevent impeachment proceedings but that any other late 
impeachment is forbidden.~M In doing so, they raise another 
line-drawing issue. One must then determine when the 
proceedings begin: 'Vhen an accusation is made on the floor of 
the House? vVhen the matter is referred to a committee? Others 
draw the line at impeachment itself. Once the House 
impeaches, they argue, the Senate has jurisdiction to finish the 
process. If the defendant resigns before the House completes its 
vote, however, the case ends.~:·' 
These distinctions may make sense as a maller of abstract 
equity or as a matter of ideal structure, but they do not have any 
basis in the text or structure of the Constitution. If the 
Constitution limits impeachment in the House and trial in the 
Senate to sitting, removable "officers," then it necessarily follows 
that a target of impeachment can end the proceedings any time 
he chooses. The fact that this conclusion is unacceptable to most 
opponents of late impeachment shows that opposition to late 
impeachment, while stemming from bare textualisIll. cannot 
remain there without either intolerable results or inhereI1l self:' 
contradiction. 
253. See, e.g., id. at 43 (defense counsd in late illlpeadlllll·J1[ ("a,.,· Cllll(t'dlllg Ih.1l 
resignation would be effective at any slagd. /Jill Sft' ,d. al flS (ddl'ns,' coun .... 1 th'llmMlIg 
question as unnecessary to decision of casd. Ob,;ously. Ihi,. Arliclt' lllaml;Um 111,11 Iht'rt' 
are significant s!lUcmral problems ,,;lIl laking such powt'r away frolll COlIgr ............ " "'lUI 
Pans V.B (discussing s!lUcmral import.1.nce of disqualifir.llion. ,,'Illch wult! t'.l>lh bt-
mooted iflate impeachment is impossibld and \'.D (dbnl>Sillg slnlclllr.1I rnlnnttlll> Oil 
the President in cases ofimpeachlllelll). 
254. See, e.g., BELK."APTRIAL. slipra 1I0le IS. aI8:~ (OpilllOIl of 5ellalOI" Frt'lmghU\'>C'1I 
in Belknap case that resignation cannol elld lrial onn' b"gulI); Ill. al 101 (OpIIIIOII o( 
Senator Christianc},) (hinting at same); /IIlra note ·m:~ and acwlllpannllg tt'XI. 
255. E.g., BELK.'1AP TRL-\L. slipra note 18. at 126 (opillion of Senalor hlli-Ilb .. 
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D. Pardons, Presidential Removal, and the Impeadunent as Inqlll'st 
The Constitution specifically forbids the President from using 
his pardon power in cases of impeachmcnt.2"" A President's 
ability to flout impeachment by removing the o fIicia I in 
question-perhaps simply by reassigning him to a post on his 
staff that does not require Senate confirmation2">7-is structurally 
incompatible with the impeachment exception to lhe 
presidential pardon power. It seems illogical that the President 
could use his removal power to achieve the same end indirectly. 
Alternatively, it seems strange that a more respectful President 
could be forced to choose between leaving the offender in OfIi(T 
or removing him promptly but preventing him from being fully 
punished. 
The impeachment exception to the pardon power arose from 
the case of the Earl of Danby in the late seventeenth centllty.2·'X 
King Charles II pardoned Danby not because Danby was 
innocent but because the King was guilty of questionable 
dealings with France. Had the impeachment trial gone fonvard. 
the evidence uncovered would have embarrassed the King; by 
pardoning Danby, Charles prevented the investigation. r ," 
Parliament later precluded pardons from barring all 
impeachment in an effort to prevent a recurrence of this assault 
on its authority.2bO 
In the United States there is no reason that Congress cannot 
pursue the President directly, and Congress can launch 
investigations short of impeachment'). So there is less danger 
that a President might pardon a subordinate to prevent a 
congressional investigation. Moreover, because a President is no 
king and serves for a maximum of ten years,2hl the general 
possibility exists that a future administration wiII be able to 
256. u.s. CO:'\ST. art. II. !:i 2. d. I. 
257. Sel'Su/ml text accompan}ing note 4 (presenting such a hypothetic,II). 
258. Kalt. sU/Jra note 13, at 783-84 (describing case of the Earl 01 i),lIIb), ,uHI 
subsequent parliamentary trimming of the royal pardon power). 
259. See ui. Charles had no particular interest in protecting Dallbl' him~ell; the E,1I1 
languished in the Tower of London for years. despite his pardon. Id. at 784 JI.:{9. 
260. Id. at 784 & n.40 (discussing 170 I Act of Settlement). 
261. U.S. CO:'\ST. amend. XXII. Cf. supra note I:{O. Before the passage of the 
Twenty-Second Amendment-including the framing era-the fact that a Presidellt 
possibly could serve forever provided a reason to ('mphasi/e removalJllit)' whell 
discussing impeachment. These \iews are consistent. or at least not incoJlsi.tellt. wllh 
late impeachability. See supra text accompanying notes 12:>-31. 149·50. 
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criminally investigate the President and his minions. But 
regardless of the potential for criminal proceedings in a new 
administration, Congress is the grand inquisitor of the L'nited 
States, with the explicit power to investigate the conduct of 
executive and judicial branch officials outside the confines of 
the criminal law. Even though Congress can hold hearings and 
launch investigations without resorting to impeachment, 
impeachment is the only process that the Constitution provides 
for investigating public officials' conduct and for render·ing a 
formal verdict on abuses of the public U"lISt. 
In other words, impeachment is supposed to check 
presidential excesses, and the Constitution explicitly prevellls 
the President from assaulting congressional impeachment 
jurisdiction via the pardon power. It does not logically follow, 
then, that the President could remove a subordinate and 
thereby terminate the highest of congressional inquests. As a 
member of the House about to vote on a late impeachment 
incredulously put it to an opponent: 
Will you say to the country that he whom you ha\'t' plact'd in 
power at the other end of this avenue is able to rob an 
American Congress of a right and a power that a King of Crt'al 
Britain could not take from Parliament? [Applause on lht' 
floor and in the galleries.] Is that your theory?:!<'~ 
This would be a curious theory indeed. 
Moreover, it would be strange if the impeachment power was 
limited in a way that gave a President deJe1771lg to Congress an 
incentive to allow a malfeasant officer to remain in oflice. The 
President also has the power to remove executive oflicials, but 
without late impeachability, a President would be hamstrung if 
disqualification of the official were appropriate as well. 
Impeachment would be necessary to level such a punishment, 
and if late impeachment were impossible, the President would 
have to choose between a full penalty and immediate removal. 
Disqualification would be most appropriate in the worst cases-
the very cases in which immediate removal by the President 
262. 4 CONGo REc. 1432 (18;6) (slalemelll of Rep. B1ackbllm). ·lllt· Comlillllloll 
actually protects impeachmelll from pardons e\"en more slrongh' Ihan Ihe Engl~h ' ... ·Mem 
did. The English pardon exception pre\·ellled Ihe king from preempling _III 
impeachment trial but did nOI pre\"elll him from pardoning Ihe Wrgl·1 afler nlll\lniun 
The American pardon exception pre\"(.·nts Ihe Presidelll frolll preempling uf IIlldulllg .111 
impeachmenL See supra nOle 13. 
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would be most important for the country-and so barring late 
impeachment presents yet another structural hiccup.~'''' 
As a final note, there is no question that a broader 
impeachment power carries with it a greater possibility of abuse, 
especially given that the President has no ability to stop an 
impeachment, and the courts have little more. This is not, 
however, a reason to give the President questionable powers 
against impeachment. Congress can abuse impeachment 
whether or not late impeachment is part of its arsenal, but the 
Constitution provides structural safeguards against such 
abuses.2h' Presidential power is not one of them. 
E. 17te Four Interpretations 
Recall the four possible interpretations of the scope or 
impeachment timing:2b:' 
iVlust the offense have occurred 
while the offender was in office? 
Yes 
No 
lvlust the party presenl(Y be ill 
office? 
Yes No 
1 (conservative) 2 (late) 
3 (Whitewatt'r) 4 (rat/ira/) 
Analyzing each possibility from a structural standpoint, severe 
defects emerge in Interpretations #1, #3, and #4. Interpretation 
#2 is not perfect, but it is the least problematic. 
The "radical" approach to impeachment (#4) would allow 
anyone who had once been a civil officer to face impeachment, 
regardless of when he committed his offense. A view this broad 
would not dissuade sitting officers from misconduct in oHiee, 
nor would it serve the purpose of removing "bad" oHiens. II 
would function only to disqualify "bad" people from future 
federal office, but there seems to be no basis under the 
2fi3. It i, perhaps not a coincidence that the only ft-deral late impe.lcilllH"lIt 111.11 
occurred during- a lime when the presidential removal power wa' 1(·,11 iCled. rhe 
Belknap case fell in the shadO\, of the Tenure of Oflice Act. willch m.l(le " (hlli( "It 101 
the Presidelll to rell1on'. or even ~uspend. members of his Cabinet. S"P IIFt"~ \1"1 RI \1. 
IIII'm note II'. at fi2 (House manag-er noting- limilatiom on pn',idential ITIlIOY.t1 I'0wel 
and asking-. "\Iusl a defaulting- Trea,urer of Ihe l'nited Stale, he kit III (h.lI).:e 01 Ihe 
elllire TreaMlry until conviction and sentence?-). It doc, not .IPI)('ar. hO\\'e\(·I. Ih.11 nlO" 
proponents of late impeachment considered thb argumenl ,iglllfi(alll, III .lIn ('''t·, Ihe 
Act wa, later correctly declared unconstitutional. ~h'er' Y. l'niled SI.IIt',. 272 t' S. ~)2, 171> 
(1926). 
264. SI'I' /lIjia Part VIILG. 
2fi:>, SrI' I/llna rart 1\'.B.2. 
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Constitution to distinguish between former ofliceholders and 
mere private citizens in this regard. If a private citizen should be 
disqualified from ever holding federal office again because of 
something he did as a private citizen, why should it maller 
whether or not he held a federal office al some other poim in 
his life? Once again, the radical approach would transforJn the 
designation that "civil officers" are susceptible LO impeachmelll 
from a check against federal officeholders i11l0 an illogical and 
arbitrary formalism.266 There is no structural support for such an 
interpretation. 
The "conservative" approach (#1) would allow only 
impeachments against sltung civil officers, for offenses 
committed in that office. A Supreme Court justice would not be 
impeachable for offenses committed as a circuit court judge.''''; A 
Secretary of State would not be impeachable for offenses 
committed in his earlier job as SecretaI)' of the Treasury. More 
problematically, a second-term Preside11l might not be 
impeachable for offenses committed in his first term. Perhaps 
the terms could be treated as continuous, so that a second-term 
President would be impeachable for actions in his first term if 
the terms were consecutive; this is a common interpretation of 
impeachment in states.26.' Under this interpre~ltion, however, 
Grover Cleveland would not have been impeachable in 1893 for 
something he had done as Preside11l in 1888, even though Bill 
Clinton would have been impeachable in 1998 for something he 
had done as President in 1993. Again, this distinction seems to 
lack a structural basis. 
Proponents of this approach would likely respond that an 
intervening election or Senate confirmation would .iustif~· a bar 
on impeachment. If someone can cOI1\'ince the Presidelll 
andC/ or?) Senate or the electorate that he is worthy of oflice 
despite his past offenses, Congress should not be allowed LO 
reverse that determination.269 But why should election \'indicate 
266. See id. 
267. This issue was implicated, bUl not decided ddilll!J\t'h, 11\ [It,· .1II.llogoll> 
Archbald case. See inJra Part VI.A5. 
268. This issue has arisen in state cases "nough [hal i[ i, di'C1I-'>t'd 11\ [h,' ClJIpu, Jum 
Secundu7lL It has been held that continuous terms in [h,' >:1111,' ofiin' an' ('ulI>ldt'ft'd Ollt' 
unit for impeachment purposes, but discolllinuous [t'nns or diIT"n'lI! ofiien .Ift' 1101. \u 
67 CJ.S. Officers § 120(c) (1978). 
269. See Two Prouedings oJI},r Small' mId I},I' HorLSl' oj Rl'prnl'11laln'''' uJ Ihr ('''lIrtf \Itlln 
in lhe Trial oj Impeachmml oj Rnbrrl II: .... rchbald. S. Doc. :-;0. 6!!·ll-lO .• 11 ltj:H.:n 1191 :i) 
[hereinafter Archbald Trial) (opinion of Senator Bn~lII) (afguillg a~lim[ .1 '111111.11 ",rt or 
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Clinton and not Cleveland? Moreover, even if an impeaching 
Congress should take this factual matter into account, there i~ 
no guarantee that anyone would know of the past illicit conduct 
at the time of reelection or reconfirmation. One need look no 
further than Watergate for an example of presidential 
misconduct that was only uncovered after an intervening 
election. Indeed, by its very nature, electoral chicanery like the 
Watergate break-in is the last sort of high crime that ~hould be 
placed beyond the reach of impeachment.~7" In any case, the (;\ct 
that confirmation or election would solve this problem in some or 
these cases is no reason to bar impeachment in all of these case~. 
The "vVhitewater" interpretation (#3), which allows 
impeachment for any past actions so long as the party i~ 
currently a civil officer, would solve the structural problems or 
the "conservative" approach. It is worth noting, of course, that if 
an officer is being impeached under Interpretation #3 for an 
offense committed in a previous office, this is a form of late 
impeachment. In other words, the vVhitewater view allows late 
impeachment, but only if the defendant is serving 111 a Ill'\\' 
office. 
Interpretation #3 has an admittedly strong structural 
underpinning: If impeachment is about removal, then thi~ 
approach fulfills that objective in the broadest possible way. A 
civil officer is removed from his current office if he is deemed 
unfit for that office, regardless of when his unfitness mallire~ted 
itself. AsJorge Souss put it: 
[A] re we supposed to believe that if we now discovcred that 
Christine Todd Whitman or Stephen Breycr (to pick two 
"officers of the United States" at random) were serial ki\lcrs 
back in the early 1980s that Congress could not impeach 
them? Or that if George W. Bush robbed ajewelry store on the 
morning of January 20, a few hours before being sworn in, that 
he would not be subject to impeachment lor such behavior? 
Such results would be unimaginable, and for good n·aSOll.~71 
This interpretation also has an answer for a converSe problem: 
Suppose a President robbed a jewelry store not an hour before 
late impeachability and stating "[bloth the Presidenl wht'n he nOlJlill.lle~ .lIld Ihe Sell.ll!· 
wht'n it advises and consents, ought to be ~atisfi('d. it ~'Tm~ 10 lilt·. wilh Ih,' (h.1I a( lei 
and qualilicaliom of the cili/en"). 
270. SrI' \II/1m lext accompanying (lOll" 125·31 «,011\('1111011 deh.lle, dl\( 1""lg Ih" 
i~sllt·) . 
271. SrI" Souss, llI/mlllOte 16. 
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he took the oath but an hour before his successor did? Should 
he be able to elude impeachment? And what about the official 
whom the President cannot pardon but can fire?"': The 
"Whitewater interpretation would provide that impeachment 
could not occur in such situations unless and until the culprit 
returned to office,273 but it would deny that this is a problem, 
given the possibility of regular criminal prosecution, 
This is fine for Souss's jewelry store owner, but it is of cold 
comfort once one returns to the real subject of impeachment, 
public offenses, "\That about a President who waits until the last 
day of his administration to abuse his authority as Commander 
in Chief? Or to issue corrupt pardons? Or to commit any other 
abuse of the public trust that cannot, should not-or, as a 
practical matter, will not-be covered by the criminal justice 
system?274 Surely, it is no coincidence that neither 'William 
Blount nor William Belknap, the only two men subjected to late 
impeachment, were ever criminally prosecuted for their 
offenses,2i5 And what of the fact that criminal liability is available 
for all impeachments, not just late ones? Under the 
""Whitewater" reasoning, the possibility of criminal prosecution 
would preclude any "regular" impeachment as well, 
Impeachment addresses great offenses against the public-
offenses that the criminal law may not touch or that ordinary 
criminal justice is not equipped to handle properly, As 
Alexander Hamilton wrote in 171(' Federalist, impeachment cases 
are placed under the puniew of Congress in large pan because 
the very nature of the offenses at issue makes them inexu'icably 
politicized, Thus, the House-not regular prosecutors and 
272, See supra Part V,D, 
273, The Whitewater interpreter could make good IISl' of (hl" fan (ha( IIIlPl"ildlllll"nt 
would reemerge as an option if the target were (0 relllfll (0 offin', In a "~I\, (IlLS \,'ould 
accomplish not just removal but disqualification, Therefon', (hl' a'1,'1.lml"nt "'(l\lld folio\\', 
there really would be no reason to pursue a la(e impl"adlllll"nt, I>l"Gll= Uo(h 
constitutionally permissible ends of an impeachment com;nion would lx, off (hl" (abll", 
But disqualification would not complctC'ly disappl"ar from (hl' (abll', 'IlIl" fan (ha( (hl" 
offender would face potential impeachmcnt if he relllrnl"d (0 offin' would no( ml",ll\ (h;u 
he could not return to office, It would mean only (ha( if he did and If hl" ,,~~ no( 
confident that Congress had shifted its predill"c(ions in his favor, hl' ,,'ould I>l" in (hl" 
same position as before he resigned, 
274, See Turley. supra note 165. a( 56 ("A( a timl' of los( public confidl"n('(' III (hl' 
integrity of the government, the conduct of a fonnl"r official Gll\ dl'mand ;1 poliuc;11 
response, This response in the form of an impl"achml'nt m;l\ bl' mOrl" imp()rtant (han a 
legal response in the form of a prosccution, -), 
275, BUSHNELL. supra note 16, a( 37 (Blount): td,a( 189 (BC'lknapl: sa' (IUO w!ml'an 
VIlLA, 
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courts-is the proper body to lead it.27h The Whitewater view 
misses the point in its argument that impeachment is for current 
officers and that anyone else is left to the criminal law alolle. 
Impeachment draws its institutional reason for being from the 
nature of the offense, not the nature of the defendant's 
employment at the time of trial. If it did not, there would be no 
reason to limit it to high crimes and misdemeanors. 
The "late" interpretation (#2) comprehends this point and 
each of the others above as well. It recognizes Congress' power 
to use impeachment to inquire "into the conduct of public 
men," however late in their terms their offenses OCCllr, and 
however long their offenses have been secreted. In doing so. it 
allows impeachment to present a full incentive for properly 
performing the duties of federal office. It vindicates the 
significant structural role of disqualification.m It permits 
Congress to fulfill its constitutional duty to deter, investigate, 
rule upon, and fully punish high crimes and misdemeanors, 
regardless of how willing the defendant and/or President are to 
subvert Congress's jurisdiction with evasion and chicanery. 
Finally, and most specifically, it precludes the President from 
evading the constitutional bar on his power to pardon in cases 
of impeachment, and it eliminates any incentive to keep 
criminals in office to ensure that they remain eligible for 
punishment. 
VI. PRECEDEf'.:T 
Unlike the speculative and inferential arguments detailed in 
the previous Parts of this Article, the arguments from precedent 
in this Part are concrete and directly address the issue of late 
impeachment. In two cases-those of William Blount and 
William Belknap-the Senate debated late impeachment at 
length. Unfortunately for ollr purposes, it did not reach a 
decisive result in either case. In Belknap's case, the Senate did 
formally accept late impeachment, but while enough senators 
2i6. SffTm: FEm:R\u<;r No. 65. at :~9i (Alexander Ilamilton) (C1illtoll Ro"u,', ,'d., 
19(1) ("\\'hat, it may be asked, b the true ~pirit of the institutloll it~e1f? I, It 1I0t d.,,,)(, ... d 
as a method of :--:ArIO:'-lAL ':--:Ql ES"' into the conduct of pubhc lIIell? 1/ thi, he Ihe d.,,,)(u 
of iI, who can '0 prope,"I} be the inquisiw" for Ihe lIalioll .'s Ihe l('I'II''''III.ui,,'' 01 II ... 
nation Ihem~eh'es?"), 
2ii, If an ex-officer b serving ill a 1It'\\ o/lice al Ihe 1IIIIt' 01 Ihe 1I11l'e ... 111111'111 .,"d 
com;ctioll, disqu<llification would amount to relllmal a~ well. III .,11\" (."e, lI'IIIC)\.,1 would 
M'l'lII 10 be required b\" ArtIcle II, ~ " e\('n if di,C(u.llili( "Iioll " IIOt. 
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agreed to allow the trial to go fon\rard on the merits, enough 
senators disagreed to acquit Belknap. Still, the Belknap case 
proposes that the House can impeach and the Senate can tI]' 
officials even after they have left office. Even as the case shows 
how controversial late impeachment is, if it stc'lI1ds for anything, 
it stands for late impeachability. 
In other cases, Congress has declined to press late 
impeachments, allowing officials to resign and the cases to drop. 
But the fact that Congress had no need or reason to pursue 
these officials did not mean that Congress lacked the authority 
to do so. Indeed, in some of these cases senators explicitly 
recognized this authority. In all, the actual precedents relating 
to late impeachment are consistent with the conclusion tllat late 
impeachment is available to Congress, even if it is not always a 
worthwhile remedy to pursue. 
Impeachment precedents are not formally binding on 
Congress, as its members are responsible only to the voters and 
not to any higher court. In each case, each representative and 
senator needs to determine whetller a proceeding is 
constitutionally permissible.~7s This Part of tlle Article does not 
suggest that Congress would be unable to decide that late 
impeachment could be inappropriate or even impermissible. 
Rather, it is intended to show that when given the opportunity, 
Congress has recognized the possibility oflate impeachment. 
Filling out the historical record, state proceedings provide still 
more evidence that late impeachment is possible, some of which 
rests on state constitutional language quite similar to that in the 
federal Constitution. Even more so than in tlle federal context, 
though, these precedents send mixed messages. 
A Federal Cases 
There is precedent for late impeachment in tlle federal 
system. While there are cases in which impeachment was 
abandoned upon the resignation of tlle target, in no case was 
late impeachment specifically deemed unallowable. In fact, 
official House precedent, citing the Blount and Belknap cases, 
indicates that the "[a]ccused may be tried after resignation.":r.'I 
278. See infra note 372 and accompan)ing text. 
279. 3 AsHER C. HINDS, Hllms' PRECEDE.''TS OF TIlE HOl'SE OF Rl:I'REsfXIAlln~ m 
THE UNITED STATES 307 (1907) (describing -nalUre of impl'achllu:I1I"); Jt~ III/ra !'alb 
VIAl (Blount case) & VIA5 (Belknap case). 
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1. Blount 
The first federal impeachment case, that of Senator William 
Blount, was a late impeachment and was dismissed by the Senate 
for lack of jurisdiction. This lack of jurisdiction did not, 
however, arise from the fact that Blount had already left ollice. 
Blount was a delegate to the federal Constitutional Convention 
from North Carolina, served as governor of the Southwest 
territory for six years, and was one of Tennessee's lirst United 
States senators.2~(J 
Blount apparently became involved in a British plot to take 
Florida and Louisiana from Spain, a United States ally. After 
hearing the charges against Blount, forwarded by President 
Adams, the House of Representatives impeached him on July 7, 
1797.2~1 The next day, the Senate expelled Blount for his "high 
misdemeanor" by a vote of twenty-live to one and ac!iourned 
until November.2R2 During this recess, Blount was ordered to 
appear before a Senate select committee. He refused to return 
from Tennessee, however, and the Senate impeachment trial 
began without him in December 1798.2M1 The trial took only a 
few days and never got to the merits.2~1 
Before arguing anything else, Blount's representatives, Jared 
Ingersoll and AJ. Dallas, asked the Senate to dismiss the 
impeachment case: 
[A]lthough true it IS, that he, the said William Bloullt, was a 
Senator of the United States from the State of TCIlIH'SS(T, at 
Some haH" argued that one succl"S!oful impcachlll(,llt, ;tgainstJII(lgc West Ilulllphll'~' 
in IH62, was a lat(' impeachment. S,'r 43 COM;. R~.c. 324 (IH7f» ('t.ltt'nlt·nt 01 R('p 
Buti(,I·). I-lumplll'qs had abandoned hi, judie-i.t! pmt to accept ont' III the Con!t'd(,I.H \'. 
Id. Thus, hI" can be said to have left o/lice be/ell'e hi, impeachlllent. .'in' III. 11111 
Humphreys had never resigned, and it was only WIth the ,ucrt'",lul (.md llll( ontt·,ted) 
impeachlll('nt that he was oflicially removed Irolll oflirt,. Sn'lIl. at :{2f> (statelllent 01 Rep 
Tremain). Sff gnwrally Bl'SIIXEI.I., \/llml nole 16, at II :>-24 (describing Ilulllplll ey' (.l~(,) 
2HO. Bl'SII,ELL, mpm note 16, at 27 (oWlining Blount's care('r); .rr Illl11 I..IWll·ll( (' 
KestenbaulII, \\,illwlll BlolIlll (1749-18()(), TIIF I'OLII ICAI (;I{,\v~.YARIl, III 
http://www.politicalgravc)anl.colll/bio/biount.htllli (last Illodilied May I:{, 2(01). 
2R I. Bl'SII1\ELL, 1I11)m note 16, al 27-28. 
2R2. 5 A'iXALSOFCO'iC. 43-46 (17~)7). 
2H3. Bl'SIIXELL, 5Il1)m note 16, at :H. 
284. Vic(' President./('flerson, who pre~ided OVl'r thl' Irial, 1Il1l~1 han' h('ell 'Ill pllwd 
at how swiftl) it proceeded (mc(' il linally begall. Earlier he had w,,(tell 01 Ihe (.I~e. 
·Artide~ of impeachmellt wen' ve~lerday gi\ell in again'l Bloun!. ... I, a Sell.llol 
impeachable? Is an ex-Senalor impeachabl('? You will readily cOllceive Ih.ll Ihe'e 
questions, 10 be settled by twenty-nine lawvers, an' nol likely 10 co lilt· 10 sp('ed)' I'-'"e .. 
WII·\KIOX. IIllml note 242, al 315 n. $ (quoling Jellerson'~ cOITesponden('(·). 
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the several periods in the said articles of impeachmt'lll 
referred to, yet that he, the said \\,ilIiam, is not now a Senator. 
and is not, nor was at the several periods so as aforesaid 
referred to, a civil officer of the United Sates. nor is he. the 
said William, in and by the said articles, charged with h;wing 
committed any crime or misdemeanour in the eXt'clIlion of 
any civil office held under the United States, nor with any mal-
conduct [sic] in a civil office, or abuse of any public trust in 
-85 the execution thereof.-
87 
Blount's argument was that senators are not subject to 
impeachment, and even if they are, he was no longer a senator. 
Even if that did not matter, he claimed, he was not charged with 
committing his offenses as a public officer-that is, a private 
citizen could have been charged with the same actions. 
In his argument to the Senate,James BaY'ard, the leader of the 
House managers, attempted to refute all of Blount's alternative 
arguments at once. He countered that Article II, Section -l did 
not purport to limit the Senate's jurisdiction; therefore, it did 
not limit impeachment to civil officers.t "" To Bayard. American 
impeachment was coextensive with English impeachment unless 
a specific exception was mentioned in the Constitution.~"~ This 
would mean that, as Blackstone had recounted a few decades 
earlier with regard to England, private citizens would be 
impeachable for offenses against the public; the allegations 
against Blount at least qualified as thal. t "-' 
Turning to the late impeachment issue, Bayard argued that it 
was irrelevant that Blount was no longer a senator because he 
had been one "at the time the articles were preferred [sic]. "ZOo" 
Technically, this was not true, because, as in most early 
impeachments, the actual impeachment was voted upon before 
specific articles were adopted.:!90 In Blount's case, the House did 
not approve the articles until January, 1798, several months after 
285. [d. at 260. 
286. [d. at 263. Su supra Part IV.B.I (discussing and n:jl'ning Ihi, \1l'\, of Amell" 11. 
§ 4). 
287. WHARTON. supra note 242. al 264-65. S~~ also supra noll' I.J:! and ac("(unp;lIl\1ng 
text. 
288. See supra note 39 and accompanying leXI. 
289. WHARTON, supra note 242. al 271. 
290. See BUSHNELL, supra nOle 16. al 30 (dl"scribing ordl'r III B1olll11 CI>t'); 
GERHARDT, supra note 12, at 26 (describing modl"rn changl' \() \(lIIng on arudl-" 
concurrently willi vote on impeachmcll\). 
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2"1 Blount's expulsion from the Senate. Blount, however, had 
been a senator when he was impeached, and Bayard made a 
strong point that "no subsequent event, grounded on thc wilful 
act, or caused by the delinquency of the party, can vitiate or 
obstruct the proceeding.,,2'·2 
Bayard sidestepped the harder question of whether an official 
can be impeached after leaving office and limited himself to the 
stronger argument that an official impeached while in office can 
be tried after leaving office. Bayard did not concede anything; he 
simply limited his discussion to the easiest case. While Bayard's 
distinction may have made sense from a strategic standpoint, no 
historical, structural, or textual basis exists to distinguish 
between late impeachments and late trials.293 
Blount's representatives made a similar effort to narrow their 
argument to their strongest possible point, addressing late 
impeachment in the process. Dallas conceded that "there was 
room for argument, whether an officer could be impeached 
after he was out of office; not by a voluntary resignation to evade 
prosecution, but by an adversary expulsion . . . .,,2"1 Dallas's 
point was that late impeachment might be appropriate if the 
party had resigned, but it could not be appropriatc if the party 
had been expelled-especially if he were expelled from the 
same Senate that would try him. Ingersoll put it more strongly 
later in the trial: 
I certainly never shall contend, that an officer may lirst 
commit an offence, and aftenvards avoid punishment by 
resigning his office; but the defendant has been expelled. Can 
he be removed at one trial, and disqualified at another, for the 
same offence? ... Is there not reason to apprehend the 
strong bias of a former decision would be apt to prevent the 
influence of any new lights brought fonvarri upon a second 
trial?:!!'" 
Thus, while Dallas and especially Ingersoll apparently conceded 
that late impeachment was possible, they found that latc 
impeachment of an expelled senator made little structural 
291. WIIARTOI'. supra note 242. at 252. 
292. WIIARTO:-; • . "'Iml note 242. at 271. 
293. Sff SlIIJra Part V.c. 
294. WIIARTO:-;, slIllra note 242. at 284 . .'iff (lLm mpm note 197 (discus-'lIlg 'lIul'tlll.11 
interplay of impeachment and expulsion. supporting notion that no m('mll('" 01 
Congres~ can be impeached). 
295. V\'IIARTOI', "'lIra note 242, at 296. 
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sense. Notably, they did not raise any practical arguments 
against late impeachment-they did not argue that there is no 
good reason to impeach someone already out of office. 
In any event, the Senate agreed to reject the case and not hear 
the merits. A resolution specifying that "''''illiam Blount \\~as a 
civil officer of the United States ... and, therefore, liable to be 
impeached by the House of Representatives," w'as rejected 
fourteen to eleven.:!96 In other words, a majority of the Senate 
did not believe that Blount had been a civil officer. The Senate 
also accepted a second resolution, which said only that Blount's 
plea was sufficient and that the Senate had no jurisdiction, by 
the same vote, and the case was dismissed.~; The three senators 
who had been delegates to the constitutional convention Uohn 
Langdon, Alexander Martin, and George Read) voted with the 
majority on both votes.~s 
Some critics of late impeachment have pointed to the 
indefinite nature of the resolution dismissing the case, noting 
that it approved only Blount's alternative pleading, which 
included not just the senator/officer issue but also the late 
impeachment issue.299 Nevertheless, the previous resolution, 
rejected by the same fourteen to eleven vote, focused only on 
the senator/officer issue, so if the Blount result can be said to 
have definitively settled anything, it is that senators are not civil 
officers. Indeed, the Blount case is generally regarded as 
standing only for that principle and for the corollal)' that only 
civil officers are subject to impeachmenL!IOO 
2. Calhoun and "Vebster 
Two non-impeachment cases expose the lise and fall of 
another side of the impeachment power. Impeachment serves 
not just as a means of trying public offenses, but as a means of 
investigating them and vindicating tlle innocent. This broader 
296. fd. at 315-16. 
297. fd. at 316. 
298. fd. 
299. E.g., BUSHNELL, S1lpra note 16. al 38; HOFFER & Heu., lIIpra 1I01t' I, al :!57; III/ra 
note 360 and accompanying text. 
300. See, e.g.. State v. Hill. 55 N.W. 794. 797 (Nl'b. 189:~) (rt'Jt'cllllg lalt' 
impeachment but conceding that Bloum case prO\idl'S no prt'ct'dt'1II Oil Iht' qut'Slion); 
GERHARDT, S1lpra note 12. at 49 (concluding thai the prt'ct'dt'nt of Iht' Blount CilM" ~ 
unclear); RAwLE, S1lpra note 35, at 170 (discussing binding naturt' of Blount prt'ct'dt'nt, 
with which author disagreed); 2 STORY, S1lpra note 42, al 258 (njl'cling idt'a Ih;1I Blount 
decision "turned upon" late impeachment question). 
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notion of impeachment as the constitutionally preferred means 
of investigating federal officials' actions has much to commend 
it, though in practice it has not gained acceptance, In 2001, 
impeachment is seen as something to be avoided if one IS 
innocent. 
The case of John C. Calhoun shows the potential usc of 
impeachment as a defensive technique to bring accusations into 
the open and resolve them with Congress's decisive investigative 
power, rather than letting them fester and thrive on innuendo, 
If a congressional committee examines a case and finds it not 
worthy of impeachment, the would-be target can proclaim 
vindication, Then-Vice President Calhoun was seeking such 
vindication when, in 1827, opponents began circulating rumors 
of his financial misconduct when he had served as Secretary of 
UT '1ni 
nar. 
Despite the fact that he no longer held the office at issue, 
Calhoun appealed to the House as the "grand inquest of the 
nation,,'l(J2 to investigate the accusations: 
In claiming the investigation of the House, I am sensible, that, 
under our free and happy institutions. the conduct of public 
servants is a fair subject of the closest scrutiny and the freest 
remarks , , , but when such attacks assume the character of 
imt)('{lc/zablR offenses, , , , an officer thus assailed. however 
base the instrument used. if conscious of innocence, can look 
for refuge only to the Hall of the immediate Representatives of 
the People,'''J~ 
The investigation took place and Calhoun was officially 
cleared,'\lll By raising the stakes beyond that of a mere 
congressional investigation, Calhoun had forced his aCCllsers to 
put up or shut up and laid to rest the accusations against him, 
301. .'iff 3 Co:,\(;, DEB. 575 (1827). Because Calhoun was Vice "residt'ut at the tllllt' 
of the rumors, some who reject late impeachment might have found him 'USt el'lI"lt, to 
impeachment anyway. Ser wpm Part V.E (discu~sing "Whitt'water" intnpretation, will! h 
allow~ for impeachment of~itting officers fOI" offen~t's cOlllmitted in I'leviou~ ollice~). 
302. 3 C:Ol\G. DEB. 574 (1827); rJ Sllpm text accompanying note~ 42-4:~, 8:" 87; 1'.11 t 
V.D (using term "grand inquest" to describe lower-house impeachment role). 
303. 3 CO:'\G. DEB. 574-75 (1827). 
304. ld. at 1123-24, 1143. Since there was no impeachment, Congrt'~ avoided the 
issue of whet he I" (he Vice President presides ovel" the Senate when it is trying him. Sff at", 
lll!mI note 139 and accompanying text (discu~ing this constitutional dilemma). 
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Nineteen years later, a similar situation faced SenaLOr Daniel 
Webster.305 The great '<\lhig leader had served as Secretary of 
State under President Tyler. Now, three years after he had left 
that post (and four years before he returned to it), \,\'ebster 
found himself accused of improperly using secret funds."'" The 
accusations were scurrilous and unfounded, but they were made 
on the floor of the House of Representatives and received 
significant attention over the following months."" Some House 
members, including at least one ,<\rebster proponent, surmised 
that pursuing impeachment was a possible avenue LO resolve the 
issue-an interpretation that his attackers were all too happy LO 
support. 308 
Not all of Webster's defenders welcomed impeachment. One 
argued strenuously that late impeachment was not possible. WJ It 
was in this context that Representative and ex-President John 
Quincy Adams made his famous comments defending Webster 
but upholding late impeachability.'JO On the latter, he said: 
I take occasion to say that I diffcr with the ... gentlemen 
who have stated that the day of impcachment has passed . . . 
. I hold no such doctrine. I hold myself. so long as I have the 
breath of life in my body, amenable to impeachment by this 
House for everything I did during the time I held any public 
office.311 
Adams's statement was not universally accepted. One colleague 
mused aloud that removal was the only purpose of 
305. For a fair description of the Webster case, see BELK.-';AI'TRI.\L. ",pm nutl' 18 .• 1t 
151 (opinion of Senator Dawes). 
306. CONGo GLOBE, 29th Cong .• 1st Sess. 6:~6 (18·16) (.(;)(t·lIIl'l\( 01 R("p. CJ. 
Ingersoll). 
307. The committee appointed to invt"stigate tht" lIIaltl'r rdl'a't'd ib "t"port III JIlIIt·. 
in which it declared that "there is no proof in relation to any of tht· ehargl~ tu IlIIp("aeh 
Mr. Webster's integrity, or the purity of his motives in tht" disehargt' of tltt' dlltlt"' of III., 
office." Id. at 946. 
308. See, e.g., Uf. at 636 (statement of Rep. CJ. Ingt"l~oll) (.ltIacklllg Wl'b,tl'r ;lIId 
wondering aloud whether Webster's allegl'd ofTenst"s -will b .. dl'l'JIIt'd Impl'.Jeh.lbl .. 
misdemeanors in office"). 
309. E.g., id. at 638 (statement of Rep. Bayly) (-I wOllld likt" tu knO\, ho'" \UII can 
impeach an officer. when he is no longer an officer?-); /If. at 6·10 t-1;ltt'lIIl'lIt uf Rl'p. 
Winthrop} (agreeing "ith Bayly). Bayly "~1S a O .. mocr.1t alld lllll~ IIUI a partb<1II of 
Webster'S; he apparently disagreed only "ith the more sCllrrilol~ .lSpecb of IlIgl"~II" 
charges. See id. at 638. Wintllrop was a Whig. 
310. Id. at 641 (statement of Rep. Adams) (deft"lIdillll W .. b.ll'r 011 IIIl'nb bUI 
disagreeing with Rep. Bayly on late impeachmt"nt). 
311. Id. 
HeinOnline -- 6 Tex. Rev. L. & Pol. 92 2001-2002
92 Texas Review oj Law & Politics Vol. (j 
h d 111 impeachment, and so late impeac ment rna e no sense. 
Adams responded eloquently that disqualification is a worse 
punishment than removal and that without late impeachment, 
the offender could skirt it: 
[E]very officer impeachable by the laws of the country, is as 
liable, tw'enty years after his office has expired, as he is whilst 
he continues in office; and if such is not the case, if an officer 
could thus ward off the pains of impeachment, what would be 
the value of the provision . . . ?313 
Webster was never impeached. He did not seem particularly 
anxious to try the impeachment process as a method of clearing 
his name, and he was able to end the controversy by releasing 
documents that clarified his role.'" Still, this episode shows that 
late impeachment was on representatives' minds, even when it 
was far from likely to occur. These two cases thus provide a 
glimpse into congressional understanding of late impeachability 
during this time, and show that it had substantial support. 
3. Whittemore and Deweese 
Article I, Section 5, Clause 2 provides: "Each House may 
punish its Members for disorderly Behaviour, and, with the 
Concurrence of two thirds, expel a Member.""·' This presents a 
keen analogy to the issue of late impeachment-it begs the 
question of whether an ex-"member" can be punished, just as 
Article II, Section 4 begs the question of whether an ex-civil 
officer can be impeached. 
In 1870, the House of Representatives used its Article I, 
Section 5 power to censure Representatives Benjamin Franklin 
Whittemore and John Deweese for selling commissions to the 
Naval Academy.3lti The House had prepared to expel them, but 
312. Id. (statement of Rep. Bayly) ("Is not the judgment, in cas,' of imp"adllnellt, 
remo\"al from office?"). 
313. Id. (statement of Rep. Adams). Adams appeared to be talking mort· abollt 
himself than Webster. Adams also mentioned Presidents as being impeach.lbl,· ,Iltt" 
leaving office, and his own tenure had expired almost twenty year.. before th". Th,,,,' 
discounting Adams's statement in later years have thu~ portrayed his pmilloll as .1 
contrarian conceit. See in/ra note 367. 
314. See supra note 307. 
315. U.S. CO:'-lsr. art. I, § 5, d. 2. 
316. CO:\G. GLOBE, 41s1 Cong., 2d Ses.,. 1544-47 (1!l70) (renmling ""011111011 
condemning "Vhiuemore's conduct as unworthy ofa represelllalive of the 1)('01''''); ,,{ .It 
1616-17 (recording resolution condemning Deweese's conduct as unworthy 01 .1 
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their resignations mooted this effort. 51; Still, the House 
unanimously concluded that it could censure these "members" 516 
even after they had left Congress: 
The Deweese case, the second of the two, spurred another 
question-whether the House could investigate members from 
previous Congresses; while vVhittemore and Deweese had left the 
present Congress, they had been members of it.51~ There was 
serious debate on this question, with no conclusive answer.""':<> In 
wrestling with this issue, Representative Bingham, the author of 
the Fourteenth Amendment, stated tl1at it was "perfectly clear" 
to him that the House could not pursue ex-members of previous 
Congresses.321 Bingham added, however, that "there might be 
some room for inquiry" over the power to impeach an ex-member 
but for the fact that the Blount case had established that 
legislators were not civil officers subject to impeachment.n~ 
Bingham believed that Congress could not attempt to punish its 
ex-members but was less limited in its ability to pursue late 
impeachment of civil officers. 
4. Delahay 
Judge Mark Delahay was impeached in 1873, when the House 
adopted a resolution of impeachment proposed by the Judiciary 
Committee.323 Delahay was alleged to have funneled $32,000 
from a confIscation case to a relative, but the impeachment 
rested solely on "the most grievous charge, and that which was 
beyond all question[:] that his personal habits unfitted him for 
the judicial office, that he was intoxicated on the bench as well 
ff. "324 aso  
representative of the people); Sri' also 2 HI:-IOS, slIpra nOlI: 2i9, al i96 (d<">Cribmg 
condemnation of Deweese as censure); id. al830 (saml: as 10 \\1Iilll:mor<:), 
317. See id. at 1544 (Whittemore case); id. al 161 i (DI:\\'n-s1: casd. 
318. See ill. at 1547 (vote on Whittemore); id. al 161 i (VOII: on DI:\\'l'nt'), 
319. See id. at 1617 (statemenl of Reprcsl:llIalh'l: Logan) (raising qUl'S11U1I of 
investigating committee's jurisdiction). 
320. See id. at 1617-22 (recording deball: on jurisdiction of ill\'l'Sligming conllnittl:l'. 
including indecisive voting on motions). 
321. fd. at 1618. 
322. !d. 
323. CONGo GLOBE, 42d Cong., 3d Sess. 1900 (l8i:~). 
324. fd. 
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Regardless of whether being a drunk is a high crime or 
misdemeanor, as alleged by the resolution,'12'\ the important l~lct 
is that Delahay resigned before the House could draft specific 
articles of impeachment and bring the case to the Senate.'21' The 
House let the matter drop without any discussion on the record. 
If anyone took this to mean that the House did not think that it 
could pursue a late impeachment, however, he was proven 
wrong three years later. 
5. Belknap 
The 1876 case of Secretary of War William Belknap is the 
single most important precedent in the realm of late 
impeachment. The House impeached Belknap a few hours after 
he resigned, and the Senate tried him. The House unanimously 
voted, and the Senate ruled specifically, that resignation could 
not terminate the congressional impeachment process. 
Unfortunately for those seeking clarity, the Senate jurisdictional 
vote passed by a simple m<~ority. The minority members who 
lost felt strongly enough about their position that most voted to 
acquit Belknap on this issue alone. Enough did so to prevent the 
Senate from obtaining the two-thirds vote necessary for 
conVICtIOn. Still, there was enough support for late 
impeachment that the five-month-long trial went fonvard on the 
merits. Moreover, the final vote was very close, suggesting that a 
more egregious case might have yielded a conviction. 
Belknap was connected to a kickback scheme involving 
western trading posts. The Secretary of War granted post 
traderships, and they were lucrative positions. In 1870. Belknap 
appointed Caleb Marsh to the tradership at Fort Sill. Oklahoma 
but asked him to make an arrangement with the old post trader. 
John Evans, to protect the latter's property rights in the existing 
buildings and stocks at the fort.'127 Marsh arranged to allow Evans 
to continue operating the post in exchange for $12.000 a year in 
cash-half of which Marsh paid to Belknap's wife. 12K The 
325. Id. al 1899. Although labeled as high (Times and misdeml·'IIIOI~. many of 1),(' 
offenses for which federal judges ),a\'e been impeached ami convicted Uelll'r fil 1),(' 
broader lerm of "misbeha\'ior" specified in ArtIcle Ill. ~ I. Srr <It/mlnole 1911. 
326. Srr V.\=-: TASSEL & FI=-:KEL \IA=-:. wpm nole I. al 119. 
327. Bl·SII:\EI.L. <It/1m nOle 16. al I (i(i (sllllllnaruing facl~ in Bdknap ('a~l'). 
321l. It!. 
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Belknaps eventually received over S20,000 from the 
329 
agreement. 
The House Committee on Expenditures discovered the entire 
arrangement six years later.3:<O Belknap learned that he was about 
to be impeached and realized that there was one thing he might 
do to prevent it. After a discussion with House leader Hiester 
Clymer, Belknap apparently concluded that if he resigned he 
might avoid the unpleasant experience of a national inquest. 
additional publicity about his embarrassing conduct. and 
disqualification from office.331 Belknap hurried to President 
Grant's office and tendered his resignation at 10:20 A.M. on 
March 2, telling the overly credulous Grant that he was 
resigning to protect Mrs. Belknap.332 
Later that day, the House faced the question of how to punish 
Belknap. House members knew that Belknap had resigned and 
briefly debated their jurisdiction over former officers. A membel' 
of the committee argued that the Senate could still disqualifY 
Belknap and pointed to the Hastings precedent. m 
Representative Blackburn offered a fiery defense of late 
impeachment.3~ Others disagreed or asked for more time. m At 
about noon, though, the House approved the impeachment 
unanimously, thus endorsing late impeachability-or. at least. 
deciding that the Senate could sort out the issue."'" The House 
then drafted specific articles of impeachment. approved them. 
and fonvarded the case to the Senate on April4.~5~ 
Unfortunately for Belknap, 1876 was an election year. The 
Democrats-who had taken over the House in 1874 due in part 
to outrage over the Grant administration' s scandalous 
329. Id. 
330. Id. at 167 (summarizing facts in Belknap casl"). 
331. See id. at 167. 171; see also BELKSAI' TRIAL, supra nOll" 18. ;11 9. 
332. BELKNAP TRIAL, SIIpra nOle IS. al iii (discussing liming of till' rnignalllln); 
BUSHNELL, supra note 16, at 167 (describing Belknap's aClions). 
333. 4 CoNG. REc. 1430 (lS76) (stalement of Rep. Robbins Ilf :\orth Clrolina). 
334. Seeid. at 1431·32 (statement of Rep. Blackburn). 
335. Id. at 1429. 1432·33 (stalement of Rep. K;lSSon) (urging Ih;1I morc IImc be 
taken to resolve the issue and ciungJusun.· SIOf1' againsllatl" impl· .. chmclII). An <,\cnll\;11 
impeachment manager, Representative Hoar, ciledJusticc SIOf1"s '1;lIcmcn~ ag;ull>llalc 
impeachment, see infra text accompan)ing notl'S 496-50 I. and argucd Ihal Ihc 1I011>l' 
should take its time. 4 CONGo REc. 1431 (lS76) (statemclII of Rcp. Hoar), 
336. 4 CoNG. REc. 1433 (1876) (unanimous appro\-J.I of rl'>Oltnion of 
impeachment); id. at 1431 (statement of Rep. Bass) (arguing thaI il \,.1> for thc Scn .. lc III 
decide jurisdiction). 
337. BEL&'1AP TRIAL, SIIpra nOll' IS. at i\~ Bl·SIISEU .. lupm nOll' 16. al 169-70. 
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corruption-were anxious to exploit that corruption again in 
the 1876 campaign. The Republicans felt pressured to come out 
strongly against executive corruption as well.3:1l1 This explains the 
lack of even political opposition to late impeachment in the 
House. Once the case reached the Republican-controlled 
Senate, however, the motives changed. The vote in the House 
had been a qui.ck affair, a cost-free way for members of both 
parties to condemn Belknap and pass the unpleasant 
constitutional issues to the Senate. But the Senate actually had 
to try the case. Facing the prospect of a lengthy trial that might 
dominate the campaign, the Senate first had to decide whether 
to postpone the case until after the election. \.\'. No Democrat 
wanted to postpone the case, and most Republicans evidently 
just wanted to get the case over with; the motion to postpone the 
case was rejected unanimously.'I-IO 
At this point, Belknap's lawyers moved to dismiss the case for 
lack of jurisdiction; before reaching the merits, they wanted to 
litigate the late impeachment issue. <II The House managers 
argued that the impeachment was not late because it occurred 
on the same day as Belknap's resignation (fractions of a day 
being disregarded at common law, by their argument), but this 
theory was never taken very seriously.·<I2 In any case, the House 
from the first had styled the impeachment as being against the 
"late Secretary of War," for offenses committed "while he was in 
office."·\'·\ 
More than two weeks of wide-ranging argumenL<; on the 
question of late impeachment ensued, followed by two weeks of 
senators' reciting their own conclusions. III The debate covered 
virtually every point raised in this Article. Whatever political 
motivations underlay the final vote, no senator could have 
33H. See B~:L1;."AP TRIAL, supm note 18, at 14-15; BlfSIlN~:I.I., lIl/ml noit' \(i, at \(ill 
(de,cribing political climate in Congress in 1870). 
339. .'Ie,. BELK.'AP TRIAL, Ill/1m note 18, at II. 
340. Id. at 15. 
341. BRK:-IAP TRIAl., sU/Jm note 18, at 6; Bl'SII:-l~:LL, lIl/mlnote I Ii, at 170·71. 
342. Sef' BELKNAP TRL\L, IIlpm note 18, at 6 (raising argulIlent); III. at :{:.8-liO 
(opinion of Senator Nonvood) (rejecting it while voting to convict). 
:H3. 1£1. at iii, 2. 
344. Id. at 15 (beginning of jurisdictional argulllents on April 28); III. .It 72 (elld 011 
~-Ia) 14); uf. at 77 (beginnmg of recitation 01 opinIOns on May 15); III. at 1:.8 (end 011 
M.I) 29). 
HeinOnline -- 6 Tex. Rev. L. & Pol. 97 2001-2002
No.1 Law, History, and Practice oj Late Impead/1l/e1l/ 97 
complained that he had not heard a well-briefed and we 11-
grounded constitutional argument. :1-15 
In the end, on May 29, the Senate voted thirty-seven to twenty-
nine that it had jurisdiction over the late impeachment."6 The 
majority Republicans-Belknap's party-voted twent)'-six to 
thirteen against, while the Democrats were twenty-four to two in 
favor. 347 Some might take this unanimity among Democrats. 
coupled with significant support among Republicans. as a sign 
of the case's strength as a precedent in favor of jurisdiction. On 
the other hand, it might just reflect Democratic partisanship 
and the pressure some Republicans felt to denounce Belknap.l" 
The Blount case is now regarded as settling tlle issue tllat onl), 
civil officers are susceptible to impeachment."~ The House 
managers and several senators voting in favor of jurisdiction in 
Belknap's case, however, subscribed to a limited view of Article 
II, Section 4 and concluded that the only limits inherent in 
impeachment were those contained in tlle common-law term 
"impeachment" itself.:I:.o To the extent tllat proponents 
conceded that Article II, Section 4 does limit impeachment to 
"officers," they argued that this was a limit on who could commit 
impeachable offenses and not on when offenders could be 
. d 351 me . 
345. CJ. id. at 137 (opinion of SenalOr Jones of Florida) (-I1.kl \1.> (l".t\(· In !Ill"" 
who shall succeed us the full benefit of e\'el)' argumelll which h;1.> COlllribUIl"d 10 !ltl" 
conclusion at which we have arrived."), 
At least one partisan observer disagreed in mid·May Ihat Ihl' dd)atl" "~I.> b.tl.UKl"(\. 
The Republican New York Tribun<" reported: -It seems 10 bl" gl"lIl"rall\' conn.-dl"d Ih.tI Ihl" 
managers are no match for the brillialll array of counsd l"mpIO\l"d b\' thl" depo!>C'd 
secretary, and the general expectation is that the senall" "ill decidl' tI h.L' no 
jurisdiction." The Belknap Impeacllmml Trial, 3 CENT. LJ. 300. :~Ol (1876), 
346. BELKNAP TRIAL, supra nOle 18. at 76; Bl'SHNEU~ supra nOll' 16. OIl (7fi, 
347. BUSHNE~ supra note 16. at 176 (breaking down ,'Otl' by pan) (1Il~I, A (111.L'I· 
Republican, Anti-Monopolist Newton Booth, also voted ag<linst juru.dicuon, Itl. 
348. See BELKNAP TRiAL, supra nOll" 18. at 12-1 (opinion of Senalur Ing;tlbl 
(Republican opponent of late impeachmelll comml"llling Ihal polilic:a( pam~ -,th\~t\ ... 
embrace among their adherents large numbers of thaI ilmlluablt· chIS'- of Mlppnne ..... who 
invariably study how they can differ with their associall'S. and nl"\'l'r bdie'l" Ihe\' .tre Inlh 
independent unless they act with their adversaries"), 
349. See supra note 300. 
350. E,g., BELKNAP TRIAL. supra nOll' 18. al :~-I. -\9-50 (al),'\lInelll 01 1I0u!>C' 
managers); id. at 80 (opinion of Senalor Wallacl"); ,d, al 86 (opillllln of Sen,tlur 
Sherman); id. at 88 (opinion of SenalOr Edmunds); ,d. al 1:~6 (opilllon of Sen,tlor 
Saulsbury); see also note 167 and accompallying lexl. 
351. E.g" BELKNAP TRIAL, supra nOle 18, al 34 (al),,\IIII<"1I1 of IIO\l.>l· lII,magl" ..... >. Ill . • tI 
79 (opinion of Senator Thurman). 
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Structural concern about giving the impeachment defendant 
or the President full power over congressional jurisdiction was 
another popular argument used in favor of jurisdiction. As one 
senator incredulously stated the counter-argument: 
[I] t is gravely insisted that ... it matters not whether the 
office be vacated by self-amotion, or by judgment of Ihis COl\l'l, 
or by executive order .... The offender is removed, out of 
office, and cannot be disqualified, cannot be impeached, evell 
though as President of the United States he had committed 
.~~<, 
treason!' ,'-
Still others focused on the deterrent effect that late 
impeachment could have on other officials.""~ 
Among those voting against jurisdiction, the most popular 
argument was that a reading of Article II, Section 4 implied a 
restriction on the timing of trials in iL<; use of the term 
"officers,,3,,4 and the prominent role of removal. ",', Given the 
majority's limited reading of this article and section, some 
opponents also raised the concern that if impeachment were 
not limited to current civil officers, any private citizen could he 
subjected to impeachment.""!> PropOnenL'i of late impeachment 
352, fd. at 359 (opinion of St>nator Norwood); 'fp (IL", Ill. at 7H (opinion 01 Sen.lto. 
i'.kDonald); Id. at 79 (opinion of Senator Thurman); III .• It HI (opinion of Sen.lto. 
Wallact»; id. at 90 (opinion of St>nator Edmunds); >FP (ILIlI \/llml Part V.D. 
353. Eg., BELK.':AP TRIAL, supra nott> 18. at H7 (opinion of Scnator S.IIKcnt) ("" 
st>ntt>nce to disqualification ... operates for the public safety not only by the t'X( h"ion 
of tht> criminal from office but as a warning and examplt- to all public OllitT.', tendnlK 
to purity in ollice."); id. at 93 (opinion of Senator Maxey) (stating that di'qualification" 
inflictt>d "chiefly, by fearful example. to teach all men that American institutiom .1IId the 
perpetuation of free government, of the people, by the people, and for the peoplt-, 
demand purit), in ollice"); see (ILso supra Part V.A (discussing detern'nn·). 
354. See, P.g., BELK.'\;AP TRIAL, 5lllJra note 18, at 29 (argument of defensc (oume!); III 
at 82 (opinion of Senator Morton); id. at 115 (opinion of SenalOl Eaton); Ill. .11 12(i 
(opinion of Senator Ingalls); id. at 132 (opinion of Senator BOlllwell). Spp (IL", \/llml l'.ul 
IV.B.2 (discussing textual interpretations of constitutional illlpeadllllt'nl dause, ra.,inK 
this argumt>nt). 
355. See, e.g., BEI.K.':AP TRIAL, supra note IH. at H2 (opinion of Senalor :o.lorton); III 
at 85 (opinion of Senator Frelinghuysen); id. at 115 (opinion of Senator Ealon); III, al 
124 (opinion of Senator McMillan). See (11m wlml Part VI.B.2 (disCl.",inK It'xlll.11 
interpretations of constitutional impeachment clallses raising thi, arK"l1lenl). 
356. E.g .• BELK.'\;AP TRIAL, Slllira note IH. al 26 (argulllenl of defcnse ('oume!); III .It 
127 (opinion of Senator Cameron) ("If the Senate has juriMliction 10 Iry one priv.llt· 
citil.en upon illlpeachment it has a right to II} any private <iIi/en bv Ihe '.III1t· pro( (',,-,:); 
Id. at 100 (opinion of Senator Howe) ("If the firM article give' to th.· 1101l,t· Ihe 
dangt>rous power to illlpt>ach a man becaust> he has onct' been in olliet'. it give' it the 
power to impeach him also because he is in danger of gt'ttillK illto ollict'."); III .• It II". 
(opinion of Senator Eaton); see (Il5O mlirfl note 2:~ and accolllpanring texi. 
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naturally disagreed that their \'Jew necessilated lhis 
implication,357 
The two sides also tussled over precedents and alllhol'ilies, 
Both sides used the records of the ConstilUtional Convemion l ... '
and the state ratification debates,:tOli BOlh sides used the Bloum 
case as well, Opponents of late impeachmelH in the Belknap 
case argued that the Blount case provided a clear precedent 
against late impeachment.:lfoO Proponents relorted thar Blaum's 
case stood against only the impeachabilit)' of senators and nOled 
that Blount's defense had conceded thal resignation could not 
stop impeachment.361 Opponents ShOl back thar such 
concessions were dicta set forth by counsel who had nothing to 
lose by narrowing their argument as much as possible,~t 
Justice Joseph Story's commental)' provided another 
prominent source of disagreement.36~ In his writings, Story had 
made some statements against late impeachmem, which 
opponents latched onto almost gleefully; .... • this spurred 
proponents to cite St0l)"s mitigation of his own commelHs,"'~ as 
well as pro-late impeachment comments fi'om others such as 
William Rawle366 andJohn Quincy Adams,""; 
357, E,g" BELKNAP TRIAL, supra nOll' 18, at 34 (argulllelll of IloUM' lll;III,lge~). 
358. Eg., Uf. at 38-39 (argumenl of defense counsd); ul, al :,3, 57,58 (;lfgulllelll of 
House managers); ill. at 98-99 (opinion of Sl'nalor Howl'); ,d. ;11 IIS.:W (OpIllIOU of 
Senator Allison); id. at 156 (opinion of Sl'nalor Cr.I!,oin). /Jill < .... ul. al 1-1:, (OpIIIlOU oC 
Senator Booth) (making anti-<Jriginalism arguml'lll). The cOlI\t'lIIiou b di!>cI~('d III !';Ift 
III.C.l, supra. 
359, E,g., BEl.KNAP TRL-\l., supra nOll' 18, al 120-21 (opiuioll oC St-llalOl Allbtm); Ill. 
at 150 (opinion of Senator Dawes). The ratificalion debales are di!>CI"-M'd ill 111(' I('XI 
accompanying notes 151-58, supra. 
360, E,g., BELKNAP TRiAl., supra nOll' 18, al 28 (arguml'lll of dt'Ct'nM' C<IIIIl-'<'IJ. 
361. Eg., Uf, at 36-37 (argumelll of House JlIallagt'~); YI" abo IIII'm I('XI 
accompanying notes 294-95 (quoting concessions al issul'l aud 299-:iOO (d&I~lIIg 
actual meaning of Bloulll precedcllI). 
362, E,g" BELK.'1AP TRIAL, supra nOll' 18, al 42 (argulllt'lII oC dt'Ct'Il'(, coull,d); "'I" 
also supra text accompanying nOles 294-95 (quoling argllllll'nt> al is>ud. 
363, See infra Part VIlA. 
364. See, e.g" BELK.'1AP TRL-\l., supra nOll' 18, al :iO, 40, 42 (argulllt'JI! of d('Cl'll-'<' 
counsel); see also supra lext accompanying nOll'S 496-50 I (I) uOlillg SWJ"" , s ,1;lIt'lIIl'lI1». 
365. Eg" BELKNAP TRIAL, supra nOll' 18, al 152 (opinioll oC St'llawr Daw ..... ); "'I" abo 
note 503 and accompanying lexI (quoling Slory's can-aL' and OIh('r COIIIIII('JI!.ln· Oil 
Story). 
366. Eg., BEl.KNAPTRIAl" sulJra nOll' 18, al III (opinion oC S('II'lIor ~llIchdl). R;I"I(' 
is quoted infra in Part VlIA. 
367. Eg., BELK.'1AP TRIAl., supra nOll' 18, al 112 (opillioll oC St'nalOr ~hldl('Il). 
Adams is quoted and discussed, supra, in Ihl' Il'XI accolllpaming 1I01l'S :HO-I:i. Ad;lIm "~L' 
not a unanimously respecled amiJorily. As defense cOllnsd Cor lklkuap. dl>IIII"'lIIg 
Adams's comments on lale impeachmelll, pilI il: 
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With the jurisdictional question out of the way, the trial 
proceeded for two more months before the final voting began 
on August l.3till Belknap continued to push the jurisdictional 
argument,369 though, and despite the lengthy and detailed 
testimony compiled about Belknap's activities, the final decision 
on the merits reflected the initial decision on jurisdiction. 
Belknap was acquitted by a thirty-seven to twenty-five vote on the 
closest charge, five votes away from the forty-two to twenty vote 
needed for a conviction. Of the twenty-five senators voting to 
acquit, twenty-two (one Democrat and twenty-one Republicans) 
indicated that they did so because Belknap had already len 
office.370 Only three senators (all Republicans) indicated that 
they had gotten to the merits and actually believed Belknap was 
not guilty of an impeachable offense.m Thus, taking these 
senators at their word, it seems that Belknap was acquitted only 
because he was being impeached after he left office. 
In sum, the Belknap case provides a precedent that federal 
officials can be impeached and tried after they have left oflice. 
Nevertheless, this precedent is binding only to the extent that 
the Senate wishes to be bound.172 Critics of the Belknap 
precedent note, correctly, that the minority voting against 
jurisdiction did not feel bound by the m,~ority, and Belknap's 
acquittal was necessarily based on the f~lCt that his was a latc 
impeachment.m On the other hand, after the vote on 
jurisdiction, the minority failed in an attempt to stop the trial on 
grounds that a two-thirds vote to convict could not possibly 
Mr. Adams of course opposed what everyhody else bdieH'd to be tlIH', 
Nothing indeed would have giH'n him greater pleasure than to be IInp('.\( hed 
It would have given him an opportunity to come over here alld I'ly ,Iho\lt 111111 
right and left. His organ of comhativelH'!>.' wa~ always in .1 ,t.lte 01 (hllllll( 
inflammation. 
BELK:'-IAI'TRIAL, suj)m note I H, at 69. 
368. Sa BELK.'1APTRIAL, sujml note IH, at 342 (lIIentioning the heglllning 01 \ollng) 
369. /d. at 170 (Belknap's Answer after defeat on juri~dictional I~S\l('), 
370. Bl'SII:-:ELL, "'I)m note 16. at IH6 (de,crihillg .lIId t.lllying vote); V·\:-, I \\~H Ii.. 
FI:-:KELMA:-:, ",pm note I, at 193 (same). 
371. Bl'SII:-:ELL, ",pm note 16. at IH6 \de~crihing and tallying vote); V·\\; I.\'>-\H Ii..-
FI:'-IKEDIA:'-I, sul)m note I, at 193 (same). 
372. Sa 2 Archbald Tna/., sul)m note 269, at 1653 (senator voting III I.I\'(}\ 01 1.lt(, 
impeachment on hasis of Belknap precedent); G~:RIIARI> I, \/l/ml note 12. .It III 
(discussing congressional prerogative to revisit constitutional pn'('('dent~); 'I Ne.t1 
Kumar Kat)"al, ImlJfllchmp1l1 as CongrrmOlllll COllllllulullla/ /nlnjnr/allflll. (i:~ L\\\" Ii... 
CO;';TEMP. PROBS. 169, 183-88 (2000) (arguing that rationale, for ,Iarf' r/('(nll .11(' nol 
compelling in legislative context). 
373. Sff, f.g., Bl'SIIi'ELL. supm note 16. at IHIHlH (de~('nhlllg IlIIpOlI.IIH (. of 
jurisdictional question to senators voting to acquit Belknap), 
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result.374 In any event, four senators who had voted against 
jurisdiction nevertheless considered themselves bound by the 
m~ority decision-three of them voted to convicLm 
Furthermore, there is necessarily a difference between an 
acquittal and a dismissal. The experience of a five-month trial 
surely had more than just nominal significance to Belknap."6 
His guilt was established, even if he was not subjected to 
punishment. By deciding only after a full trial to acquit Belknap. 
the Senate essentially decided that he should not be convicted. 
not that he could not be. Jurisdiction and conviction are 
separate questions. The Constitution bars "conviction" with less 
than a super-majority, but does not similarly bar "trials," and so a 
simple majority properly decides preliminary matters like 
procedural rules, jurisdiction, and dismissal.m 
For his part, Chairman of the House managers Scott Lord fclt 
that despite Belknap's acquittal, "great good [would] accrue 
from the impeachment.,,378 Specifically, Lord felt that "it ha[d] 
been clearly settled . . . that persons who have held civil office 
under the United States are impeachable" and that the case had 
given "the public mind clearer views of official accounL1.bility.""'-' 
Manager Hoar agreed and contended that the Belknap 
impeachment would ensure that no one in Belknap's position 
would repeat his offenses.s-'<O House Judiciary Committee 
Chairman J. Proctor Knott perhaps put it best when he said: 
Was the only purpose of this disqualification simply to 
preserve the Government from the danger to be apprehended 
from the single convicted criminal? Very far from it, sir! ... 
374. See BEI..Kl'lAP TRiAL, S1lpra note 18, at 105-06 (remarks of Senator Christian",'); 
id. at 76 (vote). 
375. fd. at 343 (statement of Senator Booth); ,d. at :H4 (statemelll of St.-nator 
Han'ey); id. at 345 (statement of Senator Oglesby); id. at :~56 (statement of Senator 
Morton). In one state late impeachment case, all of the minority of senator.. who had 
voted against jurisdiction reached the merits and voted to comin. Su mIra text 
accompanying note 483. The state's supreme coun e\'elllualh' reve~d the entire 
proceeding by a narrow vote. Sa infra Pan VI.B.2.d. 
376. Cf DAVIES, S1lpra note 54, at 415 (describing minollS effen of impe;lchmelll 
trial on Warren Hastings). 
377. See U.S. CoNS!". arL I, § 3, d. 6; GERHARDT. supra note 12. at :~5 (dlM'l1S5ing 
majority requirement for re\ising rules). The Senate agreed in the impe;lclunelll trial of 
President Clinton that a majorit), vote (not jllSt ont. ... third plu.~ one) "'ould be required to 
dismiss the case. S. Res. 16, 106th Cong. (1999). 
378. BUSHNEu.., supra note 16, at 188 (quoting Lord'~ ~t;I!t'melll m /lOlI.M" 
committee report). 
379. fd. (quoting Lord's statement in House commillel' report), 
380. 4 CONGo REc. 5083 (1876) (statemelll of Rep. Hoar). 
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The great object, after all, was that his infamy might be 
rendered conspicuous, historical, eternal, in order to pre-Yellt 
the occurrence of like offenses in the future. The purpose was 
... to teach [other officials] that if they should fall under 
like temptations they will fall, like Lucifer, never to rise 
• ~81 
agam. 
As a practical matter, if Belknap had presented more of a 
danger to the Republic-say, if his crime had been more 
treasonous than venal or if he threatened to serve in the federal 
government again-the twenty-five senators voting against 
jurisdiction and conviction might not have stood their ground. 
Only two needed to change their votes for Belknap to have been 
convicted, assuming that everyone reaching the merits would 
have voted to convict in such a case. It also appears that some 
senators were swayed by the fact that Belknap faced criminal 
liability that might result in a sentence of disqualification. '"2 IL is 
impossible to know for sure, but if 1876 were not an election 
year, if the partisan balance in the Senate had been different, if 
resignation had come after impeachment rather than hours 
before, or if other facts that lack constitutional significance had 
been changed, the Senate easily could have reached a different 
result.'l>l3 More to the point of this Article, even if the weakness of 
the majority in favor of late impeachment in the Belknap case 
prevented Belknap's conviction, it did not prevent his 
impeachment and trial, and it certainly does not legally bar 
future late impeachments. 
6. Archbald 
Judge Robert Archbald was impeached and convicted in 1912 
for corruption.""' At the time of the impeachment, Archbald sat 
on the United States Commerce Court as a circuit judge, but six 
of the twelve specific articles of impeachment covered conduct 
3RI. Turley. <II/1m note 165. at 54-55 (quoting Belknap proceedings). Iktelll"H e " 
discussed in Part V.A, m/lm. 
3R2. S/'". ".K., BEl."""AP TRIAl.. m/Jru note I R. ,It 151' (opinion nf Sen,ltor Cragill). 
3R3. Cf. V·\:-.: TASSEl. & FI:-':KEl.~IA1\. m/Jra note I, at 12 ("As a prartic,t1 mattt'l, the 
ract that the Senate did not com;C! Belknap. suggests that except in extr;wnlin,u"y 
circumstances, resignation will bring the impeachment proces~ to a clost·."). !'raeti( ,II 
considerations underl};ng late impeachment ("should" as oppl"t'd tn "( ould") ,11(' 
discussed in Part VIII. infm. 
3R4. V.\" TASSEl. & FI:-':KEDIA:-':. m/1m nott' I. at I :{2-44 (describing Archb,lld (,I'" 
and listing articles of impeachment). 
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he had committed as a district judge.""~ Thus, Archbald's case 
squarely presents the issue of whether a sitting officer can be 
impeached for acts perpetrated while holding a former office.'" .... 
If late impeachment is acceptable, then this sort of 
impeachment should be also. If this sort of impeachment is 
barred, then so too is late impeachmenr.""; 
Unfortunately, the Archbald case does not provide a definitive 
precedent. To be sure, the House debated this version of the 
late impeachment issue. Though Archbald's Answer did not 
raise it,= both sides briefed it cursorily""'9 and argued somewhat 
more thoroughly at closing, essentially summanzlIlg and 
recycling the arguments from the Belknap case.'')(l 
Ultimately, Archbald was acquitted on all of the articles of 
impeachment that related to conduct in his fonner office, as 
well as two of the articles concerning his current posr.M The 
closest vote among the district court articles was thirty-six (0 
twenty-nine against.~92 Several senators filed written opinions, 
and many addressed the timing issue.5~' Three senators 
entertained some doubts about late impeachment and voted to 
acquit rather than set a precedent that they did not wish to ser. W1 
Six others opposed late impeachment ouu·ighl."·~ Five were 
385. BUSHNELL, supra note 16, at 219. 
386. This issue is cO\'ered in more detail in Part V.E. mpra. 
387. This does not mean, cOIl\'ersely, that if Archbald "~I.!> illlp~achabl~ Cor th~ 
offenses, then all late impeachments would be acceptabl~: thc fact that Archbald "~I.!> .1 
sitting officer might have been detenninau\·e. S« supra Pan ".E (d~nbing 
"Whitewater~ view that allows impeachmeJll for old offcnst.". bllt onl\' for '1Il1ng 
officers). 
388. See 1 Archbald Trial, supra note 269. at 44-59. 
389. See 1 id. at 1062-64 (managers' brieO (arguing that jobs \\'~fl' conllnuUlI.!»: 1l1"11 
1l01-{)4 (defense brieO (surveying some history of I:lll' illlpcaclllllclII and argUIng 
against "absurd results~ it would eJllail). 
390. See 2 id. at 1412-13. 1424-25. 1470.71 (manag~rs' argulllcnts): 2 Ill • • 11 I:,OS-IO. 
1545-47 (defense arguments): su also Bl·SII!'EU.. supra notc 16. at 2:~·1 (lII~nllunlllg 
timing argument by Archbald's counsel). 
391. 2 Archbald Trial, supra note 269. at 1622-46 (chronicling \utlllg un ,III amd~J. 
392. Id. at 1634. 
393. Id. at 1650.78 (opinions). Some cursory opinion, Wl'r~ "ff .. r~d dunug th~ 
voting. E.g .• id. at 1634-36. 1647-48: su also Bl'SH!'Ell .. supra uotl' 16 .• 11 2:~S buncnug 
opinions on impeachmeJll after lea\ing office): Ooughcn\'. supra uutt· :{2. ,II 72·7:~ 
(noting opposition to and suppon for late impeachabilit\, in Archbald G\>l'l, 
394. 2 Archbald Trial, supra note 269. at 1634-35 (opinion of Senator Uorah): 2 Ill •• 11 
1647 (opinion of Senator du Pont): 2 id. at 1675 (opinion of Senator SinllnUl\», 
395. 2 id. at 1635 (opinion of Senator Bryan): 2 /d . • 11 16:~:>-:~6. IIi:, I ("punu/\> of 
Senator Works) (relying on -good beha\ior" languagc ratht'r than IlIIpl· .. c1l1n~nt 
clauses); 2 id. at 1638 (opinion of Senator Brandcged; 2 Ill • .. t 16:,:>-:,6 (opllllOn of 
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undecided about late impeachment and abstained as a result. , .... 
Most significantly, though, seven senators found this particular 
form of late impeachment appropriate, although three of them 
voted to acquit on the merits.397 Assuming (as we reasonably can) 
that at least one other senator voting to acquit saw no problem 
with late impeachment and voted solely on the merits, ".x a 
majority of the senators voting saw no problem with latl" 
impeachment. At the very least, though, given that Archbald had 
already been convicted for other, more recent conduct, this 
issue "had no real bearing" on the case, as even an opponent or 
late impeachment has concluded."'"' 
7. English 
Judge George W. English was impeached in 1926 ror 
tyrannical, corrupt, partial, and abusive conduct on the bench. "" 
He resigned six days before his trial was to begin in the Senate. '0' 
The House resolved that, in light of the resignation, it "d lid I 
not desire further to urge the articles of impeachment.""rl Thl" 
House managers informed the Senate that although they were 
recommending termination of the proceedings, they were or the 
opinion that "the resignation of Judge English in no way affects 
the right of the Senate, sitting as a court of impeachment, to 
hear and determine" such charges. '01 Indeed, three senators 
Senator Crawford); 2 id. at 1660 (opinion of Senator McCumber); 2 ul. at 1(;(;1 (opin,on 
of Senator Catron). 
396. 2 id. at 1621 (statement of Senator Clarke); 2 id. at ((;:~2 (stat('ment~ 01 
Senators Stone and Swanson); 2 id. at 1634 (statement of Senator Smith of C("orgia); 2 
id. at 1636 (statements of Senators Newlands and Foster). Stone expressed "grave dOllbt" 
about late impeachability, given the "grave abuses" it could spur. 2 ul. at 1(;52. 
39i. 2 id. at 164i (opinion of Senator Owen) (allirming late impeachabilitv,.11 le."t 
with regard to sitting officers); 2 id. at 1648 (opinion of Senator Poindexter); 2 III .• It 
1650 (opinions of Senators Root and l.odge) (affirming late im)leachability but votillg to 
acquit on merit~); 2 id. at 1653 (opinion of Senator Gronna); 2 ul. at ((;(;3 (opinioll 01 
Senator Cullom) (allirming late impeachability but voting to acquit on merit~); 2 III. 
(opinion of Senator Cummins). 
398. See, I'.g., 2 Id. at 1658 (opinion of Senator Oliver, voting appan'ntly ~ol(,\\' on 
the merits). 
399. Bl'~II:-;ELL, 51l/Jra note 16, at 238-39. 
400. ProfPl'dillg5 oj /hl' UTll/l'd S/a/I'", Sma/I' IfI /hl' Tnal of Impnzrhmm/ of (;,mKI' 1\' 
English, Dis/ric/ Judge oj /hl' Ulli/ed S/a/e5 Jor /he Em/pm DIS/ric/ oj fIllflOH, S. DOL. No. m)·I77, 
at 3-15 (1926) [hereinafter Ellglish Trial] (recording the articles ofllnpeacllment), 
401. Id. at i6 (mentioning tl1<lt English's impeachment trial W'L' to beglJl on 
November 10,1926); Id. at is (recording English's resignation on November 'I, 192(;). 
402. !d. at 80-81. 
403. STAFF OF HOl'SE CO~tM. ON HIE Jlf[}(ClARY, 93n CON(;., IMl'h\( .II~I~" I 
SELEGI'ED 1'\'IA I'ERIALS ON PROCEDl'RE H91 (COI1lI1l. Print 197'1) I h('(('III<I!J('1 
I~II'EACJ I~IE:-;Tl. 
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argued that the resignation should not prevent the Senate from 
passing judgment on English's conduct and punishing him as 
appropriate.- Eight others responded that while they agreed 
that the Senate retained its jurisdiction, they wanted to respect 
the managers' role as prosecutors and drop the case if the 
House no longer wanted to pursue it.~o~ As one such senator put 
it: 
The Federal Constitution says that in cases of this kind the 
House of Representatives shall have the sole power of 
impeachment .... In view of that language, it seems to me 
that in this case no choice is left to us. . . . but, at the same 
time, I am sure that I will be allowed the pd\'ilege of saying 
that I deeply regret the conclusion that the House of 
Representatives has reached.-I06 
No senator suggested that it would have been impossible or 
unconstitutional to proceed if the House had not "desired" to 
do otherwise:")7 Indeed, one senator noted, without 
contradiction, that he wanted it "distinctly understood" that the 
case should not provide a precedent tllat a resignation would 
necessarily terminate impeachment proceedings:"" English was 
old and unlikely ever to serve in federal office again,""} and tllere 
was little appetite for pursuing what were, after all, mild offenses 
relative to the effort and resources required to pursue tllem. 
The motion to dismiss the case passed seventy to nine: l " 
This case provides another vaguely positive precedent on late 
impeachability. Clearly, the House and tlle Senate felt that they 
could have proceeded with the case. Had tlle House believed that 
it had no authority to proceed or that tlle Senate might reach 
that conclusion, it would not have passed tlle carefully worded 
resolution that it did. If the Senate had so concluded, its debate 
would have taken on a much different tone. 
404. English Trial, supra note 400, at 81-85 (speeche~ of SenalOP.> B1e;~ ;lIId Dill); III. 
at 89-90 (speech of Senator Wheeler). 
405. Id. at 85-89, 9()"92 (speeches of Senalon; Norris, Reed of Pen 11>'\ 1\.111101, Reed of 
Missouri, Bruce, Copeland, King, Fletcher, Bordh). 
406. Id. at 88 (speech of Senator Bruno). Bul St't' III. at 89·90 (speech of Senawr 
Wheeler, arguing that trial could and should continue regardt....,." of the II00L ..... " 
decision). 
407. Bm see id. at 91 (speech of Senator King) (alluding 10 Ddah .. ,· G~ and 
suggesting that resignation was treated there as Mipso facto tennillating the Gue"). 
408. Id. at 91·92 (speech of Senator Fletcher). 
409. See id. at 92 (speech of Senator Borah). 
410. Id. at 92-93 (recording the roll call \'ote on order of disllllJiS.,t). 
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8. Aborted Cases 
On numerous occasions, the target of an impeachment 
inquiry resigned before the House could take a vote. III In every 
one of these cases (except, of course, that of Belknap), the 
House opted not to proceed. The most famous example of this. 
of course, is the aborted impeachment of President Nixon. The 
others, less famous, either concern judges not worth pursuing or 
more prominent figures against whom the cases were not 
particularly impressive. 112 
None of these cases contains evidence of a congressional 
understanding that late impeachment is impossible, but several 
of the cases spurred debate on the question. For example,Judge 
Edward Durrell resigned in January 1875 after the House 
Judiciary Committee passed an impeachment resolution against 
him.1I3 The House discontinued the proceedings by a 128-69 
vote after a discussion on whether the House had any power to 
proceed. III Representative Beqiamin Butler, who favored 
impeachment, argued after the resignation that impeachment 
could proceed but should not, given Durrell's advanced age. w. 
Representative Luke Poland opposed impeachment on the 
merits but did not believe that resignation presented any sort o/" 
obstacle to the House proceeding, if it so chose. III. 
Representative Lyman Tremain, who also opposed 
impeachment on the merits, expressed "serious doubt" as to the 
House's power to proceed. 1I7 Given that the only people who 
spoke in favor of the power of late impeachment opposed it on 
the merits in Durrell's case, the House's vote here does not 
represent any sort of statement against the constitutional power 
of late impeachment. Similar statements were made in f~lvor of 
4 I I. BCSII:'\ELL. SIIpra nott' 16. at 39 ("More than fifty federal judges have n',ignt'd 
while under investigation or after their impeachment had been ITCOIJllnt'nded to tht' 
House of Representatives. and further action was not pur~ued againstthelll."). 
4 I 2. See bll'EACII~IE:\T. supra note 403. at 691-92 (Judge Stephens); ul. at 71 () (Jmlgt' 
Irwin); id. at 720-22 (Judge Durrell); ld. at 72()'28 (Judge Bustt'ed); ul. at 85:-I-5Ij (Judge 
J'lanford); id. at R59-61 (Justice Wright); id. at 880-81 (Secretary Mellon). 
413. /d. at 720. 
414. fd. at 720-22; see also 3 Co:,\c;. REC. 319-24 (1875) (recording debate and mtt·). 
415. 3 (:0:,\(;. REC. 320 (lR75). 
416. It!. at 322-23. 
417. Iii. at 320-22. 
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the power of late impeachment in other cases in which the 
merits did not warrant proceeding.~IK 
It is undeniable that this series of cases indicates that late 
impeachment rarely will be deemed worthwhile. On the other 
hand, it does not indicate that Congress is powerless to proceed 
in such cases. By analogy, the vast majority of criminal 
prosecutions in this country end in guilty pleas, with no trial and 
with reduced sentences but at a tremendous savings of resources 
on the part of the prosecution and the courts. Given how time-
consuming and distracting full-blown impeachment proceedings 
tend to be, it is no surprise that late impeachment is typically 
considered not worth the effort. 
Just as the reality of frequent plea bargains in the mass of 
minor criminal cases (and the occasional big one) does not 
affect the prosecution's ability to go to u'ial if necessary, the 
reality of impeachment practice does not change the potential 
for late impeachment. Congress, moreover, docs not blithely 
concede its jurisdiction. The biggest limitation that the Senate 
has allowed to its jurisdiction came in the Blount case, in which 
it was decided that senators were not impeachable. But the 
Senate's decision (notably, against the House's conclusion). 
while constitutionally defensible, shows a sort of self-interest that 
would not necessarily duplicate itself in the impeachment of a 
former executive or judicial officer.m 
B. State Impeachment After 1787 
After 1787, the states continued to provide instructive 
examples both for and against late impeachment. Because the 
language of the federal Constitution was already set, state 
precedents based on dissimilar state constitutional language 
represent less persuasive authority. To the extent that state 
language did correspond to federal language, the precedents 
are inconclusive. 
1. Post-1787 Changes to State Constitutions 
In the immediate aftermath of the federal Constitution's 
adoption, several conventions rewrote their state constitutions, 
418. E.g., bfPEACHME:>''T. supm note 403. at 728 (Judge Bmlc:c:d); III. ;11 S55 (Judgl" 
Hanford); id. at 861 (Justice Wright). 
419. See supra note 197. 
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including the provisions on impeachment contained therein. In 
some cases, states adopted specific language from the federal 
Constitution. Because the impeachment language in Article II. 
Section 4 of the federal Constitution was so poorly drafted, 
however, most states adjusted it. 120 
In some cases, it is instructive to see how states with 
constitutions providing for impeachment before 1787 changed 
their impeachment provisions after 1787. Other examples are 
not instructive: Massachusetts and New Hampshire still use their 
pre-1787 constitutions, while North Carolina did not change its 
constitution until after the Civil War. 
a. Georgia 
Georgia was the first state to adopt a new constitution after 
1787. Georgia's earlier constitution had not provided for 
421 impeachment at all. In 1789, though, the state wrote a new 
constitution that essentially tracked the federal Constitution, 
and contained the following impeachment provision: "[The 
House of Representatives] shall have solely the power to 
impeach all persons who have been, or may be in office."122 That 
explicit authorization for late impeachment was reaflirmed in 
seven subsequent constitutions m and was not removed until the 
most recent constitutional convention in 1983. Besides 
providing evidence that late impeachment was we1l-regarded in 
1789, the Georgia provision improves on the form of the federal 
Constitution in two respects. First, unlike Article II, Section 4, it 
states directly which people are susceptible to impeachment. 
Second, it definitively indicates that late impeachment is 
allowed. 
One could argue that by explicitly authorizing late 
impeachments, the Georgia Constitution meant to distinguish 
420. But see, e.g., IJ'D. C01'lST. of 1816, art. III. ~ 24 ("The Governor. ,lIld all (lvll 
officers of the State, shall be removed from office. on impeac!unl'nt for. and com')( tlOlI 
of treason. bribery. or other high crimes and misdemeanors:). 
421. GA. CONST. of 1777. art. XLIX (rendering offin'r~ "liable to be c,tlled to 
account by the house of assembly" but not providing for impeachml'nt). 
422. GA. CONST. of 1789. art. I. § 9 (emphasis added); 'ee {liso M~:LVIN II. IIILL.JR .• 
TII~: G~:ORGIA STATE C01\STITl'TIO;-'; 4 (explaining congrut'nn' bl'tw('ell (;(,OIgl.t 
Constitution of 1789 and federal Constitution). 
423. See GA. CO;-';ST. of 1976, art. III, § 6, 'I I; GA. C01\S r. of 1945. art. III. ~ G. 1 :~: 
GA. CO;-';S1'. of 1877, art. III, § 6. 'I 3; GA. CaNST. of 1868. art. III. ~ 3. d. :,; GA. C();\1~I. of 
1865, art. II, § 3. cL 4; GA. C01\ST. of 1861. art. II. ~ 3. d. 4; GA. CONSI. or I 79/l. art. 1. ~ 
10. 
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itself from the federal Constitution, which, the Georgia framers 
believed, implicitly disaLWwed late impeachment. But if this is so, 
then the specification that the Georgia House has the sole 
power to impeach officers should be read as a resu'iction on the 
federal House's unmodified sole power to impeach, period. In 
other words, if the wording of the Georgia Constitution of 1789 
indicates that the federal Constitution does not allow late 
impeachment, it also indicates that the federal Constitution 
allows every private citizen to be impeached. A better 
interpretation is that Georgia neither added to nor subtracted 
from the federal impeachment power but changed and/or 
clarified it. 
Georgia removed the "have been in office" late impeachment 
provision in 1983 because late impeachments seemed irrelevant 
to the committee charged with redrafting the impeachment 
section.424 The committee's consideration of the issue, preserved 
in a transcript, is very illuminating as an example of 
commonsense (if shortsighted) intuitions about late 
impeachment 
DR. PYLES: May I raise another question? What about this M 
... against all persons who shall ha\'e been .... " What's 
the point? 
This is highly confusing if you say M • • • shall have been in 
office .... " That's almost ex post facto or something. 
MR. ClARK: How can you impeach somebody who's not in 
office[?] 
DR. PYLES: Yeah. Or why. We've got criminal prO\'isions, 
law, civil law. 
MR. ClARK: Any understandable background for that, that 
phraseology, "shall have been"? 
CHAIRMAN SWEENEY: No. 
MR. TIDWELL: If you look further into what you can do, 
the consequences are, he cannot hold office ag<\in. That might 
shed some light on that. 
424. See 2 STATE OF GEORGL-\ SElECT Cml~II1TEE 0:-: Co:-:srrn:no:-:Al. !U:\'ISIO:-:. 
TRA."ISCRIPT OF MEETINGS, 19if-1981, CoMMITTEE TO REVISE ARll(l.£ III. Oct. 29. 19i9. 
at 29·30 (stating subcommittee's understanding that ka\ing office 'oU\iille(s) the need 
for an impeachment proceeding"). 
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MR. HILL: ... Now a person could leavc office and two or 
three years later something is found out about that pcrson that 
would be serious enough to warrant an impeachmcnt trial so 
that he or she could never hold office again .... I don't think 
the language was happenstance, I think it was intcnded to 
cover both people in office and former officeholdcrs. 
MR. ClARK: . .. [1] mpeachment is to put that person out 
of office, it seems to me, and the idea if he has committed 
some malfeasance or violation, that there would be criminal 
support, this falls into COlirt action rather than the ponderous 
procedure of an impeachment. I just can't sec it ever coming 
about ... it clutters lip again and adds questions to the 
Constitution that is just not necessary. 
MS. RYSTROM: I agree with you. 
DR. PYLES: I actually think the impeachment provIsIOn 
serves as a deterrent or maybe a threat against an ollicer, 
whether it will ever be carried Ollt or not, the fact that it could 
be carried out is a pretty viable threat it would seem to lIIe to 
an individual before he continued to persist in whatever it was 
that would be heinous enough to warrant impeachment. 
CHAIRMAN SWEENEY: Especially if he knows that it may 
come up after he leaves office. 
MR ClARK: ... I don't think it's e-nough-it's not 
important enough to quibble about. I don't think it's likely to 
come up again, so I would be opposcd to leaving the wording 
in there, I don't think it serves any protectivc purpose at all. 
CHAIRl\1Ai\J SWEENEY: Well, is therc a motion to drop it? 
DR. PYLES: I so move. 
CHAIRl\1AN SWEENEY: All in favor? 
MS. RYSTROM: I was getting convinced on the- othcr side as 
this discussion went on. 
CHAIRl\1Al'\,J" SWEENEY: Four [out of seven colllmittee 
members present] in favor of dropping thc languagc. 12·, 
The Georgia late impeachment language, which had survived 
seven constitutional revisions, did not survive the eighth. The 
subcommittee started somewhat confusedly: How would late 
impeachment be "ex post facto"? Why does the availability of the 
criminal law preclude late impeachment but not regular 
425. I id., On. I, 1979, at 25-29. 
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impeachment? Nonetheless, it eventually covered most of the 
main arguments about late impeachment. Specifically, the 
availability of disqualification and deterrence were raised as 
points in favor of late impeachment,i:16 while the practical 
difficulty of late impeachment and the sU'ong connection 
between impeachment and removal were raised against it. i:!7 But 
the subcommittee ignored the significant potential problem that 
an official could resign to avoid impeachment and/or 
disqualification-the situation in many actual cases of late 
. h 49 8 Impeac menL-
The Georgia experience provides an example of 
constitutional framers deciding as a practical matter whether 
late impeachment is worthwhile-something that even 
proponents of late impeachability admit is a hard point to 
defend.429 But this article primarily addresses whether the 
federal Constitution allows late impeachment, not whether 
states, writing their constitutions from scratch, should include it. 
For this reason, the most significant point about the Georgia 
revision is that when the 1983 framers sought to preclude late 
impeachment, they used language that reflects the federal 
language: "The House of Representatives shall have the sole 
power to vote impeachment charges against any executive or 
judicial officer of this state or any member of the General 
Assembly. "430 Thus, in Georgia, language setting forth that only 
officers can be impeached was meant to preclude late 
impeachmenL 431 On the other hand, its framers' intent was 
clear, and the change from the previous language was blunt and 
meaningful. In the absence of such factors, language like this 
has been held to allow late impeachment in other states. m 
1 
426. See supra Parts V.B (discussing disqllaliliC:llion) & \·.A (dbCllS>ing d ... l ... rr ... nc ... ,. 
427. See supra text accompan)ing nOll'S 19·22 (disclIs.,ing roll' of rt'lIIm~II): IIIITt1 P.tn 
VIII (discussing practical considerations). 
428. See, e.g., supra Pan VLAA (discussing the Bd"nap c .. "d: "'1m Pan \"l.B.2.c 
(discussing the Ferguson case); see also supra Parts \'.B and \·.D (dil>CIl>.l>lIIg ,Inlrtllral 
implications of this phenomenon). 
429. My own admission of this point. and my rl.'SpOnSl' 10 II. I" d ... t.ulc.-d III Pan \"1II. 
infra. 
430. GA. CONST. an. III, § 7.1 I. 
431. See supra text accompan)ing nOll' 425. 
432. Examples include the jOl1<."5 (IIIlra texl aCCOmpaJl\1ng not..." ·I·IS-:,Ul. Dmln 
(infra text accompan}ing notes 451-52). and FlIrchl.'s (IIIlm nOll' ·16-1) c.",...". 
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b. Tracking the Federal Constitution 
Other states changed their pre-1787 constitutions in ways that 
are significant with regard to late impeachment. 
South Carolina wrote a new constitution in 1790. Its old 
constitution had not mentioned late impeachment. The new 
one did not either, but its wording matched the federal 
Constitution's impeachment provisions more closely: 
The governor, lieutenant governor, and all the civil officers 
shall be liable to impeachment for any misdcmeanor in ollice; 
but judgment in such cases shall not extcnd further thall to 
the removal from office, and disqualification to hold any office 
of honor, trust, or profit, under this state. Thc party convicted 
shall nevertheless be liable to indictment, trial, judgcment, 
and punishment, according to law. "" 
While they adopted wording very similar to that in the federal 
Constitution-and presumably sought to construct a similar 
impeachment regime-the South Carolina framers joined 
Georgia's in rejecting the confusing wording of Article II. 
Section 4. Instead, they specified all of the limitations on 
impeachment in one section and precisely listed who was "liable 
to impeachment." The South Carolina Constitution provides 
some basis for the "late" interpretation of impeachment 
jurisdiction, as opposed to the "Whitewater" interpretation, in its 
statements that officers were "liable to impeachment" as 
opposed to being "liable to removal," and that impeachable 
offenses had to be committed in office. 1"1 
Pennsylvania's constitution was the next to be ratified in 1790. 
'While the old Pennsylvania Constitution had specifically 
authorized late impeachment if the officer had not left office by 
the natural expiration of his term, the new constitution was 
silent on the subject. Instead, it, too, tracked the language of the 
federal Constitution. 1:1:> In blurring the Issue of late 
43:t s.c. CONST. of 1790, art. V, ~ 3. 
434. Th(' "V.'hitewat('r" and other illl('rpretations of impeachment are d"cllssl"d in 
Part~ IV.B.2 and V.E, mpra. The dismissal-centered language was used in New.lerwy', 
re\"()lutionary constitution. See SIlpra t('xt accompanying note 75. Of course, the 1.lIlgllag(· 
in the federal Constitution obscures this point. See supra Part IV. 
435. Sff PA. CONST. of 1790, art. IV, ~ 3 ("The Goyernor, and all other civil ofli( el', 
IInder thi~ commonwealth, shall be liable to impeachment fi)r anv mi~delll('anor III 
ofIke: But judgment, in such cases, shall not extend furtht'r than to n'nH)v;,1 frolll ofli( (., 
and disqualification to hold any oflice of honour, trust, or profit, und('\" tlll~ 
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impeachment, the Pennsylvania framers might have intended to 
expand late impeachment to include those who had left oflice 
naturally or to rule out late impeachment altogether. As in 
South Carolina, though, the failure to mention removal 
prominently and the use of explicit language regarding the 
timing of the offense provide some basis for adopting the "late" 
interpretation of impeachment jurisdiction, 
Kentucky joined the Union in 1791 and copied the SOllth 
Carolina/Pennsylvania language:~ The next year, the framers of 
the new Delaware Constitution adhered even more closely to the 
language in the federal Constitution,H' Recall that Del'aware's 
old constitution had specified an eighteen-month statute of 
limitations for impeachment cases and had required that the 
commonwealth: The party, whether com;w:d or acqui(l<:d, shall n<:\l,rthd~ \)(' habit' 
to indictment, trial, judgment, and punishment, according 10 law.-). II appt'an [hal [h<: 
1790 revision initially may not have included the first S<:ntt'IIC<: spt'nf\1l1g who wuld \)(' 
impeached. See MINUTES OF THE GRAND CO~I~IITrEE OF 11IE \\"1101.£ Cosnxl1os Of nit 
COMMOll.'WEALTH OF PENNSYLVAl',1A 59 (Philaddphia. Zachariah I'oubon 1790) (.hOl\1ng 
adoption of Article IV, § 3 without its first s<:nt<:nc<:); ul. at 98 (rt'pnntlllg t'll II n' 
constitution and showing Article IV. § 3 without its first s<:ntl'nc<:). 
The scope of the new Pennsylvania imp<:achment clalls<:s \\~LS ill!<:ndt'd 10 Ix, tht' "1111<: 
as that of the federal prO\isions--asid<: from a slight difI<:rt'nCt' in tht' ddilllllOIl of 
impeachable offenses--as demonstrated in a statem<:nt by leading Framer ,lIId Suprt'lIIe 
Court Justice James Wilson: "The president, \;ce prt'"Sident, and all chil officen of the 
United States; the governour and all other chil offiCt,rs under thi- COIIIIIIOII\\'t';llIh, .Irt' 
liable to impeachment; the officers of the United St;nes. for tre,LSon, bribel"\. or other 
high crimes and misdemeanors; the officers of thb ('ollllllon\\'t';llIh. for .111\ 
misdemeanor in office.- 1 JAMES \\'1I.50N. supm note 43. at 426. 
436. See KY. CONS!". of 1791, art. V, § 2 ("The Gm't'rnor and all chil offict'n .h;lll Ix, 
liable to impeachment for any misdemeanor in offict'; but judgtnt'nt in such c;~ .hall 
not extend further than to remo\'al from office, and disqualifir.nion to hold '111\' offict' of 
honor, trust, or profit, under this Comlllonweallh; but tht' !>;lrt\' con\1C!t'd sh.11I 
nevertheless be liable and subject to indicull<:nt, trial. and punishlllt'II!, according 10 
law.-). Tennessee followed suit in 1796. &~ TENN. COS~T. of 1796. art. IV, §.\ (-nit' 
governor, and all civil officers under this St.'lte, shall bt' liablt' 10 illl!>t';lChlllt'1I! for '111\ 
misdemeanor in office; but judgment, in such cast'"S, shall not l'xtt'nd furtht'f [h'lII In 
removal from office, and disqualification to hold any offin' of hOIlOf, tn!!>[, or profit 
under this State. The party shall, 1lC\'erthclt'"SS, in all GLSeS bt' liablt' [0 IIIdinlllt'II[, [nal, 
judgment, and punishment, according to law.-). 
437. See DEL CONS!". of 1792, an, V. § 2 (-Tht' Gm't'OIor, alld all otht'f n'll offin'n 
under this state, shall be liable to impeachment for trt';LSOII, bribt'l"\', Of all\' high cnlllt' 
or misdemeanor in office. Judgment in such cast'"S shall 1I0t t'xtt'nd furtht'f th,lII to 
removal from office, and disqualification to hold any offict' of honor, In!!>t Of profit 
under this state; but the party convicted shall ne\'enhdcss bt' subjt'C! to indicullt'II!, tn.ll. 
judgment and punishment according to law.-): DRAnan Of A CO~SI1It-1I0~ Of 
GoVERNMENT (Wilmington, Peter Brynberg & Salllul'l Andn'".,. 1792) (ft'cordlllg 
identical proposed language circulated to citizcnl')' b~' ordt'r of tht' con\'t'lluon 011 
December 31, 1791); see also PROCEEDINGS OFn~E HOl'SE OF ASSBIII!.\' OF 1lIt. Df.I_\W\R~ 
STATE 1781-1792 AND OF THE CONS!"m'TIONAl. CoSV£.,\,,110S OF 1792, at 800 «(laudla L 
Bushman et al. eds., 1988) (recording cOIl\'t'ntion's acct'pt;lIIct' of nt'W III1Pt';lcllllIt'1II 
language found in draft cited above); id. at 883 (ratif)ing S;UIlt'); rd. at :{6-:{7 (dt':S('riblllg 
resemblance between new state constitution and fed<:ral Constitution). 
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clock not begin for governors until they left office."1< Thus. 
Delaware had required late impeachment for governors and had 
permitted late impeachment for other officials who left office 
less than eighteen months after committing their offenses. With 
the new constitutional language, Delaware no longer required 
or explicitly authorized late impeachment. On the other halHl. 
it did not forbid them either, and it eliminated the eighteen-
month time limit. In some sense, then, Delaware fx/mntied the 
impeachment power to include "regular" impeachment; there is 
no reason to conclude that this expansion was achieved only as 
an unstated trade for restricting the power oflate impeachment. 
Vermont rewrote its Constitution in 1793 upon joining the 
Union. It kept the same language on impeachment, however. 
and that language remains in the Vermont Constitution today. "., 
Thus, Vermont is currently one of only two states that explicitly 
and specifically authorize late impeachmen t. 110 The other state. 
New Jersey, added a limited late impeachment power when it 
wrote its second constitution 111 1844, almost as an 
afterthought. III 
Finally, Virginia, the first state to address late impeachmellt 
explicitly in its constitution, removed that specification in l8~O. 
In doing so, it clouded the issue of late impeachment in the 
same manner as did Pennsylvania and Delaware. Recall that the 
Virginia Constitution of 1776 had required that governors could 
only be impeached after leaving office, but placed no time limits 
on impeachment of other officers. 112 Requiring late 
438. Sfr slI/Jra text accompanying note i6 and following dbnl~,ioll. 
439. See Vr. CO:-;5T. ch. 2. § 58. The Verlllont Constitutioll h." been ,ub,t.IIIII.llh 
amended since I i93. when this prO\;sion was found at § 2,1. 
440. /d. ("Every officer of State. whether judicial or exe( utivt'. ,h.11I be It.lble to he 
impeached by the House of Representatives. either when in ollice 01 a/tt'f 1{·'lgn.ltloll 01 
remoyal for mal-administration."). 
441. See;-";J. CO:-;ST. of 1844. art. V, § II ("The gowl'llor .lIId all othel olli( ('" IIIHit'1 
thi. State ~hall be liable to impeachment for IIII~dellleanOl in oflirt·. dllllllg thell 
continuance in office, and for two )'ran tllPrmfirr.") (elllpha~i' added); PROCH l>1~(,:-' O~ 
TilE ;-";E\\, JERSEY STA rE CO:-;STITl·'IIO:-;AI. CO\;VE\; 110:-; OF I !H4, .11 600 (New Je!'('\ 
\-"riters' Pn~ject ed., 1942) (chronicling last-lIIinute addition of lalt' IIl1pe.l( hlll('lIt 
p"'O\;sion); 'ee also NJ. C:O:-;ST. art. VII, § :{. rI. 1 ("The (;0\("1'1101' and .111 oth('1 St.II!' 
of1icers. while in office and for two years thereafter, ~hall be liahle to 11II»(·.l('hlllellt tOI 
lIIisdemeanor committed during their respective continuance ill o!lice."). 
Senator Eaton. an opponent of late impeachment, argued at the Iklknap tn.11 th.lt 
the addition of an explicit late impeachlllent provi,ion to the New JerM'Y (;Oll'tltlllloll 
presupposed that the old one-which paralleled the ,iien('(' ill the ft-dl'l.t1 
Constitution-barred late impeachment. BrI.K:-;,\I'TRtAL. IIt/na note I H, .It II (i, 
442. See Hl/"" text accompanying note 74. 
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impeachment of governors was a limit, and that limit was 
removed in 1830.HS Thus, the changes made in 1830 do not 
answer the question of whether or not late impeachment exists 
in Virginia. 
2. State Cases 
State impeachment precedents prior to 1787 can enhance an 
understanding of federal impeachment. These precedents are 
sympathetic to late impeachment on balance, but the balance is 
a close one. Moreover, they are decisions by courts, and thus 
represent a third participant in an inter-branch struggle to 
define the bounds of impeachment. As with federal cases, 
though, state cases do not provide a very large sample. If. They 
do not readily provide firm conclusions about the nature of late 
impeachment. 
a. EarZ)' Cases 
The New Hampshire case of Judge 'Voodbury Langdon 
presents an early state precedent against late impeachment. 
Langdon resigned from office in 1790 after he had been 
impeached but before his trial commenced."~ The assembly 
voted not to accept his resignation but had no power to compel 
him to serve.-H6 vV'hen Langdon refused to show up for the trial, 
the impeachment managers entered a 1Iol1e prost'qui and the case 
was dismissed. H; 
On the other extreme is Kentucky's impeachment of Thomas 
Jones, a county surveyor, in 1803.HS Jones resigned during his 
trial, but the senate decided that this did not remove its 
jurisdiction over the case.H9 The trial continued, and Jones was 
443. See VA. CONST. of 1830, an. 111, § 13 ("The gon-mor, dll' judgl"> ollh<' coun of 
appeals and superior couns, and all mhers offending alf<linsl dll' .Ial<', <,uh<'r I)) 
maladministration, corruption, neglecl of dUl)', or ;111\' Dlher high Crilll<' or 
misdemeanor, shall be impeachable by dIe house of dclelf<lI'-s , , , ,"), 
444. See 1 A.E. DICK HOWARD, CO~I~IE:-'TARIES 0:-; rm. Co:-;slIn'lIo:-, OF \'IRl,l:-;l\ 
557 (1974) ("Impeachments hal'e been a soml'lime Ihing in Ihe SI;lIl"'. !'in<' gUl<'mor5 
hal'e been impeached, ... and impeachmelll of olher l'Xl'ClUi,,' ofikef> ha~ I><"<'n f.uril' 
rare. As wim me federal impeachmelll c1altse. slale c1ausl-s han' had Ihelr gr<,;unl l~ in 
me impeachment of judges:). 
445. HOFFER & HUu., supra nOle I, al 126":~9 (desC'nbing Langdon ca~d, 
446. [d. at 128. 
447. [d. 
448. See id. at 172 (describingJones C'ast"). 
449. !d. 
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convicted and disqualified from future oflice.,··n Similarly, SOllth 
Carolina impeached Daniel Doyley, a state treasury officer. ">1 He 
too was tried despite voluntarily leaving office, was convicted, 
and was disqualified from future oflice. m 
b. Hill 
One distinction between state late impeachments and federal 
ones is that many state cases have resulted in judicial review. '"0< 
Unlike legislative precedents, judicial precedenL') carry both a 
clear statement of intent and understanding (that being the 
purpose of judicial opinions) and the full weight of stare decisis. 
A key case in the realm of state judicial treatment of late 
impeachment was the Supreme Court of Nebraska's decision in 
State v. HilL ,j, Hill rejected late impeachment, against a 
background of other state cases that had affirmed it. , .... The case 
concerned the attempted late impeachmenL') in April 1 H9~ of 
former state oflicials Thomas Benton and John Hill.'·'" Both 
defendants entered pleas in the state supreme court challenging 
their amenability to impeachment.1">7 The state constitution 
provided that "all civil oflicers of this state shall be liable to 
impeachment for any misdemeanor in oflice.,,'··H The cOllrt 
viewed this provision and procedural requirements in the state 
constitution that related to oflicers as evidence that private 
citizens, whether ex-officers or not, were not amenable to 
impeachment: 
[S]ection 5, already quoted, designates the persons who llIay 
be impeached as "all civil officers of this stale." This language 
450. !d. 
451. !d. at 256-57 (describing Doyley ca~e). 
452. {d. 
453. See .m/1Ta note 163 and accompanying texl. 
454. 55 N.W. 794 (Neb. 1893). [n a case decided tht' sallie day, the cOlllt dl'II1''''I'<I 
another late impeachment on different grounds, whilt' noting its argull1t'nt in 'fill. St.lt,· 
\'. Leese, 55 N.W. 798, 799 (Neb. 1893) (citing Hill and pointing Ollt that the' II'gi,latlll(' 
had no power to impeach Leese because he had bet'n out of ollicl' for two Yl'a,,) 
455. In each of the cases allirllling latl' impeachment. the defendant wa, ,till III 
ollict' but was being impeach('(1 for offenses commiltt'd in a prevIOus tl'rlll. Sf'l1Ifra not(' 
463 and accompanying text. While this sCl'nario is consistent with latl' illlpl'adIllH·nt. It 1\ 
also consistent with other \;ews of impeachnll'nt that preclude late ill1pl'a( hnH·nl. .\I'f 
SIl/1Ta Part V.E (discussing this issue with regard to alternative intl'rprl'tation,) 
456. Hill, 55 N.W. at 794. 
457. !d. at 794-95. The impeachment court III unicall1l'ral Nl'hr.l~k.1 IV.I\ .IIHI 1\ 
composed of state judges. :-.IEIl. CO:-;ST. art. 3, ~ 17; HIli, 55 N.W. at 795. 
458. Hill, 55 N.W. at 795 (quoting :-.1m. C()~SI. of 1875. art. 5. ~ ".). 
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is unambiguous. It means existing officers; persons in office at 
the time they are impeached. Ex-officials are not civil officers 
within the meaning of the constitution. Jurisdiction to 
impeach attaches at the time the offense is committed. and 
continues during the time the offender remains in office. but 
no longer. 459 
117 
The court also considered a state statute that allowed late uial of 
impeachment but construed it expressio UT/ius to distinguish 
between late impeachment (forbidden) and late trial 
{permitted).460 
In the process of stating its decision, the court also surveyed 
Justice Story's commentaries against late impeachment and 
labeled them a "generally accepted . . . correct exposition of 
the law. "461 The court rejected the British cases of Hastings and 
Melville as irrelevant given the broader scope of English 
impeachment. 462 It also considered a trio of slate cases (from 
Nebraska, New York, and Wisconsin) in which a foml of late 
impeachment was approved-officials who served multiple 
terms continuously were successfully impeached for offenses 
committed in prior terms.463 The Hill court distinguished these 
cases; it considered the current status of the officials more 
important than the timing of the trial vis-a-vis the offense!'" 
Finally, it rejected the Belknap precedent because of the 
weakness of the Senate's majority and also because, unlike 
Belknap, Benton and Hill were out of office from the natural 
expiration of their terms.465 
459. Id. at 796. 
460. See supra text accompanying notes 250-51. 
461. Hill, 55 N.W. at 796; su also il/fra Part VII.A (quoting Jmtict· 510r),·5 
commentary on late impeachment). 
462. Hill, 55 N.W. at 797; su also supra text accompan)ing nOll"; 5-1·58. 
463. Hill, 55 N.W. at 797. The cases described in Hill.. conceming Go\"e-mor Buder 
of Nebraska. Judge Barnard of New York. and Judge Hubble of\\rlSC(lllsin, are describrd 
in more detail in Newmal/ v. Strobel, 259 N.Y.S. -102. -106-07 (N.Y. App. Di\". 1932). 
464. Hill, 55 N.W. at 797. The court did not make clear whelher Ihe defendants· 
terms must be continuous for such an impeachment to occur, Ihough it did men lion 
continuousness in a way that suggests it dlOugln so. Su id. The Opposile ,iew, hOl,·<."\e-r, 
would be more logically consistent-it would focus impe .. chment on remOl"a1 for offiCl .. 1 
misconduct, period. This issue is discllssed in more detail in Part V.E, supra. 
An even starker case-in which senice \\"as continuous bill Ihe office changed-
occllrred after Hill See 2 Archbald Trial.. supra note 269, al 1.J2-1 (manager', alb'1lmelll) 
(discussing 1901 case of Judge Furches of North Carolina). 
465. Hill, 55 N.W. at 797; su also supra Part Vl.A.5 (disCIIssing Belknap G=). Rer.11I 
that the first state constitution of Pennsyh"ania and all of Ihl" comtiuuion" of Ve-nllolll 
ha\·e allowed late impeachment against officials. bill onh· if Iheir It·nm did nol expire-
naturally. See supra text accompanying notes 78 and 8:~. 
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c. Ferguson 
Another case, with simpler facts, occurred in Texas in 1924. I ... 
Governor James E. Ferguson had been impeached in 1917 and 
disqualified from future state office. Ferguson was attempting to 
get his name on the ballot in 1924, alleging that he resigned the 
day before he had been disqualified, making the Senate's act 
void. 167 As the court described the facts, Ferguson had 
participated in his trial and had lost the vote of conviction, but 
"before the Senate, in due course of orderly procedure, could 
pronounce its judgment, [Ferguson] filed his resignation with 
h f ,,"ill Th C . IF' t e secretary 0 state. e ourt reJectec erguson s 
argument that he could deprive the Senate of the jurisdiction to 
sentence him: 
[The Senate's] power to conclude the proceedings and enter 
judgment was not dependent upon the will or act of the 
Governor. Othenvise, a solemn trial before a high tribunal 
would be turned into a farce .... [T] he resignation of 
Governor Ferguson in no manner impaired the power or 
jurisdiction of the Senate to render judgment "" 
To be sure, Ferguson's case was an extreme one. Nevertheless, 
the Texas Supreme Court recognized that impeachment is not 
just about removal. The court made clear that if removal were 
the only possible penalty-if the jurisdiction of the Senate 
somehow depended on its ability to remove the del'endant-
then Ferguson's action would have been effective."" Because ill 
Texas, as in the federal system, impeachment convicL<; can be 
disqualified, however, this view of jurisdiction must f~li\.171 This 
was true even though the Texas Constitution, tracking its federal 
counterpart, referred only to impeachment of the "Governor" 
(as opposed to the ex-Governor) and made clear that the 
466. Sel' Ferguson v. Maddox. 263 S.W. 888 (Tex. 1924). 
467. ld. at 888-89. After losin~ this case Fer~uson simply had his Wlft-... M .... 
Ferguson. run for ~o\'ernor. She won easily and became the nation', st'('<md It·m.llt· 
governor-in part by assurin~ voters that they would get "two ~overnors lor the prin' 01 
one: because she would follow her husband's advice. See.lohn D. Iluddkston. FI'I,,""'". 
Miriam Amanda WaUaa. TilE HA:-;D1100K OF TEXAS ONLI:-;~.. (// http:/ / 
www.tsha.utexas.edu/handbook/online/articies/view/FF/lle6.html(last modi lied , till' 
23.2001 ). 
468. FerglLwn. 263 S.W. at 893. 
469. Se,> id. 
470. Id. 
471. Id. 
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principal practical purpose of impeachment was to remove silting 
"1 ffi 47" ClVl 0 lcers. -
d. Smith 
The most recent state opmlOn on late impeachment is the 
1981 Florida decision in Smith v. Bml1tley:'~ In that case, the 
Florida Supreme Court decided four to three that late 
impeachment was not allowed.m 
Circuit Judge Samuel Smith voluntarily suspended himself in 
1977, after sixteen years on the bench, in the midst of 
allegations that he was involved in a scheme to traffic over 1,500 
pounds of marijuana.4'; On JanualJT 13, 1978, Smith altempted 
to resign from the bench, but Governor Reubin Askew refused 
to accept the resignation, in part because he did not want to 
prejudice any case against Smith:,6 The most ob"ious potential 
prejudice was the possibility that Smith might not be 
impeachable if he had already resigned. As expected, onJanualJ' 
31, a special committee was appointed in the state House to 
consider impeachment, and on April 12 Smith was impeached. m 
Smith tried to stop the proceedings with a lawsuit alleging that 
as an ex-officer he was no longer subject to impeachment.'" His 
lawyers argued that he was no longer an "officer," cited 
numerous cases in which officials who resigned were not 
pursued, and argued that federal precedent was either neutl(ll 
or against late impeachment.4<9 The House managers and several 
472. [d. at 890 (citing constimtional provisions. including Tl-.X. o.):-'SI. art. X\". ~ 2 
(stating that "Go\'emor~ and other named officers can bt' impt';lcht'd»; Ill. ~ i (;lllo"1ng 
legislamre to provide for impeachment procedures in cast" ill\ohing -cinl o/liet'n." II,H 
named in § 2); id. § 5 (prO\iding for suspension of impeachmt'l\I d.·ft·ll(bnl'> frulll offiet' 
during pendency of case). 
473. 400 So. 2d 443 (Fla. 1981). 
474. [d. 
475. jOUR.'1AL OF THE SE:-IATE, STA IT OF FLORIDA 196 (Court of Impt·.ldllut'1\I I !Jill ) 
[hereinafter SENATE jOUR.'1ALj (setting forth Artick 11 of Iht' articl.-" of impt';ldllllt'l\I; 
"Conspiracy to Unla\\fully Obtain and Dislribule in [XCl'SS of Appruximald\' 1:,00 
Pounds ofMarijuana~). 
476. See Smith, 400 So. 2d at 445. 
477. [d. 
478. [d. at 445-46. 
479. SENATE jOUR.'1AL, supra nOll' 4i5. al 22-2:t :'\ont' of Ih.· (';tl>e. ntt'd .tl> Ix-lIIg 
dropped upon resignation appear to have invoh'ed a delt'nnillalion Ihal I! \\ould h;"t' 
been unconstitutional to proceed. On the federal precedeuLS. Smilh' s lal,"\ er argut'd Ih;1! 
Blount's case stood against late impeach melli, sl"t'supra Part \"LA.I. ;lIId Ihal Iklkllap', 
was not applicable because the majority in fa"or of lale impeaehabilil' \,~tl> ,hort of 1',,)-
thirds, see supra Pan VI.A.5. 
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senators disagreed and made their own historical and structural 
arguments. IW The Senate voted twenty-nine to six to go fonvard 
with the trial after the Chief Justice, presiding over the Senate 
for the occasion, advised the Senate that it did have jurisdiction 
over the case even if Smith had resigned. 1"1 The trial court then 
rejected Smith's lawsuit. IR2 The impeachment proceeded, and 
Smith was unanimously convicted, removed from office (to the 
extent that the effectiveness of his resignation was in doubt), 
and disqualified from future office. IR.1 
Reviewing the case, the supreme court disagreed with iL<; chief 
justice and with the lower courLI"1 The court concluded that the 
resignation could be effective despite the governor's refusal to 
accept it,~!l:. and that once an officer is out of office, the HOllse 
has no jurisdiction to impeach him.ll<(, (Interestingly, because the 
court was so badly split, Smith's conviction nevertheless was 
affirmed. ~R7) 
The court took a simple view of the question, similar to the 
one sketched out at the outset of this article. IRR First, the cOllrt 
looked at the state constitutional provisions that governors, 
judges, and other officers are liable to impeachment for 
misdemeanor in office, are to be suspended from performing 
their duties during the impeachment proceedings, and arc to be 
480. SreSEl':ATEj0l"RNAL, sll/Ira note 475. at 26. 31·32 (Court or Impeadllllt'nl 1!/78) 
(recording House managers citing cases of Blount. fee m/lm ParI VI.A.I. Belknap. "'/' 
Sill Ira Part VI.A.5. and Ferguson. see mjra Part VI.2.c. and arguing that disqualilkallOn. "'/' 
mjra Part VIlLA. represented adequate basis to proceed against ex·oflicers); 1(1. at :1O 
(recording inquiry by Senator Dunn that barring late impeachability would allow sub)," I 
to resign to avoid disqualification. see mpm Part V.B. and thereby "unilater,llIy Ihwar I Ihe 
will of the p("ople"). 
481. SEl':ATEjOl'RNAL, sullra not(" 475. at 49 (Court of Impeachment 1978) (VOle). 
id. al 41 (chiefjustice's opinion). The chief justice relied heavily on the h\{'I thai Snlllh 
would receive a pension if not impeached and convicted. which he round 10 be .111 
adequate ba.~is for proceeding. See injra text accompanying note 506 ('Imilar .lIgumenl 
in case of President Nixon); Part VIII.B (discu~ing practical dfert 01 pension' on 1.lle 
impeachment) . 
482. SmIth. 400 So. 2d at 446. 
483. SEl':ATE jOl'R:-;AL, mpra note 475. at 185-87 (Court of ImpearIllnenl 1978) 
(mentioning and explaining the VOles). 
484. Smith. 400 So. 2d at 451. 
485. [d. at 449. 
486. !d. at 487. 
487. While the court split four to Ihree on late impeachabihty, onejustl(e wanled 10 
make prospective the ruling that re~ignations are effective regardks., 01 the goVt"lnOl', 
actions, and so he aflirmed the Senale's verdict along with the three dis.,t·nlel'. Id . • 11 F,:{ 
(England,j., concurring in part and dissenting in p<lrt). 
488. Sfl'm/ml Part [I. 
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removed from office if convicted.~'~ The coun concluded that 
officers are officers; ex-officers, who could not be suspended or 
removed from office, are not.~90 The coun thus was making the 
linguistic argument that "officer" meant "sitting officer" and the 
functional argument that "the primary and dominant purpose 
of impeachment in Florida is removal of an officeholder from 
office."491 Once an officer has resigned, this purpose is fulfilled, 
the court said, and the mere possibility of disqualification from 
future office does not change the fact that the main purpose of 
the process has been achieved.m The court considered Blount, 
Belknap, and Ferguson, but argued that in each case the 
resignation did not occur until impeachment proceedings had 
b 49~ egun. 
Three justices dissented, asserting two functional arguments 
made in this article-that disqualification is significant and that 
the jurisdiction of an impeachment court should not depend on 
the whim on the defendant or the timing of his offense: 
The majority holding will allow officers who secretly commit 
serious breaches of the public trust... to escape 
impeachment and disqualification if the), resign or if their 
terms of office expire before their misdeeds arc discovcrcd 
and impeachment proceedings are begun. This surely was not 
intended by the framers of our constitution when the)' gave 
the Senate the authority to disqualify .... ~9~ 
Perhaps fittingly, this closest of constitutional questions received 
the closest of verdicts. 
489. Smith, 400 So. 2d at 449 (examining fL.\. CoNST. an. III, § Ii). In dIe prt'\ious 
version of the state constitution, disqualification was a mandatory pan of Ihe SClllence ;IS 
well. See id. at 450 (discussing FLo\.. CoNST. of 1885, an. III, § 29). 
490. Id. at 449-50. 
491. Id. 
492. Id. at 450. 
493. Id. The court was right that Blount and Ferguson lefl office onl\' after Iher had 
been impeached. See supra text accompan)ing nOll'S 281-82 (cOl'ering Ihe B10ulII 
chronology) and 466-67 (covering the Ferguson chronolob'}'). BUI Bdknal>-who 
resigned before any official action was taken againsl him by Ihe HOIJ.MO bill afler his 
offenses were being considered in commillee, stY BELK."AI' TRIAl1 mpm nOle 18, al 130 
(opinion of Senator Bayard)-presents serious line-dr.ming problems Ihal Ihe }Olorid<! 
court glossed over. See supra text accompanying nOll'S 33()"32 (discussing Ihe Bdknap 
chronology). 
494. Smith, 400 So. 2d at 455 (A1dennan, J., concuning in pari and d~lIIing in 
part). These structural points arc discussed supm in Parts V.A (discussing delern:ncc:) 
and V.B (discussing the significance of disqualification). 
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VII. THE COMMDiTARY 
Unsurprisingly, given the high stakes and close questions 
inherent in late impeachment, the issue has attracted il<; share or 
commentary from the academy. As with the rest of the evidence 
marshaled in this article, commentators are divided but lean 
toward the acceptance oElate impeachment. 
A. Rawle (Inri Story 
In his famous treatise on constitutional law, William Rawle 
gave a relatively terse treatment of the issue and concluded that 
late impeachment was constitutionally acceptable. As he put it, 
"[Ih is obvious, that the only persons liable to impeachment, arc 
those who are or have been in public office.""'; 
An even more distinguished commentator, Justice Joseph 
Story, weighed in on the question a few years later in his 
Commentaries. 1% Story disagreed with Rawle, whom he rc/"erred to 
as "[aJ learned commentator."I"7 Story focused on the 
prominent mention of removal in Article II, Section 4, which he 
considered to define who and what was impeachable:"'~ 
If, then, there must be a judgment of removal from office, it 
would seem to follow, that the constitution contemplated, that 
the party was still in office at the time of the impeachlllent. .. 
. [T]he language of the constitution may create sOllle doubt, 
whether it can be pronounced without being coupled with a 
removal from office. I'" 
Story denigrated disqualification as a remedy, noting that it 
"would be scarcely felt, as a punishment, by the profligate and 
the base,":"" and positing that "it might be argued with SOIl1C 
force, that it would be a vain exercise of authority to try a 
delinquent for an impeachable offence, when the most 
495. Rl,\I'!.E, supra note 35, at 213 (empha;is added). 
496. STORY, m/mlnote 42. 
49i. 2 it!. at 2iO. 
498. Cf. Illpra note 90 (disCllssing Sto'1-"s con("(''s',ion that Article II. ~ I wOllld lit 
more logically in Article I). 
499. 2 STORY, supra note 42, at 2il. Story elsewhere mentioned that "[tlherl' seellls 
to be peculiar propriety, in a republican government at least, in confining the 
impeaching power to persons holding office." 2 ul. at 256. In context, howevl'l, Story \v," 
merely limiting impeachment to official as opposed to priv.lte a,tion and not di'ClI!>.'"lg 
the timing of the proceedings. See 2 it!. 
500. 2 it!. at 251. 
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important object, for which the remedy was given, was no longer 
. bl ,,501 necessary, or attaIna e. 
Although Story's arguments against late impeachment could 
not convince a majority of the Senate in the Belknap case, he 
did influence many among the minority.~! The main reason that 
Story's arguments have not received more definitive support is 
that, with all due respect to Story, his arguments about late 
impeachment did not address the weakness of the textual case 
against late impeachment and did not engage, let alone answer, 
the structural concerns that militate in f~lVor of late 
impeachability. Story himself seems to have recognized the 
limits in his presentation; he issued this strong caveat at the end 
of his discussion oflate impeachment: 
It is not intended to express any op"llon in these 
commentaries, as to which is the true exposition of the 
constitution on the points above stated [including late 
impeachment]. They are brought before the learned reader, 
as matters still suiJ judice, the final decision of which Illa), be 
reasonably left to the high tribunal, constituting the coun of 
impeachment, when the occasion shall arise. 50' 
Opponents of his position have used this caveat, quite rightl)" to 
rebut those who have cited Story as an authority against late 
impeachment;504 Story himself realized that this was not a simple 
question and that the Senate would have the last word. 
B. Recent Commelltm)' 
More recently, in the wake of\,Vatergate and [,affaire Lewinsky, 
the argument for late impeachment has reemerged. 
The political atmosphere in Vhtergate was somewhat 
charged-a President unpopular among law professors, whose 
conduct seemed clearly to be impeachable, who resigned rather 
than face impeachment, and who was pardoned by his successor. 
Other than the dim possibility of state criminal proceedings, the 
50l. 2 id. at 27l. 
502. See supra notes 364-65 and accompan)ing I ... XI. 
503. 2 STORY, supra note 42, al 273. The hesitalll nature of Slory'~ conclusion go.ne 
one unblushing advocate a reason 10 question whether Slory' had "Tillell Ihese 
comments at all. 43 CoKG. REc. 324 (1875) (stalemem of Rep. Butler> (-1111.' diclUIlI of 
Judge Story upon this question was, I am afraid, lik ... some olh ... r dirla in h~ mituninuus 
works, written by some law-school sluden I [.J"). 
504. E.g., supra text accompanying nOll' 365. 
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only possibility of punishing Nixon under the law was to 
impeach him even though he had left office. One article in the 
Duke Law Journal argued that Nixon could still be impeached:''''' 
even as it conceded that Congress appeared unlikely to do SO."'I"' 
Another article reached the same conclusion in quite strong 
termsJ07 and chided Raoul Berger for leaving the late 
impeachment issue completely out of his book Impearhment: TIll' 
Constitutional Problems. j08 
It was assumed by some of these same commentators that an 
impeachment conviction would allow Congress to strip Nixon of 
his pension,509 but it now seems that this would have violated the 
constitutional limitation on judgments to removal and 
disqualification. In retrospect, Congress could have taken steps 
to allow late impeachment to strip an ex-officer of his pension, 
but it was probably too late to apply such a law to Nixon.""" 
Most recently, Michael Gerhardt, perhaps the leading scholar 
on impeachment working today, has written that there is a 
"surprising consensus among commentators" that late 
impeachment is acceptable.511 (In fact the consensus, while 
505. Firmage & Mangrum, supra note 142. at IOH9-94. Firmage and M,\Ilgl UIII noled 
the Blount concession, see supra text accompanying notes 294-95, Ihe Belknap case. \/'/' 
supra Part \'1,A.5, and the English caveat, see wpra text accompanying note ,lOll. They 
then argued that late impeachment could be used to disqualify, to slrip emolumenls. "ul 
see infra Part VIlLA, and to set prec(·denl. They recogni/ed, how('v('r, Ihal n',ign.llioll 
would accomplish many of the goals of an impeachment and '0 mighl lIIake II 
worthwhile to end the proceedings, 
506. Firmage & Mangrum, supra note 142. at 110 I. 
507. See Bestor, supra note 133, at 277-81 ("[Mlany members of Congless. 10 '.1\' 
nothing of the general public, assume that the liability of an of1idal to impeachmelll 
somehow terminates the instant he leaves of1ice , ... Such an assumption h,l' no 
substantial historical foundation and is not supported by a single author ilati\'(' ami 
unequivocal decision of recent times."). Bestor raised the Hastings precedellt, lee lIl/ml 
text accompanying notes 54-57, the Virginia and Delaware Constitutions, Iff lIl/ml lexi 
accompanying notes 74 & 76, the absence of any constitutional provision hal ring 1.11(' 
impeachment, the "whilst in office" discussion at the constitutional convention. I/'f lIl/ml 
Part I1LC.l.b. the Adams quotation, see supra text accompanying IlOte, :HO-I:~, Ihe 
Belknap case, see supra Part Vi.A.5, and the functional argullll'nt that late impeadllm'lIl 
would be less destabilizing than seeking to n'm()\'e a sitting Pre~idellt, 'fI' III/Ill lexi 
accompanying note 543. 
50S. See Bestor, supra note 133, at 2S0-81 (arguing that late imp(',Khment i~ ,I mOl(' 
important problem than others considered at length by Bergn). 
509. Firmage & Mangrum, supra note 142, at 1092. 
510. See infra Part ViILB (discussing ability to use impeachment 10 strip pensions). 
51!. GERHARDT, supra note 12, at 79 & n.22 (citing ,l' examples an ('arlier artid(' hI' 
himself; Rotnnda, supra note 190; Firmage and Mangrum, lupra note 142; and Heslol. 
IU/Jra note 133). Others have written in favor of late impeachability. /\:/( .. Jonath.1II 
Turley, 171e ExeClllive HlIlClioTl Theo,)', Ihe HamiltoTl Affair, lITld ollwr (,'",,-,lllllt/(JTlIlI 
Mylhologies, 77 N.C. L. REv. 1791, IS27 (1999) ("[TJhe Belknap case indicates th.1I 
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surprising, is not unanimous.~'I~) Gerhardt agrees that the 
precedents of failure to use late impeachment reflect practical 
considerations rather than constitutional limits.m Gerhardt cites 
the Warren Hastings precedent and pre-l 787 st.-He constitutional 
language addressing late impeachmenl.~1i He continues with a 
structural argument about disqualification, evidence of original 
understanding, citation to John Quincy Adams, and a dismissal 
of Justice Story's concerns.;I; 
When President Clinton outraged many with his literally last-
minute pardons, the issue emerged again. I can personally relate 
that I wrote an updated op-ed piece on the subject, which was 
rejected by all outlets to which I submitted it, including one 
conservative publication that said the notion of impeaching a 
President after he had left office was too fantastical even for 
-16 them.' A few days later, Senator Arlen Specter appeared on a 
Sunday morning talk show and expressed his f~l\'orable opinion 
on late impeachability, which suddenly seemed much less 
fantastical, if still quite unlikely in Clinton's particular case.~I; 
Specter's comments in favor spurred commental)' of its own on 
both sides of the issue, thus further belying the consensus that 
Gerhardt had found not long before.;I~ 
resignation from office does not prevent trial on anicles of illlp ... achllll:IlI.-); C.S. p()t~, 
Impeachment as a Remedy, 12 ST. Lams L. REv. 15,23 (1927). 
512. See supra note 16 (listing some of thos ... who havt' \"rittl'1l ag'lill.>t lill ... 
impeachability). 
513. GERHARDT, supra note 12, at 79-80 (-No doubt, III ... n· ar ... IIUIll ... rOII.> n-il.>OlI.> 
not to move for impeachment against an ollicial aft ... r r ... sil,'llillioll, but 1I01ll' of th ........ 'Ifl' 
constitutionally mandated.-); see infra Pan Vll. 
514. GERHARDT, supra note 12, at 79. On Hastillgs, St'l' wpm t ... xt aCCOlllpall)ll1g 
notes 54-57. State constitutional language is discuss ... d ill Pan 11l.8.2, wpm. 
515. GERHARDT, supra note 12, at SQ.SI. 011 disqualiliGllioll, Sl'''' Pan \'.8, wpm. 
Original understanding is discussed in Pan Ill.C.l, supm, alld lilt' -\,'hibt III ollie ... -
language that Gerhardt focuses on is discussed ill Pan l1l.C.I.b, wpm. Adalll.> I.> 
discussed in text accompan}ing notes 310-14, supra, and Ston' in Pan VIl.A. ",pm. 
516. The piece eventually appeared 011 the Jurist web sit .... St't' Kilh Ijt'RlSI), wpm 
note S. A similar piece had run twO years befort"-in Canada, Su Kilh (:-:,,1'1 l'oSI), 
supra note S. 
517. See infra text accompanying not ... 532. 
51S. See, e.g., Souss, supra note 16 (opposing lat ... illlpl'aehability); Mink R. l.r\1 11 , 
Arlen Specter, the Constitution, & UFOs, NATIONAL REVIEW O~IJ:-;f. (Fl'b. 12, 2001), lit 
http://www.nationalre\iew.com/contributors/le\in02120 1 a.shulli (opposing latl' 
impeachability); Kalt (JURIST), SIlpra note S (favoring latl' illl(>l'achabilit\"); Victor 
Williams, Pardongate: Another ImjNnchmnlt Aft" th~ /rWt:StlgtttIOIU G",cilllirr, FI:-;lll_"\\"~ 
WRIT (Feb. 27, 2001), at http://writ.news.lindlaw.colll/colllllll.llIarY/200102..!7 _ 
"illiams.html (favoring late impeacltability). 
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VIII. PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
The foregoing has all been directed at the question or 
whether late impeachment is allowed. It is time to confront a 
more difficult question for proponents of late impeachment: 
What is the point? 
Even though they do not prove that late impeachment is 
legally impossible, the nearly unbroken series of cases in which 
impeachment proceedings were dropped when the target 
resigned show that pursuing a late impeachment is generally 
regarded as pointless in actual cases. Whatever the abstract 
purposes of impeachment, it is evident that removing the target 
has been the primary practical purpose and that once removal 
has been accomplished-by whatever means-there was often 
little point in continuing. Then again, the sample size is (;\irly 
small, it includes the late impeachments of Blount and Belknap, 
and it is easy to imagine a future case in which late 
impeachment is worthwhile. 
A. Disqualification 
Disqualification is currently the only practical consequence to 
the target of a late impeachment. Despite the many arguments 
made by proponent<; of late impeachment that disqualification is 
a significant punishment:"" the simple fact of the matter is that 
in most cases it is not. Most people who resign to avoid 
impeachment will carry enough disgrace that they cannot count 
on being re-appointed and re-confirmed anyway"·2f1 Moreover. 
some of these people have been old enough that they were not 
likely to get new federal jobs even if they were proven 
innocent"·21 Indeed, in most impeachment cases, the Senate has 
not even bothered to disqualify the convict.;22 
Still, one can imagine a case in which disqualification is 
worthwhile. An official may have committed an offense so 
heinous that it is appropriate to declare to the nation that he is 
constitutionally unworthy of "honor, trust, or profit." 
519. See SlI/1m rart V.B. 
520. Cf wpm note 269 and accompanying text. 
521. See. e.g .• supm text accompanying notes 408-10. 
522. Of the fourteen men cOI1\~cted in impeachment C'L~es. only two. Judge~ We'\ 
Humphreys and Robert Archbald. have been disqualified. BI'SflNH.L. wpm note Hi, at 6. 
HeinOnline -- 6 Tex. Rev. L. & Pol. 127 2001-2002
No.1 Law, History, and Practice oj L(lte /mp('(lchmi'1l1 
One can also imagine a case in which the prospcct of thc 
convicted party staging a comeback is likely cnough-and 
undesirable enough-that disqualification is worth pursuing. 
While the undesirability of such a comeback is a subjcctivc 
matter that would depend on the specifics of the case. therc is 
little doubt of their likelihood. Senator Blount rcmaincd 
popular at home and could ha\'e st.1ged a comeback if hc had 
not died prematurely.:':!" President Andrew Johnson was eJcctcd 
to the Senate after he left office.··~~ Belknap had a successful 
Washington law practice after his impeachment."'" Onc can 
easily imagine a re!atively young ex-President such as Bill 
Clinton being interested in a judicial or diplomatic post. Thcre 
is, of course, a potential for abuse in such a situation, similar to 
Hypothetical 1 at the beginning of this article""'-
disqualification might be used as a weapon to defeat the 
political will of a convict's supporters. This is a problcm 
inherent in impeachment itself, however, and not just latc 
impeachment in particular, 
A further advantage of late impeachmclll IS that thc 
punishment is much more flexible. Especially \"hen high-
ranking executive officials are u'ied, removal from oflicc is so 
weighty and disruptive a penalty that it might precludc 
adjudication of the impeachment case "on thc rccord."'·"-
Disqualification is a severe penalty, but it is not mandatory; it is 
just the maximum.:'2S A late impeachmelll could rcsult in a 
suspension of eligibility for certain oflices, or for a ccrtain timc, 
or it might result in no punishment at all.":..'" 
To be sure, if Congress were interested in exprcssing its 
disapproval of an ex-oflicer withom actually levcling 
523. See id. at 37. 
524. See BUSHNEli.. supra note 16. at 160 (describing Johll>on\ po>l·p""'I(il'nll.11 
career); Lawrence Kestenbaum. johllsoll, ,4I1dm,· (/808·J8i~/. III '11It 1'00111L\I 
GRO\VEYARD, at http://www.politicalgra\,eyard.coJll biu, juhll>olll.hlJllI (iiL'1 lIuKilfinl 
May 13,2001). 
525. See BUSHNELL, supra note 16. al 189. 
526. See supra text accompan~ing IIOle I: 5a auo ,"pm nol,' :WG \,iI'>CII'Mllg 
argument of Senator Stone). 
527. See illfra text accompan)ing note 543. 
528. While precedent establishes othen,ise. sOJlle bdie\'C Ih.1I diMllI.lhfkilllOIl U 
mandatory. See supra note 165. 
529. See BELK."IAP TRIAL, supra note 18, at 48 (argllJlll'lII of Iloml' JIl.III.lgl'r- III Iiltl' 
impeachment trial). 
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punishment, it could simply censure him:'w But this provides a 
perfect example of the special essence of impeachment. 
Censure reflects the desire of a bare m~ority of Congress to 
make a relatively costless-and weightless-political statement. 
Impeachment, by contrast, requires a two-thirds m~ority in the 
Senate, which essentially requires bipartisan agreement. The 
very difficulty of obtaining an impeachment conviction casts it as 
a sober and momentous judgment rather than just a cynical 
political one. If the Senate determines that punishment is not 
worthwhile in the case at hand, this reflects iL'i nuanced 
judgment rather than the inevitable limits of the mechanism 
iL'ielf. Moreover, because of iL'i inherent weight, impeachment 
represenL'i a determination that similar conduct by others in the 
future is liable to be held impeachable and, if the target is in 
office, basis for mandatory removal. An impeachment of one 
person thus represents a precedent for others, promoting 
accountahility and providing deterrent. By comparison, censure 
is just congressional froth, as significant as a joint resolution 
commemorating National Toothpick Week:· 11 
In any case, just as disqualification is available as a remedy 
even though it is rarely necessary, so too is late impeachment 
available regardless of how infrequently it proves worthwhile. 
B. Punishmrot Beyond Disqualification 
r\ practical reason to pursue late impeachment is that 
c\isqualifi(ation may not be the only punishment being the 
oflicer in question. "Vhen Senator Arlen Specter suggested in 
February. 200 I that former President Clinton could still he 
5:~O. The constitutionalit} of censure is " matter 01 some (l!sagH'enH'nt, 1I""t 
H'ccnt" during the Clinton impeachment . . \1'1' ~lichaelJ. Klarmall. CO/lllllltlIlJllflIFrl"h"lII 
fl1/d llit' 0111101/ !m/Jrtldlmnll f)dmle. H5 \"\' L REV. 6:H, 649-50 & 1I11.7:~74 (1999) (ntlllg 
dillcl ing opillion, Oil ITIl'un' durillg ClilltOIl impeachmellt). Thc argumcllt ill 1,1\'01 "I 
the IOll'tltutiollalit) of ccn~ure i~ morc per~ua~i\('. SrI'. r.K" Micha('1 J. Gnh,udt, Till' 
(.'01/l/lllIl101/f/bly of CnlHlrr. 33 L'. RICII. L RE\'. 3:~ (1999) (pn"entillg oa~ic ,lIglllll('lIt III 
1,1\ or 01 (oll~titlltiollalit) of censllre) . 
.>:q. ,\., ,Ill ex,lInple, Presidellt Jacksoll's censllre oy the Sell"II' III IH:H W,,, 
e"p"llged Ihrec \('ar~ laler whell his party took cOlltrol 01 the Sell ate. I:~ (:ON( .. [HI\. :.0,' 
( I H:n) (n""It'II<)I] expllllglllg Jackson's censure); Jack Chaney. TIll' CO/llllllllllllwitly 0/ 
Ct'l/I//171lg tilt' I'It'l/riml. 61 01110 5r. LJ. 979, 9HI·H2 (2000) (de.,crihillg epl<ode). II 
(T""" (' ,\( 111,,111 carried a,,} weight. it would be lIIor(' likely to be IIl1collstitlllioll,,1 
pllr~lIanl 10 Ih .. COllstillltional prohibition against bills of atlainder. Com/J(lrf .1.111\(" (: 
110, ,\Il1ll11tienlood I'rt'rn/I'III: Al/rirf'llljf/ckwl/ al/d Ihr Ut'al C(Hr AK(//."I CP>/Illrf, 2,' I L\RV, J L 
& PI II. POI '1' ~H:~, ~90 (~O()O) (arglling thai n'nSIlIT viol"tt's prohibilion 011 ,1lI"indel)' 
!I'IIIi Cerhardt. IIl/JlYl note 5:~O. at 34 (arglling that Congre~s has the ,lIlthority to "pas' " 
1I011·bincilng n',ollltioll expressing an opinio,,- 'liCit as censure). 
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impeached, he did not even mention lhe possibililv of 
disqualifying Clinton from future office. Inslead, Specter 
indicated that if convicted, the ex-Presidelll would lose hi~ 
perquisites: 
President Clinton technically could still be impe;l("hed. And 
you say how can that happen, he's ou! of omce~ Became a 
president may be impeached for the emolullIcnts or oflin·. 
such as the substantial sums being speIH on thc library. stich a~ 
the bodyguards, such as his pension.~'~ 
Although Specter was correct (if lonely) in assening lhal 
Clinton could still be impeached, he was wrong lO slale lhal 
Clinton's punishment upon conviction could include slripping 
him of his "emoluments." Federal law currently prO\'ides lhal a 
President who is impeached does lose his pension and olher 
benefits, but only if he is impeached while in oflke.'" 
Therefore, impeaching Clinton would nOl affect hi~ 
"S4 
emoluments.' 
All of this means that if a malfeasing Presidelll is inleresled in 
keeping his pension, he need only wail until the end of his lenn 
to commit his impeachable offenses. To avoid lhis son of 
misincentive,535 Congress should change the law to make dear-
prospectively-that an impeached and cOlwicled Presidelll (or 
other official) does not deserve to reap millions in federal 
benefits, regardless of when the offenses and impeachmeIll 
occur. This would add teeth to late impeachmenl and make il 
much more likely to be a worthwhile exercise of congressional 
resources. It would also prevent the awkward situalion of 
Congress using a pension as an improper bargaining chip lO 
induce resignation.5~ 
532. Fox News SundG)' (Fox News Channel tdl'\isioll broad, .L\t. I'd). II. :!OO I , 
(transcript available at 2001 WI.. 7790809); su also text ."TOIIII),lIl\III~ 'IOtl' ",.)'1 
(expressing similar belief by Watergate-era COllllllel1lator.;). 
533. 3 U.s.C. § 102 (1994) ("As used in this section. the tl'nll '(Olllll'r I'r ..... dl'l1l· 
means a person , .. whose senice in such office shall han' tl'nllln.ltl·d oth"r th.u. b, 
removal pursuant to section 4 of article II of the Constitution o( th,' l'UIl,'d St.lt .... O( 
America[.]"). 
534. Changing the law just to reach Clinton lIIi~ht h.1\ ,. UlII\lIlllt,·d .111 
unconstitutional bill of attainder. If it would 1/01 haw b""n all att.und,'r. CUll~I<"'" ,ollid 
have passed a law stripping Clinton of his bl'nl'liL~ "ithOlIl b()(h,'nll~ to ~() till ()1I~h til<' 
cumbersome impeachment process. 
535. See infra Part \'111.0. 
536, Congress apparently continued the illlpt·achlllt·nt pru«,,'dlll~' .'~'lI"'t Jud~l' 
Warren Davis even after he had resigned frolll offict'. until ht' .l~n·,'d to ~l'l' up h" 
pension, See Turley, supra note 165. at 75 n.3:>9. 
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One could argue that making the punishment on convICtion 
include such a severe financial penalty would violate the 
constitutional provIsIOn that 'Judgment in Cases of 
Impeachment shall not extend further than to removal from 
Office, and disqualification to hold and enjoy any Oflice of 
honor, Trust or Profit under the United States.,,·,17 If this is tnte, 
however, it makes the current presidential benefits law 
unconstitutional as well. More to the point, the law defining the 
benefits of ex-PresidenL<; operates independently of the 
impeachment process-it is a law approved by both houses and 
the President, and losing the pension would be based on the 
operation of the pension law, not on the 'Judgment" of the 
Senate in the impeachment case.'Il< 
C. Pnwdml 
As in the rest of our common-law system, impeachment cases 
not only affect the principals of the immediate controversy, but 
also establish the principles that future cases will follow. An 
impeachment case may present issues on which Congress wishes 
to establish precedents, and late impeachment may be the only 
way to do this successfully. 
Hypothetical 3 presents an example of a potential case in this 
vein,"'" If the issue is whether a certain type of conduct is 
impeachable, regardless of iL<; criminal nature, there is no 
substitute for impeachment to develop the precedent. 
Impeachment convictions and acquittals are rare, but they do 
sen'e to telegraph to other oflicials which conduct will, or will 
not, be tolerated. If Congress feels the need to resolve an issue 
by setting such a precedent, it might wish to proceed even if the 
target is no longer in office. 
D. Timing 
Another reason that a late impeachment would be 
appropriate is timing. Ideally, holding all other things equal, an 
offense committed near the end of an officer's tenure would be 
537. l'.S. emsr. art. I. ~ 3, d. 7. 
5:~H. One cOllld respond that the lucrative p'''t of ex-Pre~iclent i,. in .1 "'n"'. ,Ill 
"office" of "profit," fro III which rellloval and c1i"lualificatlon b acceptable. hut thi, 't',."" 
too cute. C/. !\.alt, supra note I:~, at 797 (using dl"lualilication language III c1", u""I"g 
congressional power to provide for ex-President~). 
539. Sfe '1I1ml text .Kcompanving note :1. 
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treated the same as one occurring at the beginning. At the 
beginning of a presidential term, if the President or a cabinet 
member commits an impeachable offense, he can be 
impeached, removed, disqualified, and prosecuted. At the end 
of the term, given the cumbersome nature of the impeachment 
process, he can only be prosecuted. 
To be sure, this difference may just boil down to the value of 
disqualification, and as argued above disqualification often will 
not be enough to warrant proceeding with a late 
impeachment. 540 On the other hand, the f~lCt that 
disqualification usually will not matter does not justif)' taking it 
off the table for the cases in which it would matter. And if 
stripping the President of millions of dollars worth of benefits is 
added to the mix,"41 the incentive effect would easily be 
significant enough. Moreover, criminal prosecution is rarely if 
ever certain in the sorts of cases that lead to impeachmeI1ls."·! 
One might also argue that, for Presidents anyway, late 
impeachment is preferable to "regular" impeachment pl'ecisely 
because it does not involve removal. Thus, it is the Mleast 
disruptive way" to adjudicate presidential misconduct, and it 
ensures that external factors will not unduly sway the sober 
judgment of the Senate. 54' 
Without late impeachability, then, lame-duck oflicials are 
situated in a way that allows them to perpetrate offenses against 
the United States with relative impunity. Any disincentives to 
such conduct that can be erected would impro\'e this situation, 
and late impeachment is an obvious way to do just that. 
E. Congress Defends Its Tll1f 
The structural problems that late impeachment helps to avoid 
have already been described."H Congress might find itself in a 
case where an executive or judicial official is thumbing his nose 
540. See supra Pan VIIl.A. 
541. See supra Part VIIl.B. 
542. See supra note 235. 
543. See Bestor, supra note 133. at 281 (-The n'mo\~11 of Ih,' oI(llIal hr.1(1 01 .1;1\,·. 
however, is potentially so tllreatening to the slabilily of 1;0\ t'nlln,'Jl\ IL,df. Ih.1I p"blu" 
opinion is usually prepared to allow precedents of cX"clllin' IL'"'lJalioll 10 .lcnlmll(;l\l· 
ramer man run me risks involved in impcachmcnt. Such ri_"'-. h()\~t'\t·r. di...lpp,·ar If .1 
President is made to answer for \\illful \iolations of Iht' slIpn·m,· law aft"r h,' h.1S ct"N'd 
to be in office."). 
544. See supra Pan V. 
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at his would-be impeachers. If Congress is interested III 
preserving its role in government oversight, it would have to 
take action through late impeachment. If an onit-iars 
resignation amounts to something of a guilty plea and achieves 
removal without the expense and distraction of an 
impeachment trial, Congress would have no reason to proceed 
just to protect its turf. If, by contrast, the resignation is 
calculated to avoid disqualification, maintain a pension, or 
preempt public inquiry,;':; then Congress will want to assert itself. 
Thumbing one's nose at Congress (as the President does in 
Hypothetical 4>1f') would be-and should be-a surefire way to 
spur Congress to pursue a late impeachment.H7 
F. Quick and t'asy 
One objection to late impeachment is actually a reason in its 
favor. Given how cumbersome the impeachment process is, 
critics ask, why bother impeaching an ex-officer when the 
criminal justice system will probably handle the case itself? If an 
official is in office, impeachment is necessary to remove him 
even if he is convicted of a crime.-"H Once he is out of oHin·. 
though, removal is irrelevant, and the punishments that a 
judicial court can dole out may represent adequate punishment. 
Indeed, the punishment for violating the federal bribery statute 
can include disqualification (though this provision would seelll 
to be of dubious constitutionality) .-"., 
545. Congress can still hold hearings and launch inVt',tigatiom without holding fllll-
blown impeachment proceedings. However. the impeachment prO( t'''' can he 't.II ted 1>\ 
anyone. Regular hearings. by contr<L't. require a~ .1 pranical mattn th.lt .1 (OllllllltttT 
chairman be interested in pursuing the matter. Depending on the p.lrt)' .IIul POWI" 
alignments in Congress, impeachment m.l), be the only way to l>rIng the (.IM· to Iht' 
forefront. .'Iff slt/)m Part V.D (discussing rolt- of IInpeadllllent ill light of cOllg,e,-"oll.11 
power to launch lesser investigalions). 
546. See sltpm text accompanying note 4. 
547. CJ. BELK.""!' TRIAL. IIlpm note 18. at 87 (opinion of Sen.IIO! Shnlll.lII) ("It " 
not likely that the power to impeach persons not in office. for ollici.11 IIl1'co,ul\l( I wht'll 
in ollice. will often be invoked. and only in extreme case~ and whell Ihe offt'IItI(" 11('1" 
from justice by resignation:). 
548. A striking example of this fact orrurred in 198(i. whell Judge Ila, rv (:I.uho,lIt· 
was convicted of tax evasion. Claiborne was wntellred to pri~on. whne he ,.11 'Tlel\'lllg 
his judicial salary. apparently intending to retake his .,eal on the la·1It h whell h" 
sentenre expired. Bl'SII;'>;ELL • . 1Il/)m note 16. al 289. This lIIoved the Ilou~e 10 11111'1'.11 h 
him, /d, at 293, This spectacle recurred three year~ later III the (ase of Judge W.tllI" 
Nixon. who refused to resign despite being ullpn~olled, Nixon v. Ulliled SI.llt·~. :,()(i ll.S 
224,227 (1993). 
549. E.g .• 18 USc. ~ 201 (b) (1994) (spenfying that per,on COll\'i( It'd ulldt'l I" ,hen 
provision "may be disqualified frolll holding anv offire of hOllor, In"I, 0' 1" ofil ulldt" 
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On the other hand, if a person is out of office and is being 
pursued by the criminal justice apparatus, there is much less 
reason not to impeach him-after the criminal process has run 
its course. Because the impeachment is Ulate" already, there 
would be litde pressure to conclude the impeachment quickly. 
Congress can simply wait for the criminal case to conclude and, 
if guilt is obvious, use the record developed by the court to 
perform an expedited impeachment and trial.~~ For this reason, 
if the pragmatic decision on whether or not to launch a late 
impeachment is based on a cost-benefit analysis, the "cost" may 
be much less than that of a regular impeachment. 
G. Potential Abuse 
As a final note, one might argue that glVlng Congress the 
ability to impeach ex-officers introduces a dangerous potential 
for abuse. The impeachment power is one of the few held by 
Congress that carries with it no inter-branch check or balance. 
From its early near-abuse by Jeffersonians in the early 1800s to 
its highly politicized use against Presidents Johnson and Clinton, 
this dangerous potential of impeachment has often been at the 
forefront of debate. 
While as a practical matter, late impeachment may be 
susceptible to abuse, it is, however, subject to the s<une safeguard 
that has prevented abuse of regular impeachment-the fact that 
the United States"); id. § 1901 (co\'ering disbursing officers trading in public propenyl. 
Similar provisions date back to the First Congress. &or Act of Apr. 30. 1790. ch. 9. § 21. I 
Stat. 112, 117 ("Act for the Punishmelll of IClenain Crimes [A)g:linst the United 
States."). 
Notwithstanding this faCI, the constilUtionality of such laws is qucstionable. -[Tlhe 
Bribery Act of 1790 was ne\'er enforced. in part becausc of concen.,. abulll its 
constitutionality." GERHARDT, supra nOle 12. at 20. The C.onstillllion would ~eem to allow 
the President to appoint and remo\'e whome\'er he liktos. subject onl)' 10 Senate 
confirmation in certain cases. Admittedly. though. the courts would prob;lbl)' reject this 
argument if push came to shove. See United St.-lies \'. Espy. 145 F.:'kI 1369. 1372 (D.C. ur. 
1998) ("[W]e have litde doubt that Congress could k'gitimatd)' rcstrict Agriculture 
Department officers to those not comicted under thc !Ileal Inspcction Act.-); srI' abo 
Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52. 128 (1926) (arguing that Congrc5S .. Ill prescribe 
qualifications for offices, so long as -the qualifications do not so limit sdection and so 
trench upon executi\'e choice as to be in effectlegislath'e dlosignation-). 
550. Congress proceeded quickly. if not as quickly as it could ha\,<', in the C;\Sc5 of 
Judges Walter Nixon and Harry Claibome. both of whom had alrcady bcen con\icted of 
crimes when they were impeached. &or Nixoll, 506 U.S. at 227·28 (describing :-\ixon trial. 
which entailed four days of hearings and dlree hours of floor debate); Bl'SIISfJJ1 ,upm 
note 16, at 293-301 (describing Claibome trial. which elllailed sC\'<'n d;I'''' of he;lrings 
and three days of Senate deliberation); cf GERHARDT. supm notc 12, at 45 (noting that 
despite "ample discovery" in criminal trials. Nixon casc cl1lailed sub~lallli;11 pretrial 
workload). 
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convlctlOn is designed to be difficult to achieve'-"" Indeed, the 
Jeffersonian Republicans failed to convict Justice Chase and the 
rest of 171e Federalist judiciary; the Radical Republicans f~tiled to 
convict President Johnson; and the latter-day Republicans f~liled 
to convict President Clinton. The reasons are many, but most 
can be tied back to the original design of impeachment. Trial is 
placed in the Senate because it is designed to be a deliberative 
and relatively careful body'-"'2 A two-thirds mcyority is required 
for conviction in order to require that an impeachment 
conviction cannot occur without bipartisan support or, in the 
unusual event that one party has a two-thirds m<~jority in the 
Senate, without unusual party unity. In any case, the impeachers 
and triers are accountable to the voters. These structural 
safeguards are adequate for regular impeachment, and they are 
just as adequate for late impeachment. 
H. Conrlusion 
While late impeachment is usually not worth pursuing, this 
Part of the Article has sketched out some reasons why it may be 
in future cases. The punishments available-disqualification and 
possibly others-may prove compelling. The case may present a 
unique opportunity to set a precedent or a good way to make an 
example of a lame duck offender. If the officer's affront to 
congressional power is too great, late impeachment provides a 
structured and restrained method of defending Congress's 
honor. Finally, the costs would be lower and the potential for 
abuse no higher than with regular impeachment. 
IX. CO:\CU'S!ON 
Late impeachment provides a difficult problem of 
constitutional interpretation. It confront<; an ambiguous portioll 
of the text, which renders unclear whether the political focus of 
impeachment limits just the offenses and offenders who can be 
pursued or whether it also restricts the timing of the 
proceedings as well. But if the text is unclear, the history 
underlying it is not. Late impeachment was practiced in England 
and, unlike other aspects of English impeachment, was never 
55 I. Sf£' BEl.K.,\A!' TRI.\L, JII/ml note IH, at !J.I (opinion 01 Senator Wright) (1lI,ll..lllg 
,imilar structural point about abuse); /(1. at 112 (opinion of Senator Mitchell) (',1111('). 
552. THE FEDER.\LlSI :--io. 65. at :~97·9H (Akxander 1-I,lIl1ilton) (Clinton Ro,sll(" cd .. 
19fil1. 
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explicitly ruled out in America, either in prc-17'd7 statc 
constitutions or in the federal one. Indeed. some statc 
constitutions made late impeachability explicit or cven rcquired. 
Constitutional structure is also consistent with latc 
impeachability. If the only purpose for impeachmeI1l werc 
removal, then there would be no reason to conduct a latc 
impeachment. But removal is not the only purposc of 
impeachment. Impeachment is designed as a deterrent to 
prevent offenses from occurring in the first place. and this 
deterrent effect would be severely undermined if it f;ldcci away 
near the end of a term. Moreover, convicted impeachees can bc 
disqualified from future federal office, an imponaI1l 
punishment that the offender himself should not be able to 
moot. Nor should the 'President be able to prccmpt a full 
investigation or full punishment; the Constitution forbids thc 
President from using his pardon power to achievc thcse ends, 
and late impeachment is the only way to prcvcnt an end run 
around this clear structural imperative. Although somc 
opponents of late impeachment make allowances for these 
extreme cases by allowing some late i'InpeachmcI1ls. in reality. no 
constitutional basis exists for distinguishing betwecn them. 
Finally, precedent favors late impeachability. Admittcdly. 
there is no wholly clear and binding authority. Statcs construing 
similar provisions have come to mixed results. 8111 the Scnate. 
which, in the end, is the final arbiter of this question. has 
approved late impeachment. Senatc opponcnts of late 
impeachment may have prevented cOIwictions. blll they have 
not prevented late trials, and they cannot altcr thc formal 
declaration of a majority of the Senate that oniccrs can bc 
impeached after they have left office. 
In practice, late impeachment may rarely if cver provc 
worthwhile to pursue. Then again, onc can imagine scvcral 
scenarios in which it might. Even if no occasion evcr arises in 
which late impeachment is worthwhile to pursuc. this would 
place late impeachment in the same class as rcgular 
impeachment-more important to have a\'ailablc than to 
actually use. No federal executive onidal has cvcr bccn 
impeached and convicted, either while in onice or aftcr lcaving 
it, but every federal officer is appropriately constraincd by thc 
possibility of impeachment, and it is only with late impeachmeI1l 
that this constraint can be properly wholc. 
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